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This edition of the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy is
dedicated to the memory of Jonathan Christopher Stonington Cox (J.D. 1971, M.A.
1970), our founding Editor-in-Chief, who died suddenly on February 1, 2004.
Jonathan made his mark at the College of Law He was instrumental in
strengthening the Denver International Law Society and initiating the drive to
establish the Journal; throughout his legal career he continued to provide dynamic
leadership to the International Legal Studies Program in many ways. A few years
ago, Jon, along with several other former students and now dear friends,
established the Ved Nanda Professorship in International Law that, more than
being a tribute to me, enshrined our common respect for international law at the
University of Denver.
I vividly recall the day when a cocky young man walked into my office
questioning several aspects of international law jurisprudence. He wanted to
reshape the international system on the use of force, on the role of the state in the
international arena, and on issues ranging from the Law of the Sea to Space Law.
This young man was Jon Cox, a student in my International Law class during his
first year. I had recently left Yale Law School as a great admirer of Professor
Myres McDougal's "Law, Science, and Policy" approach to international law, as
well as of the contribution of The New Haven School. I repeated to Jon what
Professor McDougal had told me a few years earlier, when I questioned him on his
approach to international law- "Wait a few more weeks until I brainwash you. It
was the beginning of a lasting and durable friendship with Jon.
Jon had entered the law school after making his mark at Stanford - as captain
of the soccer team and a hot prospect for being on the U.S. Olympic team. He was
intense and yet very personable, and his peers considered him larger than life.
Leadership was natural for him. He not only revitalized the International Law
Society but made it a premiere participant in the national organization, the
Association of Student International Law Societies, as it was called then and
International Law Student Association, as it is known today At the national
meeting of ASILS in Washington, during his second year at the College of Law,
Jon successfully promoted a classmate who had succeeded him as President of our
own International Law Society, Julius Duru from Nigeria, for election as the
national president. That was a coup for the University of Denver as Julius won,
and very gratifying to me because as a student at Yale I had been the very first
President of the ASILS.
When Jon began at the College of Law, Robert Yegge, then Dean, was an
ardent supporter of international law He, however, did not have sufficient
resources to finance a new journal. As I shared this information with Jon and some
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of his colleagues who were keen to start a new journal, Jon said that he, along with
his friends, would be able to raise the money to start one. In the meantime a good
friend of the program, Ed Goodin, who had founded an oil exploration database
firm, offered to pay for the first issue and to continue helping us until the College
of Law was able to provide the necessary financial resources. This year, the
Journal celebrates its 33rd anniversary edition and it gives us pride to give the
credit for our founding to Jon and his friends who courageously took the initiative.
As I mentioned earlier, Jon also led the initiative to establish an international
law professorship at the College of Law Along with several former editors of the
Journal he succeeded m this initiative as well.
The International Legal Studies Program and the College of Law, along with
Stanford University were of very special interest to Jonathan. He enjoyed
working hard and long hours, he was very successful as a lawyer, and he was full
of zest and adventure. He became not only a lifelong friend and supporter of the
Program but a dear personal friend, as well: Jon's son, Stonmgton, is my God-son
and my daughter, Anjali, was his God-daughter. Jonathan Cox's death was
untimely and shocking.
It was a strange coincidence that the evening before he passed away, Jon
called me on the phone and kept talking for a long time about our families, about
his work, and about the College of Law and his vision for the International Legal
Studies Program. I still cannot get over the great loss the Program, the Journal,
and I personally have suffered.
Ved P Nanda
Vice Provost for Internationalization, Evans University Professor, Thompson G. Marsh Professor of




AN AFRICAN DIMENSION TO THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT
MECHANISM: FINDING A PATH TO SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT IN THE ENERGY SECTOR
Patricia Nelson
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of "sustainable development" is probably suffenng from its
success as a buzzword. So frequently adopted by so many groups with wildly
varying agendas-from the Sierra Club to the coal mdustry'--the term might seem
to be well on its way to becoming meaningless. 2 Nevertheless, the debatable
political process of imbuing the term with something for everyone has resulted in
one of the essential "takes" on sustainable development: The Kyoto Protocol to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which
makes a comprehensive effort to link sustainable development with the task of
global greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction.3 The link is made by the Protocol's
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which encourages the developed world to
invest m GHG-reduction projects in developing countries. 4 This particular effort
comes with a major problem-one that implicitly suggests its own solution. The
African nations, whose development crises might offer the best crucible to refine
Patricia Nelson graduated from the University of Denver College of Law LL.M. program in natural
resources law in May of 2003. She also holds an LL.M. degree in environmental law from Golden Gate
University and currently works for Environmental Advocates in San Francisco, California.
1. See RON KNAPP, COAL UNDER SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS OF THE 21ST
CENTURY 1, at http://www.wci-coal.com/uploads/IMA2001.doc (2001) (on file with author). Ron
Knapp, in his role as Chief Executive of the World Coal Institute, London, presented this paper at the
2001 Indonesian Mining Conference and Exhibition in Jakarta. For the Sierra Club's conflicting
viewpoint, which seeks to de-emphasize fossil fuels, see SIERRA CLUB, GLOBAL WARMING & ENERGY,
RISKY BUSINESS: TRADING AWAY OUR RESPONSIBILITIES, at http://www.sierraclub.org/
globalwarming/articles/jifact.asp (last visited Mar. 26, 2004) (on file with author).
2. Helio International, Energy and Ecodevelopment: An Assessment of the Impact of Energy
Policies on Planet Earth, in GLOBAL REPORT FOR Rio + 10 (Sustainable Energy Watch 2002), at
http://www.helio-internatonal.org/Helio/Repos/2002/English/global-report.html (last visited Mar. 28.
2004) (on file with author). Helio International is an organization that monitors the performance of the
energy industry vis-a-vis the international environmental Conventions. This report incorporates a series
of analyses of various facets of the environmental situation ten years after the 1992 Rio Summit.
3. The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Convention
on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-38, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 849, available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2004); Kyoto Protocol to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998), available at
http://www.jus.uio.noilm/un.climate.change.kyoto.protocol. 1997/doc.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
4. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 12.
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the concept of sustainable development in practice, are poorly served by the
Protocol and its CDM.5
This poor fit does not derive from a lack of relevance or urgency--or even a
lack of agreement as to the basic problem. Although there is a small, vociferous
group of dissenters, the Kyoto Protocol reflects a broad scientific consensus that
nsmg concentrations of industrial gases in the atmosphere will intensify a natural
greenhouse effect.6 This effect, whose most significant cause is carbon dioxide
(C0 2) emissions from fossil-fuel combustion,
7 is projected to lead, in turn, to rising
sea levels, changes in crop patterns, more frequent droughts, and increasingly
extreme swings in weather conditions.8  Scientists anticipate that a
disproportionate share of these side effects of industrialization will be felt m the
less developed areas that benefit least from industrialization and are least equipped
to deal with its impacts. 9
This scenario of impending disproportionate climate impacts is profoundly
bad news for Africa, which already suffers disproportionately from drought,
flooding, and famme.' ° Even now, widespread displacement of Africans due to
natural and manmade disasters is a common occurrence; the global warming effect
5. See UNEP COLLABORATING CENTRE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT, AFRICAN
PERSPECTIVES ON THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM, at http://uneprisoe.org/
CDMIAccra/AccraPapers.pdf (Aug. 1999) (on file with author). This document is a series of papers
presented at a regional workshop, New Partnerships for Regional Development: The Clean
Development Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol, in Accra, Ghana (Sep. 21-24, 1998) and collected
by UNEP's Riso National Laboratory, Roskilde.
6. The consensus exists not as to the short-term, micro effects, but as to the underlying physical
processes that create the greenhouse effect and the long-term changes that will occur at global level.
See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, WORKING GROUP I, SUMMARY FOR
POLICYMAKERS 7-10, at http://www.gcrio.org/OnLnDoc/pdf/wglspm.pdf (approved Jan. 2001) (on file
with author). See also Richard Wolfson & Stephen H. Schneider, Understanding Climate Science, in
CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: A SURVEY 3, 41 et seq. (Stephen H. Schneider et al. eds., Island Press
2002); Stephen H. Schneider & Knstin Kuntz-Dunseti, Uncertainty and Climate Change Policy, in
CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: A SURVEY 53, 53-87. There is a dissenting view that the effects, and even
the existence, of a greenhouse effect have not been scientifically established. The fossil-fuel industry is
a major proponent of this viewpoint. See, e.g., Dr. Robert C. Balling, Jr., Dr. Craig D. ldso & Dr.
Robert E. Davis, A Critical Review of EPA' "State and Local Climate Change Outreach Kit, at
http://www.greeningearthsociety.org/Articles/2000/browner2.htm (July 2000) (report prepared for The
Greening Earth Society, a climate-change skeptics group) (on file with author). See also THE HEAT IS
ONLINE, THE DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS OF BIG COAL, at http://www.heatisonline.org/
contentserver/objecthandlers/index.cfi?id=4380&method--full (n.d., last visited Mar. 26, 2004)
(discussing the industry stance from an environmentalist perspective) (on file with author) and
Alexander Ewen, Consensus Denied: Holy War over Global Warming, GLOBAL WARMING AND
CLIMATE CHANGE 3 (2000), at http://www.tenearth.com/climate_3.html4holywar (on file with
author).
7. Cheng Zheng-Kang, Equity, Special Considerations, and the Third World, I COLO. J. INT'L
ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 57, 59 (1990).
8. Schneider & Kuntz-Duriseti, supra note 6, at 53-87.
9. Wolfson & Schneider, supra note 6, at 35-41.
10. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, ECONOMIC REPORT ON
AFRICA 2003: ACCELERATING THE PACE OF DEVELOPMENT 25, http://www.uneca.org/era2003/ (2003)
(on file with author).
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will add massive waves of "climate change refugees."" Africa's capacity to adapt
to climate change is also disproportionately low because Africa has limited
technological and economic resources,i2 African scientists have taken the initiative
to pinpoint the probable impacts of climate change in their various sub-regions.'
3
Given the existence of many more pressing African problems,' 4 the African
countries' significant commitment of their limited scientific resources to climate
change studies, their speedy ratification of the Framework Convention on Climate
Change. and their efforts to craft regional climate-change and CDM policies
indicate their recognition of the seriousness of the problem and the opportunity
presented by the CDM.15
The Kyoto Protocol's agenda is difficult to apply to Africa m part because
Africa's development problem is so large and various, 16 and in part because the
Protocol spotlights difficult North-South development issues: the deployment of
finite energy resources, environmental degradation, and uneven distribution of
wealth.' 7 A seemingly comprehensive way out of these problems is sustainable
energy development.' 8 However, some Africans are skeptical of a CDM strategy
dominated by the energy sector because, m their experience, the agenda of energy
companies is "rarely compatible" with the urgent needs of other economic
sectors. 19
The lopsided state of global development also makes African energy
development more difficult. The developed countries account for three-quarters of
the fossil fuel combustion that has served as the historical path to prosperity 
20
Comparable industrial development of the rest of the world would place a
tremendous strain on finite and dwindling fossil fuel resources. 21 A more
11. Nsongurua J. Udombana, How Should We Then Live? Globalization and Afrtica's
Development, 20 B.U. INT'L L.J. 293, 302-04 (2002); Clare Breidinch, Daniel Magraw, Anne Rowley
& James W Rubin, Current Developments: The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 315, 316 (1998).
12. Wolfson & Schneider, supra note 6, at 36.
13. Under the auspices of the African Centre of Meteorological Applications for Development, in
Niger, the scientists have conducted several studies and predicted accelerated desertification in North
Africa, more widespread drought in the Saharan and Sahelian areas, more intense and frequent flooding
and drought in North-East Africa, increased dry periods in East and Central Africa, increased flooding
in humid areas of West Africa and regular droughts in dry areas of West Africa, and more intense
recurrences of the recent devastating droughts in Southern Africa. Moussa Cisse, Yuoba Sokona &
Jean-Philippe Thomas, ENDA Energy Programme, INFORMATION NOTE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION IN
AFRICA OF TH4E UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (UNFCCC) § 1.4,
at http://www.enda.sn/energie/rapports/ccd97ouaga/notegb.htm (Mar. 1997) [hereinafter NOTE ON
IMPLEMENTATION] (on file with author). ENDA is a Third World development group based in Senegal.
14. See id at § 1.3.
15. Id, Davidson & Sokona, supra note 5, at 11.
16. See, e.g., AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM, supra note 5.
17. See, e.g, Paul Baer, Equity, Greenhouse Gas Emissions, and Global Common Resources, in
CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: A SURVEY, supra note 6, at 393-408.
18. NOTE ON IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 13, at § 1.2.
19. Id. § 11.4.
20. Cheng, supra note 7, at 59.
21. See, e.g., John J. Berger, Renewable Energy Sources as Response to Global Climate
2004
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fundamental, if less obvious, issue is the developed countries' consumption of
more than their share of the atmosphere's limited capacity to absorb the waste
gases of industrialization.22 The developed countries' disproportionate use of the
atmosphere's capacity to assimilate greenhouse gases might have foreclosed the
opportunity for the rest of the world to use the traditional fossil-fuel path of
economic development--at least if environmental goals are taken seriously.
23
When the climate-change problem is conceived-as an imperative to force a
more equitable sharing of limited atmospheric and energy resources, instruments
such as the Kyoto Protocol present an implicit challenge to developed-world
lifestyles. Thus, it is not surprising that several key features of the Kyoto Protocol
are controversial in the developed world. Perhaps the most controversial feature is
the declining cap on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, which will become binding
on parties when and if a sufficient number of countries ratify the Protocol.2 a The
Protocol requires the developed countries to collectively reduce their emissions of
greenhouse gases to a level 5-6% below 1990 levels in the first compliance period
while developing countries have no comparable emission-reduction obligations.25
This "asymmetrical" division of responsibilities embodies a philosophy of "joint
but differentiated responsibility" in which a country's historical contribution to the
climate change problem and its capacity to contribute to the solution determine its
obligations.26
To make the emissions cap more palatable to the developed countries, the
Protocol provides various "flexible mechanisms" to facilitate cost-effective
compliance.27 The flexible mechanisms include a system of emissions trading and
28joint implementation projects. The flexible mechanisms seek to direct
investment, on a global basis, to the least-cost options for GHG reduction.29 This
combination of flexible mechanisms and the emissions cap is commonly viewed as
the Protocol's "carrot and stick."30
Concerns, in CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: A SURVEY, supra note 6, at 413-414.
22. Anil Agarwal, A Southern Perspective on Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: A
SURVEY, supra note 6, at 377-78 [hereinafter A Southern Perspective].
23. See, e.g., id.
24. Article 2 of the Protocol provides that the UNFCCC Annex I (developed country) parties
"shall" implement policies to reduce their GHG emissions. The emissions cap is set forth in Article 3
and Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol. For discussion of the projected effects of uncontrolled GHG
emissions from various perspectives, see CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY- A SURVEY, supra note 6.
25. The initial compliance period is 2008-2012. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 3(i).
26. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 12. See Jacob Werksman, The Clean Development
Mechanism: Unwrapping the "Kyoto Surprise, 7 REV. OF EUR. COM. & INT'L ENVT'L L. 147, 147
(1998).
27. Nathalie Eddy and Glenn Wiser, Public Participation in the Clean Development Mechanism
of the Kyoto Protocol, in THE NEW "PUBLIC"- THE GLOBALIZATION OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 203,
203, (Carl Bruch ed., Environmental Law Institute 2002), http://www.ciel.org/Publications/
CDMPubPartic.pdf (2002) [hereinafter Eddy & Wiser] (on file with author).
28. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 6 authorizes joint implementation among developed
countries and former Soviet bloc "countries in transition. Article 17 authorizes emissions trading
among developed countries and countries in transition.
29. Schneider et al., CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: A SURVEY, supra note 6, at xv-xvi.
30. See, e.g., Glenn Wiser, Kyoto Protocol Packs Powerful Compliance Punch, 25 BNA
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The Clean Development Mechanism is the flexible mechanism most
significant to two key players, the global energy industry and the developing
countries. The CDM counts on private investment as part of its implementation
strategy, and was designed to foster sustainable development in the developing
countries as well as the overarching treaty goal of climate change mitigation.3
The CDM permits investors from the developed countries to earn credits toward
their emission-reduction obligations 32 by investing in GHG-reduction projects in
developing countries, thereby promoting sustainable industrialization in those
countries.33  In view of the central role of energy development m the
underdeveloped countries, the CDM offers significant international investment
opportunities for energy companies that develop climate-friendly energy
34technologies. Moreover, the CDM is the only flexible mechanism that envisions
the participation of developing countries.
This article discusses the opportunities and pitfalls that the Clean
Development Mechaism poses for developing countries in Africa and the
reciprocal African challenges that present an opportunity to improve the CDM.
Part II outlines the CDM and its links to sustainable development. Part III
describes the African context for energy development under the CDM. Part IV
describes some of the defects in the CDM from an African perspective, and
proposed African solutions. Part V sketches the contours of a wider debate
between the developed and developing countries about the impact of the Kyoto
Protocol and the CDM on equitable global development. Part VI discusses the
potentially problematic role of multinational corporations in sustainable energy
development. Part VII is a conclusion that summarizes the most essential features
of African CDM prospects and proposes a small role for the public in developed
countries, particularly the United States. My underlying premise is that the
African countries, which are among the most vulnerable to the effects of climate
change and the most handicapped in obtaining foreign investment, pose an acid
test for the ideals underlying the CDM. Although there are of a number of
principal players, this article will focus on the global coal industry and the African
governments.
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT REPORTER 86 (January 16, 2002), available at
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/NER Compliance.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
31. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 12(9) (participation of private actors) and 12(2) (purpose
of CDM).
32. Id. at art. 12(3)(b).
33. Id. at art. 12(2).
34. See, e.g., William L. Thomas, Daniel Basurto & Gray Taylor, Creating Favorable Climate
for CDM Investment in North America, 15 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 172 (2001) [hereinafter Thomas
et al.], describing the investment of major energy companies in sustainable energy technologies; One L.
Loucks, Business Capitalizing on Energy Transition Opportunities, in CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: A
SURVEY, supra note 6, at 495-507.
35. ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT GROUP, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, THE
CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM: A USER'S GUIDE 11, http://www.undp.orgtseed/eap/htmli/
docs/cdmchapter 1.pdf (2003) (on file with author).
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II. THE CDM AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Dubbed the "surprise of Kyoto, the Clean Development Mechanism was
introduced by the Brazilian delegation, with U.S. support, near the close of
negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol. 36  In essence, the CDM allows developed
countries to meet a portion of their own obligations to reduce emissions by
reducing emissions in developing countries. 37 The investor in such projects, either
a government agency or a private corporation,38 earns certified emission reductions
(CERs), a form of credit that the investor can either sell or use to meet a portion of
its emission-reduction obligations under the Kyoto Protocol.39  The flow of
investment dollars and CERs will be guided in large part by the market forces of
risk and profit potential. 40
The CDM is a compromise mechanism designed to promote cooperation
among the developed and developing countries.4' It reflects in part the developed
countries' wish for ways to reduce their compliance costs.42 The CDM provides
two benefits to developed countries. It creates an alternative mode of compliance
for countries that are unable to fully meet their emission-reduction targets by
regulating their domestic industries.43 It also allows the investor to reduce the cost
of compliance; emission reductions can often be achieved at a lower marginal cost
in the developing country 44
The CDM also reflects the developing countries' high-priority goal of no-cost
or low-cost transfers of funds and technology 45 Such transfers are intended to
36. Farhana Yamin, The Kyoto Protocol: Origins, Assessment and Future Changes, 7 REv. OF
EuR. COM. & INT'L ENVT'L L. 113, 122 (1998).
37 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 12; Eddy & Wiser, supra note 27, at 203.
38. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 12(9).
39. Sean S. Clark, Mark C. Trexler & Laura H. Kosloff, Installment Six of the Climate Treaty
Debate: A Report on COP-6, 15 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 180, 181 (2001) [hereinafter Clark et al.
Emission-reduction requirements are imposed directly on state parties through the Kyoto emissions cap
and indirectly on private corporations in developed countries through regulations imposed by the state
party attempting to comply with the Kyoto cap.
40. YOUIBA SOKONA, STEPHEN HUMPHREYS, JEAN-PHiLiPPE THOMAS, THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT
MECHANISM: WHAT PROSPECTS FOR AFRICA? § 2, at http://www.enda.sn/energie/cdm2.htm#4.2 (n.d.,
last visited Mar. 26,2004) [hereinafter WHAT PROSPECTS FOR AFRICA?] (on file with author).
41. Id. WHAT PROSPECTS FOR AFRICA? summarizes, in rank order, the competing priorities of the
developed and developing countries in the negotiations leading up to the Protocol. These are, for the
developed countries, emissions reduction, an emissions credit and trading program, developing country
participation in emission-reduction requirements, some form of joint implementation, inclusion of
carbon sinks in the calculation of emission reductions, and compliance and verification. Developing
country priorities were sustainable development, equity, common but differentiated responsibilities,
technology transfer, financial assistance, and consideration of special circumstances. For both sides, the
CDM was an afterthought and something of a question mark. Id. at § 2.1.
42. Gray E. Taylor, Global Climate Change Agreements-Do the Storm Clouds Have a Silver
Lining?, 45 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 2.03[2] (1999).
43. Glenn Wiser & Donald Goldberg, The Compliance Fund: A New Tool for Achieving
Compliance Under the Kyoto Protocol 3-4, http://www.ciel.org/Publications/ComplianceFund.pdf
(June 1999). This is a publication of the Center for International Environmental Law.
44. Eddy & Wiser, supra note 27, at 203.
45. WHAT PROSPECTS FOR AFRICA?, supra note 40, at 2.
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mitigate the impacts of an impending acceleration of industrialization in the
developing countries by enabling developing countries to build up a "national
capacity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 46 This aspect of the CDM echoes
what the developing countries have been saying for years: They have as yet
received few of the benefits of industrialization and have contributed relatively
little to the industrial emissions problem, yet the developed countries (which
caused most of the problem) expect them to bear a full share of the burdens of
solving the problem and to make contributions that far exceed their financial and
technical capacities.47 The developing countries suggest that those who have
caused three-quarters of the problem and have superior capabilities to take
corrective action should assume the lion's share of the financial responsibility 48
The developing Southern countries note that the Northern developed countries
achieved their industrialization by exploiting fossil fuels and externalizing the
attendant environmental costs. 49 There is an added cost to taking a different, more
environmentally sound path to development in the South---one that the developed
countries should subsidize, in the view of the developing countries. 50 The CDM,
which holds the prospect of wealth and technology transfer, is one vehicle for
implementing this agenda of wealth transfer.5' The Southern countries' premise is
that such payments should not be viewed as a gift but as a form of compensation
for using a disproportionate share of the atmosphere's assimilative capacity 52
Developing countries support their agenda with a cost-efficiency and mutual-
benefit argument. They emphasize that mefficient industrial processes emit more
carbon dioxide per unit (of energy and other products) manufactured in the
developing world 53 and propose technology transfer as a cost-effective and fair
solution, arguing that low-cost or no-cost access to advanced energy technologies
would enable them to produce more energy and less CO2 with the same natural
resources.54  Developmg countries would then be able to industrialize and
"improve their standard of living without contributing as much as they might
otherwise to the problem of global warming. '55 Part of the moral rationale for
such transfers rests on the distinction between the developing countries' survival
emissions and the developed countries luxury emissions: "Unlike their more-
46. Clark et al., supra note 39, at 180.
47. Cheng, supra note 7, at 57, 59.
48. Id. at 62.
49. Mark A. Drumbl, Poverty, Wealth, and Obligation in International Environmental Law, 76
TUL. L. REV. 843, 849 (2002).
50. A Southern Perspective, supra note 22, at 377-78.
51. Drumbl, supra note 49, at 854-57. Drumbl notes the developing countries' emerging
negotiation tactic of requiring wealth and technology transfer in exchange for their participation in
global environmental treaties and conditioning the performance of the developing countries upon the
developed countries' compliance with their obligations to transfer wealth and technology. This
approach appears in the Montreal Protocol, the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, and
the Convention on Biological Diversity.
52. A Southern Perspective, supra note 22, at 377-78.
53. Cheng, supra note 7, at 66-67.
54. Id. at 67
55. Id. at 64.
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developed counterparts, developing nations lose energy to mefficiency and poor
management rather than to overconsumption. Corrective actions can be taken
without large investments of capital. 56 This anticipated globally beneficial effect
will not occur in the absence of some change in the developed world's policy,
because developing countries cannot afford the current high transfer fees for
technology."
The CDM seeks to preserve some degree of national sovereignty in setting
environmental and development prioities.8 Its evolving design is meant to be
flexible enough to accommodate different national and international agendas. 9
The CDM appears promising to many African (and other) developing countries
because it is incorporates their number-one priority m the climate change debate:
sustainable development. 6° Because the potential flow of funding would be larger
than is currently available from the Global Environmental Facility the CDM is
potentially well suited to meet one of Africa's primary needs, the creation of
regional infrastructure to deliver environmentally sound energy, transportation, and
technical and organizational expertise.6'
By defining the "purpose" of CDM as assisting the developing countries to
achieve sustainable development, and by requiring an independent certification of
the project, the concept of sustainable development theoretically sets the limit on
the investments that are eligible to earn CERs under the CDM. 62 However, there is
less here than meets the eye because there is no firm, binding definition of
"sustainable development." 63
The most frequently cited definition of "sustainable development" is the one
developed by the Brundtland Commission: "development that meets the needs of
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs." 64  A World Bank definition emphasizes the ways in which
development is embedded in a country's particular web of social factors-the
"comprehensive nature of development."6 5 This definition, highly influential in
56. Id. at 67.
57. Id.
58. See WHAT PROSPECTS FOR AFRICA?, supra note 40, at § 2.
59. See id.
60. Id. See also R.S. Maya & John Turkson, CDM Baseline and Additionality in the African
Context-The Issues, in AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM, supra
note 5, at 19 (pointing out the dual objectives of emission reduction and sustainable development).
61. WHAT PROSPECTS FOR AFRICA, supra note 40, at § 4.2.
62. Lavanya Rajamim, Renegotiating Kyoto: A Review of the Sixth Conference of Parties to the
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2000 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y YEARBOOK 201,
218(2000).
63. See id. at 218 (applying the concept in the context of the Kyoto Protocol); U.N. WORLD
COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE 8 (1987) [Brundtland
Report].
64. See, e.g., the epigraph on the web page for the United Nations Department of Economic and
Social Affairs, Division for Sustainable Development, at http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/.
65. World Bank, The World Bank Working to Make Development Sustainable, at
http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/43ByDocName/SustainableDevelopment (n.d., last
visited Mar. 28, 2004)(on file with author). The definition appearing on the World Bank web page
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guiding investment, incorporates African priorities such as institutional capacity
and the urgent needs of the rural poor.6 To Africans, however, the inevitable
weave of complex local factors suggests a need for a "made-rn-Africa
prescription" for sustainable African development.67
One African definition that attempts to fulfill this role posits five components
of sustainable development: financial, economic, environmental, technological and
social sustatnability. 68  Many Africans would add another crucial, particularly
African component: institutional sustainability. 69 A high premium is placed on
building institutions to Implement African development priorities.70 Institutional
capacity is the bottom line for implementing the CDM in Africa because "without
tt[, no policy or strategy can be developed or implemented.",7 1 Africans hope to
build institutions strong and flexible enough to create balanced growth. According
to one succinct and elegant definition: "Broadly, sustainable development can be
defined as attainment of economic growth and equity given environmental
constraints." 72  The mention of "equity" is significant and mirrors the
preoccupations of many developing countries.7
On a global level, the concept of sustainable development is almost infinitely
complex in practice, requiring a skill in balancing many national circumstances
and many kinds of equities in additional to the intergenerational one. One
possibility pertinent to Africa lies in the roots of the concept: the idea of
"ecodevelopment" introduced at the 1972 U.N. Conference on the Environment at
Stockholm. 74 Ecodevelopment is a "mode of development in harmony with nature
and human needs in a given environment"--which "can be different in
discussing the role of the Bank's Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Network
states that sustainable development programs entail a parnership among the public and pnvate sectors,
and civil society. Participation, empowerment, strengthened institutions, environmental protection and
conservation, and focus on the rural poor are all foundations for sustained and inclusive economic
growth. The stated objective is to ensure that "actions taken today to promote development and reduce
poverty do not result in environmental degradation or social exclusion tomorrow.
66. Id.
67 Udombana, supra note 11, at 295.
68. Id.
69. Randall Spalding-Fecher, Khorommbi Matibe & Gillian Simmonds, The Clean Development
Mechanism: Energy Projects for Africa, m AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT
MECHANISM, supra note 5, at 63, 69 [hereinafter Spalding-Fecher et al.]. See also Richard Wolfson &
Stephen H. Schneider, Understanding Climate Science, in CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: A SuRvEY, supra
note 6, at 3, 36 (regarding Africa's limited capacity to adapt to climate change).
70. See, e.g., Spalding-Fecher et al., supra note 69, at 67-69.
71. Anil Agarwal, Boiling Point: The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change/Kyoto Protocol, in GREEN POLITICS 15, 55 (Anil Agarwal et al. eds., New Delhi Centre for
Science and Environment 1999) [hereinafter Boiling Point], citing Youba Sokona, of ENDA, an NGO
headquartered in Senegal; Spalding-Fecher et al., supra note 69, at 67-68.
72. F.D. Yamba, The Clean Development Mechanism as Tool for Enhancing Sustainable
Development, in AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM, supra note 5, at
53-54.
73. See, e.g., A Southern Perspective, supra note 22, at 375 et seq.
74. This is the position of Helio International regarding the global situation for developing
countries in general. See Energy and Ecodevelopment, supra note 2.
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industrialized and land-based [rural] countries without inviting judgment., 75 This
concept is particularly pertinent to Africa, with its predominantly rural population
whose needs and priorities diverge from the accustomed perspective in the
developed countries because of its dependence on biomass energy for the
foreseeable future.76
There is one recent definitional trend that has a potential to alter the nature
and the balance of power surrounding CDM projects: The international coal
industry has entered the fray and seized some of the ground usually occupied by
environmental groups. According to the industry, "sustainable development" is the
assurance of a stable supply of energy m a time of escalating demand. 77 In this
context, further development of coal, the fossil fuel that happens to have the
highest level of emissions of greenhouse gases and other pollutants, 78 is a
"resource bridge" to bring economic development within the reach of as many
nations as possible.79 Given the mix of equities and resources m Africa, this
version of sustainable development might (or might not) be in the interest of the
various developing countries and is disquieting in view of the amount of power
that large multinational companies may wield vis-A-vts small developing countries.
Moreover, despite its definition of sustainable development, the World Bank
approach to reform in the energy sectors of developing countries does not seek to
mmnimze the use of coal; rather, it focuses on promoting an internationally
competitive coal sector within the developing country and balancing the supply
and demand for coal m specific countries.80 The Bank's energy-sector policy
proposes that subsidies be removed from inefficient coal operations.8' However, it
does not propose the removal of subsidies for the development of new technologies
for high-emission fuels, although such subsidies in wealthy, exporting countries
might effectively limit the choices for energy investments worldwide and might
run counter to local development priorities m developing countries. An ample role
for foreign coal technology is implied m the Bank's more specific goals of
identifying and closing the higher-cost mines, eliminating government subsidies
for local industries, and promoting competition in the industry.
8 2
III. THE AFRiCAN CONTEXT FOR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE CDM
North-South development inequities are particularly glaring in Africa. Africa,
75. Id.
76. Spalding-Fecher et al., supra note 69, at 64.
77 Ron Knapp, supra note 1, at 1.
78. STEPHEN BERNOW, MICHAEL LAZARUS & SivAN KARTHA, COAL. AMERICA'S PAST,
AMERICA'S FUTURE? 2-4, al http://www.worldwildlife.org/climate/coalcrossroads.pdf (Tellus
Institute May 2001) [hereinafter COAL. AMERICA'S PAST] (study prepared for World Wildlife Fund).
79. Ron Knapp, supra note i, at i.
80. THE WORLD BANK GROUP, MINING: COAL SECTOR RESTRUCTURING,
athttp://www.worldbank.orglogmc/mmmg_coal.htm (n.d., last visited Mar. 29, 2004) (on file with
author).
81. Id.
82. Spalding-Fecher et al., supra note 69, at 70.
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which has abundant reserves of fossil fuels, currently accounts for only 2.5 percent
of the world's economic actiVity83 and is unmatched in the "diversity and
complexity" of its environmental and economic problems.84 The U.N. Secretary
General's list of obstacles to African development is daunting even without the
prospect of global warming: it includes "external debt problems, declining external
resource flows, declining terms of trade, barriers to market access for their
products, high population growth, inadequate social development, lack of
infrastructure and environmental constraints, including water shortages."8 5 All of
these market-based and social problems are of course exacerbated by AIDS and
Afica's high poverty rate and low standard of living.
8 6
Given all of these pressing problems and Africa's minimal contribution to the
global warming problem, reducing greenhouse gas emissions is not high on
Africans' development agenda.8 7 Africans' primary development priorities are the
more urgent ones of food and energy security for the majority of the population
that lives m poverty.
8 8
Perhaps energy development is the heart of the issue. Africa's very low levels
of energy consumption are both "cause and consequence" of underdevelopment,
according to African NGOs.8 9 Africans must consume more energy in order to
"climb out" of both their economic and environmental problems. 90 However,
bringing energy to the African people, sustainable or not, will be exceedingly
difficult, given the reality that Africa has the lowest rate of foreign direct
investment (FDI) In the world9' and a dysfunctional energy sector.
In this energy sector, consumption of electricity for commercial purposes,
already at the lowest per-capita rate in the world, is falling. 92 Household access to
electricity is even lower due to the limited, creaking energy infrastructure and
rampant poverty 93 Energy intensity, the amount of energy that is burned relative
83. YOUBA SOKONA, Energy in Sub Saharan Africa, Rio + 5 REPORT (AFRICA) 1 (1997), at
http://helio.mterserver.net/Helio/anglais/reports/africa.hml#charactenstics (publication of Helio
International, discussed at note 2, supra) (on file with author). See also CLAUDE MANDIL,
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY AND AFRICA, at
http://www.tea.orgldbtw-wpd/textbase/papers/2003/aficanenergy.pdf (n.d., last visited Mar. 29, 2004)
(on file with author).
84. Moussa Cisse, Yuoba Sokona & Jean-Philippe Thomas, Introduction to NOTE ON
IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 13.
85. Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess.
Supp. No. 1, Para. 140, U.N. Doc. A/56/1 (2001), cited in Udombana, supra note 11, at 308.
86. Id.




91. Udombana, supra note 11, at 308. See also Reimund Schwartze, Activities Implemented
Jointly, in CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: A SURVEY, supra note 6, at 293-304.
92. Energy in Sub Saharan Afrtica, supra note 83, at 4; NOTE ON IMPLEMENTATION, supra note
13, at § 1.2.
93. Energy in Sub Saharan Afrtica, supra note 83, at 5.
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to economic output, is extraordinarily high, three times higher than in Europe.94
Power outages and interruptions in fuel supplies are frequent. 9' The Sub-Saharan
region's power-generating capacity is one-twentieth that of Europe. 96 The regional
model for a working energy grid is South Africa, which relies heavily on coal-
burning power plants.97
For people inside this dysfunctional system, efficient fossil-fuel technology is
a major step up. Indeed, improved access to fossil fuels and cleaner fossil-fuel
technology are high on the list of African development goals.98 However, the
fossil-fuel model is not the whole solution, m part because it would be expensive
and time consuming. To extend a traditional electrical grid to the entire
population, Africans would have to build an enormous transportation and energy-
distribution mifrastructure virtually from scratch.99
Furthermore, another model must be found for the 95% of the rural
population that does not have access to electricity and cannot be connected to an
electrical grid cost-effectively 100 This population, which relies primarily on
biomass fuel and devotes an ever-mcreasing amount of labor to fuel gathering,0i
forms the basis of another set of African energy-development priorities. These
include a "greater range of technological choice, financing mechanisms and
technology support for rural and decentralized energy systems" and "improved
forest management, cook stoves, and charcoal conversion methods to ensure
sustainable and environmentally sound use of traditional fuels." i02 The rural
population is the theoretical customer base for small-scale renewable-energy
technologies that are popular with developed-world advocates of climate change
mitigation. 103
Although people living in poor rural villages are more vulnerable to the
impacts of pollution than other populations and therefore might benefit most from
low-emitting energy technologies, all strategies to develop energy for rural
customers have major economic benefits insofar as they bring industry and jobs to
94. Id. 6; Spalding-Fecher et al., supra note 69, at 64.
95. Spalding-Fecher et al., supra note 69, at 64.
96. Id.
97. See td.
98. Spalding-Fecher et al., supra note 69, at 64.
99. See YOUBA SOKONA, STEPHEN HUMPHREYS & JEAN-PHILIPPE THOMAS, SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT: A CENTERPIECE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL §§ 1, 2, 3. 1, at
http://www.enda.sn/energie/susdevkp.htm (n.d., last visited Mar. 28, 2004) [hereinafter A CENTERPIECE
OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL] (on file with author). This is report for the ENDA Tiers Monde, Energy
Programme.
100. Id. § 2.2.
101. A. MARKANDYA, ECONOMICS OF GREENHOUSE GASES: THE INDIRECT COSTS AND BENEFITS
OF GREENHOUSE GAS LIMITATIONS 6.1.2 (UNEP COLLABORATING CENTER ON ENERGY AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 1998), at http://www.uccee.org/EconomicsGHG/IndirectCosts.pdf (last visited Mar. 29,
2004).
102. This is one factor in a list of African development priorities formulated at Energy and
Development Research Centre of the University of Capetown. Spalding-Fecher et al., supra note 69, at
64.
103. See A CENTERPIECE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL, supra note 99, at § 2.2.
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rural areas.' 4 Any energy system that creates reliable lighting and pumping
capacities improves several conditions associated with poverty, including a lack of
educational opportunities and poor access to water and health and sanitation
services."°5 Promising clean coal technologies, for example, include integrated
combined-cycle generation, 106 carbon sequestration, 10 7 fluidized-bed combustion,
and coal liquefaction and gasification. t08
Cost is the big drawback to the more advanced fossil fuel technologies. The
price tag for a coal gasification plant ranges from $1.2 to $1.6 million per
megawatt of power. 10 9 Even a conventional coal-fired power plant costs $1 million
per megawatt."l 0 Constructing a natural gas plant costs approximately $550,000
per megawatt and entails a continuing, potentially crippling cost of importing a
fuel that is subject to large price swings--especially in a time of escalating demand
due to environmental concerns."' Such large-scale fossil-fuel investments seem
inconsistent with one important African development concern-that energy
investments should be proportionate to a country's GDP and should not place an
undue burden on other sectors.! 12 In light of the large upfront costs, the low profit
potential of most of the African markets, and the relatively weak bargaining
104. ENERGY AND ATMOSPHERE PROGRAM, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, ET
AL., ENERGY AFTER Rio: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES § 4.2.1, at http://www.undp.org/
seed/energy/chapter4.html [hereinafter ENERGY AFTER Rio] (on file with author).
105. Id. In addition, such projects reduce the hours devoted to gathering fuelwood and water,
freeing up labor for other purposes and indirectly promoting the welfare of women. It is primarily
women who devote increasingly long hours to fuel and water gathering, and women are particularly
vulnerable to health problems caused by inefficient biogas stoves. A. MARKANDYA, ECONOMICS OF
GREENHOUSE GASES: THE INDIRECT COSTS AND BENEFITS OF GREENHOUSE GAS LIMITATIONS, supra
note 101, at § 6.1.2., ENERGY AFTER Rio, supra note 104, at § 4.2.3 (both addressing the situation of
developing countries in general).
106. CARE, ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY, at http://www.careenergy.com/technology/utility.asp (n.d.,
last visited Mar. 23, 2004) (on file with author).
107. CSI, CARBON SEQUESTRATION INITIATIVE: TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW, at
http:llsequestration.mitedu/technologyoverview/index.htnl (n.d., last visited Mar. 28, 2004)
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology project) (on file with author).
108. See, e.g., American Coal Foundation, New Technologies for Coal Combustion, COAL.
ANCIENT GIFT SERVING MODERN MAN, at http://www.ket.org/Tnps/coal/AGSMM/agsmmtech.html
(last updated Oct. 1, 2001).
109. Lisa Kosanovic, Clean Coal? New Technologies Reduce Emissions, But Sharp Criticisms
Persist, EITHE ENVIRONMENTAL MAGAZINE (Jan. 23, 2002), at http://www.enn.com/news/enn-
stories/2002/01/01232002/s_46190.asp (on file with author).
110. Id.
111. Id. Fuel-switching from coal to natural gas is one of the most popular alternatives for
lowering the environmental impacts of power plants and is often the lowest-cost alternative once an
investment has been made in conventional power plant. See David Mallery, Clean Energy and the
Kyoto Protocol: Applying Environmental Controls to Grandfathered Power Facilities, 10 COLO. J.
INT'L ENVT'L L. & POL'Y 469, 473 (1999) (noting the lack of incentive to invest in cleaner methods of
coal combustion); CARL E. BEHRENS, THE CLEAN COAL TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM: CURRENT
PROSPECTS 3, available at http://www.cnie.org/nle/crsreports/energy/eng-71.pdf (Apr. 6, 2001)
(Congressional Research Service report).
112. F.D. Yamba, The Clean Development Mechanism as a Tool for Enhancing Sustainable
Development, in AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM, supra note 5, at
53, 55.
2004
DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
position of African countries, a more likely investment scenario might include
decidedly low-tech options such as coal-washing and conventional coal-fired
steam technology." 3
in contrast, some of the available, environmentally oriented technologies that
are well suited to rural villages include more efficient cookstoves, biogas-driven
water pumping systems, household- or village-scale photovoltaic systems, as well
as "liquid fuel production from biomass, biomass co-combustion, wind energy
technologies, solar-thermal for heat and electricity methane production from
solar and liquid residues and wastes, thermal generation from biomass sources, and
small hydroelectric plants."'" 4  Solar and other renewable energy systems are
suited to the needs of off-grid villages." 5 They are m scale with the needs of
individual villages and would support the African development priorities of
"technological choice" and unproved access to decentralized energy
technologies." 6 However, one risk to be considered is the potential impact on
nascent local industries that are using "tried and true" technologies." 7 Destruction
of those industries could "place a significant brake on development," according to
African NGOs. is
Examples of successful projects include a pilot project that installed
photovoltaic systems in Ugandan rural villages."l 9 The project, designed to
counter a trend toward increasing, inefficient use of diesel generators, reduced
GHG emissions below a fossil-fuel baseline. 120  The project also reduced the
country's national dependence on imported oil, which was consuming an undue
share of Uganda's foreign exchange earnings. 121 A government subsidy enhanced
development opportunities for otherwise non-competitive local industries
producing related products such as batteries, and thereby promoted national
development along sustainable lines.'
22
113. See Section IV(A), infra, for discussion of Anil Agarwal's argument that the CDM tends to
lock m low-tech fossil fuel technologies.
114. ENERGY AFTER RIO, supra note 104, at § 4.2.3; Odingo's Report: Why CDM Needs Africa,
EQUITY WATCH, October 30, 2002, at http://www.cseindia.org/html/cmp/climate/ew/
ew-oct30/odingo.htm [hereinafter Odingo's report].
115. See A CENTERPIECE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL, supra note 99, at 2.2; DEPARTMENT OF
METEOROLOGY, MINISTRY OF WATER, LANDS, AND ENVIRONMENT, CAPACITY BUILDING IN CLEAN
DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM IN UGANDA (FINAL REPORT), Report Section 5 and Annex B, at
http://www.uccee.org/CDM/CDMCapacityBuildUganda.pdf (June 2001) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Uganda Report].
116. This is one factor in list of African development priorities formulated at Energy and
Development Research Centre of the University of Capetown. Spalding-Fecher et al., supra note 69, at
64.
117. ENDA, FROM JOINT IMPLEMENTATION TO THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM: SHOULD
AFRICAN POSITIONS CHANGE AFTER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL? § 2, at http://www.enda.sn/energie/cc/
cdm.htm (n.d., last visited Mar. 23, 2004) (on file with author).
118. Id.
119. Uganda Report, supra note 115, at § 5 and Annex B.
120. Id §§ 5.1- 5.2, Annex B.
121. Id. § 5.1.
122. Id. at Annex B.
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Rural villages' current reliance on biomass fuel provides another obvious
opportunity to use the CDM to promote energy development along an
"ecodevelopment" pathway. 123  The United Nations Development Programme
notes that there are "[a]dvanced biomass power technologies now under
commercial development" that could use the residues from plantation agriculture
to produce electricity for adjacent rural areas. 124 Biomass power projects have
frequently failed m the past because of maintenance problems caused by excessive
tar formation.'25 However, biogas technology has recently improved in this
respect. 126 The modem version can meet rural power demands for water-pumping,
for example, at a lower cost than would be achieved by connecting the area to the
national power grid.1
27
There might be a further, largely psychological benefit to renewable fuel
technologies. There is a historical relation between fossil-fuel consumption and
prosperity; the mmdset that presumes a necessary relation drives resistance to
greenhouse gas reduction. To dislodge the kind of resistance that is based on fears
of reduced lifestyles, it is necessary to find a way to "disconnect" increased
prosperity from increased consumption of fossil fuels.12i The renewable-fuel
technologies do just that.
Whichever energy-development route they select, however, Africans must
consider a web of economic and environmental issues. For example, farming is
the predominant livelihood m Africa and the most obvious route to food security
for a rising population.29 However, increasing reliance on agriculture contributes
to deforestation and soil exhaustion as more and more land is cleared and
traditional practices of fallowing the land are abandoned. 30 The farming
population also makes heavy use of wood and other biomass fuels, which
contributes further to deforestation and desertification. 13 Excessive reliance on
biomass fuels intensifies flooding and erosion and can deter other development
projects.i32
It is not a simple matter of staving off agricultural decline by implementing
modem energy projects, particularly the large-scale coal technology programs that
some powerful foreign investors will be selling via the CDM or domestic export
policies. Much of the African soil is thin and poor, and a battle is already pitched
against drought, famine, and desertification.133 African soils are also "sensitive to
123. Energy and Ecodevelopment, supra note 2.
124. ENERGY AFTER RiO, supra note 104, at § 4.2.2.
125. Id. § 3.3.2.6.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Energy and Ecodevelopment, supra note 2, at 5.
129. See Udombana supra note 11, at 315 (discussing African countries' dependence on
agriculture).
130. NOTE ON IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 13, at § 1.2; Energy in Sub-Saharan Africa, supra note
83, at § 1.3.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Udombana, supra note 11, at 315 n.136, citing ECONOMIC CoMMissioN FOR AFRiCA,
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acidification." 134  Coal-fired power plants would exacerbate damage caused by
acidification because they emit more pollutants that contribute to acid ram than do
plants powered by other fuels.
135
It is also not possible to simply defer consideration of global warming to deal
with these more pressing problems. Studies by the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change suggest that Africa's future under global warming is one of lower
gram yields, less rainfall, decreased availability of water, more disease, accelerated
desertification, loss of coastal settlements, and intensified droughts and floods.
136
The additional stress due to global warmmg would further erode the African
agricultural sector's capacity to provide food security or export dollars to fund
economic development. 137
Any reduction in agricultural exports will also mtensify an already crippling
debt crisis that was fueled by the high interest rates of the 1980s and compounded
by declining commodity prices and counter-productive Structural Adjustment
Programs.'38 Added to the mix of complicating economic factors is the fossil fuel
industry's status as a major employer m Africa. 139 Developing countries with a
high poverty level naturally wish to protect existing jobs. One viewpoint is that
requests for employment-sensitive alternative-energy projects under the CDM
might drive up project costs to such an extent that they would deter the
investment. 14° However, there is another, more optimistic view that seeking
projects such as advanced biomass energy production would create jobs m a
manner that is painless to the investor.14 ' The theory is that such projects would
naturally and cost-effectively generate a fair number ofjobs related to the growing
and processing of biomass crops, 142 as well as a vastly greater number and variety
of jobs related to an across-the-board migration of mdustry to rural areas with
competitive biomass electricity. 143 Successful biomass projects would create an
ECONOMiC REPORT ON AFRICA 2001: TRACKING PERFORMANCE AND PROGRESS 33 (2002). This note
states that as of 2000, "[56%] of Africans--431 million people-depended on agriculture for their
livelihoods.
134. Gareth Porter, Pollution Standards and Trade: The "Environmental Assimilative Capacity
Argument, 4 GEO. PUBLIC POL'Y REv. 49, 54 (1998).
135. See, e.g., COAL. AMERICA'S PAST, supra note 78, at 2.
136. Richard Wolfson, Stephen H. Schneider, Understanding Climate Science, in CLIMATE
CHANGE POLICY: A SURVEY, supra note 6, at 36, citing the Technical Summary of IPCC 2001b.
137. See id.
138. Commodity prices began to rebound in 2002, particularly for petroleum-exporting countries.
See U.N.E.C.A. ECONOMIC REPORT ON AFRICA 28, supra note 10. For concise description of the
negative impacts of Structural Adjustment Programs implemented by international financial institutions,
see Udombana, supra note 11, at 313-17.
139. Spalding-Fecher et al., supra note 69, at 70. As modem methods of mechanized coal mining
are introduced in developing countries, this status is likely to change. See AMERICAN COAL
FOUNDATION, How COAL Is PRODUCED, at
http://www.ket.org/Tnps/Coal/AGSMM/agsmmproduced.html (on file with author).
140. See Spalding-Fecher et al., supra note 69, at 70 (noting the employment benefits of the fossil
fuel industry in general).
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expanded rural tax base capable of financing local infrastructure projects and
stemming the flood of migration to the cities.4
Nevertheless, at least a part of Africa's energy development path will consist
of investment m large-scale, conventional power plants because a regional
electricity grid has been identified as "one of the most important tools for
improving access to commercial energy while reducing environmental impact
[from existing, crude methods of biomass combustion]." 45 A regional energy
infrastructure also would create economies of scale that would reduce the
transaction costs and increase the economic competitiveness of small countries. 46
One debatable assumption is that a regional grid and institutional capacity to
oversee power trading and distribution would create free mtra-regional trade in
energy, in turn allowing southern African countries to substitute hydropower for
the environmentally "dirty" coal-fired electricity from South Africa. 147
Viable African institutions are necessary to build energy capacity and energy
trading systems and to achieve regional cooperation on energy standards and
technology development. 14  Some form of regional organization is necessary to
carry out the goal of building a regional electricity grid. 149 The lack of African
infrastructure also drives up transaction costs and drives investors away from the
region."10 Moreover, many CDM projects involve experimental technology, which
requires a high degree of institutional capacity and subject matter expertise to
oversee the project's implementation. i51 Without a decision-making infrastructure
of its own, the country might be saddled with an intrusive level of oversight from
outside agencies. 152
Institution building is in part a matter of national pride and sovereignty. Thus
far, the lack of a bureaucratic and financial infiastructure has hampered even the
development of an African" position and the promotion of African interests
144. Id.
145. Spalding-Fecher et ai., supra note 69, at 66.
146. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the
European Parliament-Energy Cooperation with the Developing Countries, COM(2002)0408 final,
available at http://europa.eu.mt/smartapi/cgi/sgadoc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber
&lg--en&typedoc=COMfinal&an_doc=2002&nu_doc='408 (discussing strategies for introducing
clean coal technology from the EU to the African countries).
147 Spalding-Fecher et ai., supra note 69, at 66. It has not worked out that way in the United
States, where the market share of coal-fired power from the oldest dirtiest plants has increased because
it tends to be cheaper, particularly m a deregulated market and context of low environmental
regulation. JOHN COEQUYT, ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP & REBECCA STANFIELD, U.S. PUBLIC
INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, UP IN SMOKE: CONGRESS' FAILURE TO CONTROL EMISSiONS FROM COAL
POWER PLANTS 9 (July 1999) [hereinafter uP IN SMOKE], at http://www.ewg.org/pub/home
/reports/upinsmoke/pr.html (on file with author).
148. Spading-Fecher et al., supra note 69, at 64.
149. Id. at 66.
150. Id. See also Reimund Schwartze, Activities Implemented Jointly, in CLIMATE CHANGE
POLICY: A SURVEY, supra note 6, at 293-304.
151. Boiling Point, supra note 7 1, at 79.
152. Id.
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during the climate change negotiations. i 3 The lack of African influence on the
Kyoto Protocol agenda might reflect its minimal presence and resources in the
negotiation process.
1 54
The concepts of African economic unity and institutional development have
been inseparable since the Organization of African Unity was formed in 1963 to
assume control over African development m the aftermath of colonization. 155 An
African vision of economic unity has evolved through a 1991 Treaty Establishing
the African Economic Community (AEC). 156 This treaty created a new African
entity, the African Union, modeled on the European Union. 57 The constitutive act
for the African Union, which entered into force m 2001, provides for a new
institutional infrastructure for African economic cooperation and regional energy
development. iSS
IV DEFECTS IN THE CDM AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS FROM THE AFRICAN
PERSPECTIVE
Among the most problematic features of the CDM are its additionality
criteria, which require project developers to demonstrate that they will go beyond
the busmess-as-usual development scenario. The primary additionality criterion is
"environmental additionality"" the project must reduce GHG emissions below the
baseline level.1 5 9  This requirement is made explicit m Kyoto Protocol Article
12.160 A "financial additionality" criterion, widely understood to be implicit in
Article 12, requires that project developers tap supplemental sources of funding;
the CDM project may not divert Official Development Aid or other government
aid from other types of development projects.16 ' A proposed criterion of
153. Dr. Albert Mumma, The Poverty of Africa's Position at the Climate Change Convention
Negotiations, 19 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 181, 202-03 (2000/2001).
154. Whereas the developed countries could support their negotiating requests at the various
Conferences of the Parties (COPs) with extensive research from private and public think tanks as well
as side events, booths, and daily newsletters, the African countries typically had between two and four
delegates due to financial constraints and were not asked to speak at panels or side events organized by
others Id.
155. Corinne A. Packer & Donald Rukare, Current Developments: The New Afrtican Union and Its
Constitutive Act, 96 AM. J. INT'L. L. 365, 366-67 (2002).
156. Id. at 369-70.
157. Id.
158. Constitutive Act of the African Union, July 11, 2000, at http://www.oau-
oau.orgfLOME2000/introductoryriotenote.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2004); Organization of African
Unity, Press Release 52/2001, The Constitutive Act of the African Union Attains the Legal
Requirement for Entering into Force (Apr. 27, 2001), at http://www.oau-oau.org (last visited Mar. 18,
2004) The Act establishes number of committees, including one that integrates several subjects
relevant to developing an African policy for the CDM: the Committee on Industry, Science and
Technology, Energy, Natural Resources and Environment. See Packer & Rukare, supra note 128, at
375-76.
159 Kyle W. Danish and Jonathan C. Rotter, Drafting Contracts for Greenhouse Gas Offset
Projects in Developing Countries, 15 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 168, 170 (2001).
160. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 12(5)(c).
161. See, e.g., CENTRE INTERNATIONAL DE RECHERCHE SUR L'ENVIRONMENT ET LE
DEVELOPPEMENT ET AL., POLICIES FOR THE DESIGN AND OPERATION OF THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT
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"investment additionality" would exclude high-profit projects that are likely to
occur m the business-as-usual scenario, without the added inducement of CER
credits.1 62 Also pertinent is "technological additionality, which would require
developers to make a new technology transfer to the host country 6  and
institutional additionality, a requirement that CDM projects go beyond the host
country's ongoing government programs.64
A. Counterproductive Environmental Additionality Criterion and Baseline Issues
The criterion of environmental additionality is the problematic one from the
perspective of the African countries. This requirement creates an unintended
incentive for CDM investors to "bypass" the poorest countries that are most in
need of development and most in danger of developing via the cheapest, most
pollution-intensive means.i65 The bypass effect results from the market-based
nature of the CDM, which prompts private corporations to invest in CDM projects
where they see high opportunity and low riski66  m other words, "fast and cheap"
emission-reducton credits. 167 In practice, tlus means that CDM projects will be
clustered in developing countries, such as China and India, that have already
developed along a traditional fossil-fuel pathway- such countries have a substantial
emission problem that can be easily improved with technology that is readily
available to the developer and would require little or no investment in research and
development. Countries where GHG emissions are low because development is
still nascent are not rewarded for the opportunity for innovation that they offer;
rather, they are effectively locked out of the process.69 This is particularly true of
the African countries other than South Africa, which have minimal fossil fuel
infrastructure and customer base, as evidenced by the lowest fossil-fuel
MECHANISM 2 (2000), at http://www.centre-cired.fr/archives/articles/2000/JCH-Toman.PDF (2002)
[hereinafter CDM Policy Workshop] (on file with author). This document summarizes discussions thai
occurred in a multinational workshop on the CDM, September 24-25, 1999.
162. Danish & Rotter, supra note 159, at 170.
163. Id. This concept has been applied in various ways by host countries determining whether to
participate m CDM project. Some have required a transfer of state-of the-art technology. See DECON
MBH ET AL., CLIMATE PROTECTION PROGRAMME, CDM IN THE FIELD OF RENEWABLE ENERGIES IN
MOROCCO 2, at http://www.gtz.de/climate/publications/projects/CDM-Marocco-Kurz-engi.pdf (Oct.
2001).
164. S. Brown, et al., Issues and Challenges for Forest-Based Carbon-Offset Projects: A Case
Study of the Noel Kempff Climate Action Project in Bolivia § 4, 5 MITIGATION AND ADAPTATION
STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 99-121, at http://www.winrock.org/GENERAL/Publications/
CarbonIssues.pdf (2000). This criterion has also been defined in a less ambitious way, as the transfer of
technology that is the "best available, and practicable for a country's environment, environmentally safe
and sound technology. See F THOMAS, S. ULLRICH, CDM FACT-SHEET FOR DECisIONMAKERS 3, at
http://www.europarl.eu.tnt/workshop/Kyoto/docs/ierfactshetdemaken.doc (2002).
165. A Southern Perspective, supra note 22, at 386.
166. A CENTERPIECE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL, supra note 99, at § 3.1.
167. A Southern Perspective, supra note 22, at 386.
168. Id. See also Youba Sokona & Djimmgue Nanasta, The Clean Development Mechanism: An
African Delusion? 54 CHANGE 8-11 (Oct.-Nov. 2000), http://www.enda.sn/energie/cc/cdm-afnc.htm
(last visited Mar. 28, 2004).
169. A Southern Perspective, supra note 22, at 386.
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consumption rate in the world, at only 2-3% of the global rate.
170
This situation is not likely to change under the CDM if a pilot program for
Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) is any guide) 71 Under this program, the
forerunner of the CDM, Africa garnered only twelve out of 156 pilot investment
projects. 172 This investment deficit is largely a matter of perceived risk. Africa's
abysmal rate of foreign direct investment (FDI), already the lowest in the world
due to the low purchasing power of its small markets, has now shifted into a
declining mode because of warfare in the region and perceptions of high political
risk. 173 Corporations tend to perceive lower investment risk if the host country is a
"known quantity" due to ongoing investment relationships. 174 However, Africa
does not benefit from this perceptual phenomenon because of its low rate of FDI.
One proposed African solution to the lack of incentive for international
corporate investment under existing norms, is to measure environmental
additionality in terms of emissions avoided rather than emissions reduced. 
175
Whereas the existing model rewards investors for "cleaning up" fossil-fuel power
plants, an avoidance approach would reward Investments that bypass the fossil fuel
mode of development entirely 176 This approach would promote a technological
"leapfrog effect" (as yet largely theoretical), in which an undeveloped country is
able to adopt clean energy technologies at the outset of development and thereby
avoid the environmental and public-health impacts of fossil fuel use and the costs
of retrofitting existing facilities as the country's environmental standards
mature. 177 The avoided-emissions approach might be the only feasible method of
integrating Africa into the Kyoto Protocol, in view of its exceptionally low levels
170. Id.
171. Under the Climate Change Convention, the UNFCCC Secretariat launched a trial program for
North-South cooperation in GHG reduction, the Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) program. This
program was launched at the First Conference of the Parties (COP 1), in Decision 5/CP.I (Apr. 7,
1995), available at http://unfccc.int/program/coop/aij/dec5cp.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2004). See also
Abeeku Brew-Hammond, Designing Energy Projects in Africa for the Clean Development Mechanism,
in AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM, supra note 5, at 75, 76.
172. See list of AIJ Projects at UNITED NATIONS, ACTIVITIES IMPLEMENTED JOINTLY (Feb. 12,
2002), at http://unfeec.mt/program/coop/ij/aijproj.htm (UNFCCC website, last visited Mar. 24, 2004).
See also Spalding-Fecher et al., supra note 69, at 67, Brew-Hammond, supra note 173, at 76, and
Suraje Dessai, Air and Atmosphere: The Fifth Conference of the Parties to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change: An Advancement or Derailment of the Process, 1999
COLO. J. INT'L ENVT'L L. Y.B. 192, 199 (2000) for descriptions of the problem at an earlier stage of the
program.
173. U.N.E.C.A. ECONOMIC REPORT ON AFRICA, supra note 10, at 28-29 (2003). To some extent,
the high investment risk might be more matter of perception than reality. According to the United
Nations Economic Commission for Africa, "African countries have the highest rate of return on
investment in the world-four times more than in the G-7 countries, twice more than in Asia, and two-
thirds more than in Latin America. Id.
174. A Southern Perspective, supra note 22, at 386.
175. WHAT PROSPECTS FOR AFRICA?, supra note 40, at § 2.2.
176. Id.
177 Richard L. Ottmiger & Rebecca Williams, Renewable Energy Sources for Development, 32
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 331, 354 (2002).
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of GHG emissions due to its current state of underdevelopment. 178
Another proposed solution is to establish quotas for CDM investment, in the
hope of equalizing investment opportunities among the developing countries. 
179
These quotas might be regional (i.e., one-third for Africa), or economically based
(i.e., one-third to the least-developed countries).180 The problem with the quota
system is that if the profit picture is not to their liking, investors can simply invest
outside of the CDM.
Under any approach, the project sponsors must establish a baseline, the
business-as-usual scenario that serves as the basis for calculating emission
avoidance or reduction. 18' Establishing a baseline is particularly difficult if the
host country has only a sketchy institutional capacity to measure current emissions,
gauge future economic growth, and develop a coherent and credible energy policy
that would establish a trajectory for future emissions. 82 Another baseline issue that
is specific to the energy section is the treatment of ongoing improvements in
power-plant efficiency. m3 Investment in more efficient power generation is a
standard economic development strategy- by increasing the amount of power
generated per unit of fuel, the developing country reduces costs and perhaps allows
the plant operator to get by on a lower grade of fuel. 184 The effect of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions might be an incidental one; thus, in terms of the
Protocol's main goal of reducing GHG emissions, it might be counterproductive to
reward such projects under the CDM. 85  According to one (non-African)
commentator, if the CDM is used to fund a technology that would have been
adopted anyway via an econormc development strategy, the CDM will become
"merely a tool for resource transfer rather than a tool for reducing emissins."'186
Suggested solutions for the "mere resource transfer" issue include a
heightened efficiency baseline for CDM projects, which would enable decision-
makers to distinguish between GHG-reduction projects and standard development
projects.!81 However, this heightened baseline also comes with an unintended
social cost-it is likely to crowd out local technology developers who lack the
resources of the more efficient multinational corporations.'"
178. WHAT PROSPECTS FOR AFRICA?, supra note 40, at § 2.2.
179. Id. § 5.1.
180. Id.
181. Gray E. Taylor, Global Climate Change Agreements-Do the Storm Clouds Have Silver
Lining?, 45 ROCKY MT. MiN. L. INST. § 2.03[21[a][il (1999).
182. See Mumma, supra note 153, at 200-201. See also R.S. Maya & John Turkson, CDM
Baseline and Additionality in the African Context-The Issues, in AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE
CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM, supra note 5, at 19-33.
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B. Inequitable Assignment of Emission Credits
A particular sore point among many developing countries is their restricted
role in the market for trading emission-reduction credits, an opportunity that has
evolved from the emissions-trading and jomt-tmplementation mechanisms.189 The
primary function of emission reduction credits is to offset the emission-reduction
obligations of countries subject to the emissions cap; developing countries, which
are not subject to the cap, might seem to be excluded almost by definitionse
However, the developing countries, which can obtain credits only through the
CDM process, do not wish to be restricted to a limited secondary market.' 9' The
credit trading market is a profit-making opportunity, and many developing
countries view emission rights and the attendant tradable credits as "de facto
property rights" in which they should be allowed to share freely.
9 2
One possible approach is to distribute credits among all states, including the
developing countries. At several points in the Kyoto-implementation process, the
African delegation proposed a plan to allocate emission rights on a per-capita
basis. 193 The per-capita approach reflects the view that all of the world's citizens
have an equitable right to share equally in the right to use the atmosphere.' 94 A
premise of the per-capita rights proposal is a theory of gradual "contraction and
convergence, in which the developed countries currently using more than their
share of the atmosphere's assimilative capacity will progressively reduce their
emissions while the underdeveloped regions such as Africa would increase their
emissions until they achieved a comparable state of economic development' 9
This approach is frequently associated with an invocation of historical patterns of
overproduction of greenhouse gases. 196
Another African proposal goes further, suggesting an allotment "based on the
Poverty Index, reflecting the country's need to develop (i.e., the poorer the
country, the higher the assignment)."' 197 In accordance with its position in favor of
an avoidance criterion, the African countries also suggest that the credit allotment
be based on "emissions foregone" rather than emission reduction.
98
A different kind of alternative is to allocate a share of the CERs generated by
189. A CENTERPIECE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL, supra note 99, at § 3.1.
190. Boiling Point, supra note 71, at 79.
191. Id.
192. JEAN-PHILIPPE THOMAS, YUOBA SOKONA & STEPHEN HuMPHREYs, ENDA TIERS MONDE
PROGRAMME, AFTER BuENOs AIREs: A DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT NGO PERSPECTIVE 2 (Feb.
1999), at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/19/2059382.pdf [hereinafter After Buenos Aires]; A
CENTERPIECE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL, supra note 99, at § 3.1.
193. This proposal was raised at the seventh ad hoc working group on the Berlin Mandate, which
met in Bonn in 1997, and again after the 1998 Buenos Aires conference of the parties. After Buenos
Aires, supra note 192; Boiling Point, supra note 71, at 55.
194. See, e.g., A Southern Perspective, supra note 22, at 387- Baer, supra note 17, at 393, 401.
195. Boiling Point, supra note 71, at 55, citing Rungano Karamanzera, Zimbabwean delegate to
AGBM-7.
196. A Southern Perspective, supra note 22, at 402.
197. Mumma, supra note 153, at 203-05.
198. Id. at 206-07.
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a CDM project to the host state.199 This approach has been characterized as a
tradeoff between cash and CERs; the potential problem is that a host country that
demands a share of the project CERs would simply induce the investor to cut back
on the monetary benefits it will offer.2° Perhaps a more promising suggestion is to
allow the developing country to fund CDM projects and earn the CERs as an
investor.20 ' This approach would permit the developing countries to tailor CDM
projects to their own development agenda.20 2  Moreover, with the added
inducement of the CERs, African infrastructure projects could become more
attractive and affordable to cash-strapped African countries. 20 3 Another creative
suggestion is to distribute CERs as a reward domestic policy changes that create
sustainable development, even if the policy's GHG-reduction effect is
mcidental.2°4
C. Insufficient Emphasis on Emission Reductions in the Developed Countries
Like many other developing countries, the African countries propose that
developed countries meet a greater share of their emissions-reduction obligations
at home. As formulated by African NGO groups,
This issue extends beyond the UNFCCC, whose global reduction objectives
cannot in any case be reached solely through application of the Kyoto Protocol
and its flexibility mechanisms (i.e., least cost reduction). At best the mechanisms
should be considered as instruments to assist a variety of societies to transit
towards low carbon energy and economic systems.
20 5
In addition to the safety valve offered by the flexible mechanisms, there are
several loopholes in the Kyoto Protocol that allow developed countries to
minimize their obligation to reduce their domestic emissions. For example, the
Protocol addresses a combination of six greenhouse gases.206 Some of these gases
also qualify as ozone-depleting gases, which emitters are already obligated to
phase out under the Montreal Protocol.20 7 Developed countries also may buy "hot
air" credits from Eastern European countries that are currently m economic decline
and whose baseline levels are therefore unrealistic, and cheap CDM credits from
the developing world, and bank them on a long-term basis to postpone the need to
reduce fossil fuel emissions.0 8
Forcing wealthy developed countries to make more domestic reductions






205. After Buenos Aires, supra note 192, at § 1(c).
206. The six greenhouse gases covered by Protocol are carbon dioxide (CO2), methane, nitrous
oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, and sulfur hexaflounde. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, at Annex A.
207. Boiling Point, supra note 71, at 65.
208. A Southern Perspective, supra note 22, at 77-78.
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would tend to promote an earlier commercialization of non fossil-fuel energy
technology- such countries would have little choice but to regulate their coal-fired
power plants more stringently and to redirect subsidies to low-emitting renewable
fuels.209 An increased subsidization of alternative energy technologies would in
turn affect the range and cost of technologies available to developing countries
under the CDM.2 l
A greater range of commercial, low-polluting energy technologies would fit
in well with African environmental policies, which are stringent but are not yet
backed up by strong enforcement capabilities. On a political level, African
solutions for environmental problems have been emphatically progressive ones
environmentally, and have included the Bamako Convention, which took a strong
stand against the transport of unwanted hazardous waste into Africa, and the Lagos
Plan of Action, 1980, which formulated a plan for environmentally sound, regional
economic development.21 ' Africa, like other developing areas, does not want to be
a haven or dumping ground for emission-intensive industries.
There are historical and current bases for the fear of becoming a "dumping
ground." Developed countries have a history of exporting their pollution-intensive
industries and less efficient technology to developing countries with lower
environmental standards.2i 2 Africa might well assume the role of a pollution haven
in the energy sector as the expected explosive growth of this sector in developing
countries creates an increasingly "powerful incentive" to relocate coal technology
to countries that have weak enforcement standards or capabilities and are not
subject to the Kyoto emissions cap.213 Once a capital-intensive coal Infrastructure
is built, it tends to remain in place for many, many decades; thus, such transfers
have the potential to undermine local preferences and saddle the developing
countries with expensive, outmoded, pollution-intensive energy technology that
will constrain their environmental choices for years.2i 4
D. Mismatch Between CDM and African Development Priorities
Key concern of African countries are whether the CDM can contribute to their
sustainable development and the degree to which CDM projects fit the country's
209. See, e.g., COAL. AMERICA'S PAST, AMERICA'S FUTURE, supra note 147, at 2, stating that coal
plants account for 76% of the CO2 emissions of the electric utility industry. See also GREENPEACE,
GLOBAL WARMING & ENERGY: THE GLOBAL WARMING CONNECTION at
http://www.greenpeaceusa.orgelimate/energytext.htm; Berger, supra note 21, at 411 et seq.
210. See the discussion in Section V(B), mfra, for further reasons why the developing countries
advocate a greater emphasis on domestic reductions in the developed countries.
211. Packer & Rukare, supra note 155, at 366. The Bamako Convention, 30 I.L.M. 775 (1991),
requires the Parties to "promote clean production methods, to favor pollution prevention over pollution
reduction, and to consider the environmental costs of the mining phase of production. DAVID HUNTER,
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 879 (Foundation Press 1998).
212. Cheng, supra note 7, at 63, 65.
213. See Alex G. Hanafi, Note: Joint Implementation: Legal and Institutional Issues for an
Effective International Program to Combat Climate Change, 22 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 441, 471-72
(1998) (contrasting joint implementation with implementation solely in the developed countries).
214. See UP IN SMOKE, supra note 147, regarding the U.S. expenence; Cheng, supra note 7, at 63.
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unique economic and social development agendas.215 The CDM requires
"voluntary participation" by each party, and the developed countries maintain that
voluntary participation is enough to assure that a CDM investor will respect the
developing country's sustainable development strategy 216 However, the
Protocol's emphasis on sustainable development m accordance with local
preferences might well be compromised by the large role given to private
investors, who are not bound by Article 10's requirement that "parties" take
regional development priorities into account.
Moreover, the current African investment situation does not provide the
bargaining leverage to ensure the desired "African solutions for African
problems. 217 Already passed over by most foreign investors, African countries
are competing for investment on an investor's terms.2 1 The CDM, with its
project-by-project approach also tends to relegate host countries to a relatively
passive "take-it-or-leave it" role.219 In combination, such financial pressures could
easily undermine a people's ability to say "no.
220
Africans also seem to sense an impending necessity to fend off anti-
development pressures from enviromnentalists. 22l The regional New Partnership
for Africa's Development (NEPAD) plan for development of the African energy
sector envisions the development of a fossil fuel infrastructure for natural gas
power generation, including gas pipelines and gas-fired power plants.222  The
vision entails a full exploitation Africa's rich oil and gas resources for the benefit
of African consumers, and is designed to relieve poverty by "guaranteeing a
sustainable supply of affordable energy." Noting that the Climate Change
Convention does not require developing countries to subordinate their priority
goals of economic development and poverty eradication to the goal of GHG
reduction, they anticipate that they will be obliged to "find ways [to avoid]
215. Spalding-Fecher et al., supra note 69, at 67.
216. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 12(5)(a); Paper No. 6, Responses to G77/Chna Questions
on Flexibility Mechanisms, MATTERS RELATED TO DECISION I/CP.3 PARAGRAPH 5 (Activities
Implemented Jointly) (A Compilation of Submissions by Parties), FCCC/CP/I998/rmsc.7, COP 4, at
http://unfccc.mt/resource/docs/cop4/miscO7.htm (Oct. 5, 1998).
217 Packer& Rukare, supra note 155, at 366-67
218. See Udombana, supra note 11, at 306.
219. Lucia Schild Ortiz, Mark Lutes & Rubens Born, Ringside 111: Not So Clean, EQUITY WATCH
(October 30, 2002), at http://www.cseindia.org/htmllcmp/climate/ew/ewoct30/clean.htm.
220. See CDM Policy Workshop, supra note 161, at 3, which also notes the negative influence of
corruption.
221. See, e.g., Drumbl, supra note 49, at 849.
222. NEPAD, Executive Summary [Draft], SHORT-TERM ACTION PLAN: INFRASTRUCTURE § 2,
http:/lwww.csir.co.za/akani/2004/Mar/pdfs/nepad_actioninfra-pdf (May 2002). NEPAD is an
organization that promotes regional economic cooperation among African states. For a discussion of
implementation of the SHORT-TERM ACTION PLAN, see NEPAD INFRASTRUCTURE SHORT-TERM
ACTION PLAN (STAP): REvIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS AND THE WAY FORWARD (May 2003),
at http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000652/NEPADInfrastructure_May2003.pdf.
223. NEPAD, Executive Summary [Draft], SHORT-TERM ACTION PLAN: INFRASTRUCTURE, supra
note 222, at § 2. This vision of sustainable development is quite similar to that of the international coal
industry. See the definition of Ron Knapp, supra note 1, at 1.
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measures that are contrary to their interest, i.e., that impede their development. 224
The current economic distress of most African countries is caused in part by
the export of about 80% of Africa's oil to fuel economic activity in other countries
and pay off massive debts to banks in the developed world.22 This export pattern
is in turn linked to an increasing mvestment-related pollution problem in Africa.226
Massive indebtedness makes it Impossible for African countries to invest in
improving their environment, and the resulting lower environmental standards
create an incentive for developed countries to export their most pollution-intensive
industries and technologies to African and other developing countries. 22 7 The
situation has been characterized as the poor countries' subsidy of economic
development and environmental improvement in the wealthy industrialized
countries. 228
The current African development plan to develop Africa's fossil-fuel
resources for the benefit of African countries is supported by several U.N.
resolutions designed to end the economic disadvantages of colomalism and neo-
colonialism, particularly Resolution 1803, which affirms a developing country's
permanent sovereignty over its natural resources. 229 The position of the African
countries also finds some support in Kyoto Protocol Article 10, which sets forth
the development obligations of the developing countries and specifies that the
GHG-reduction agenda will take account of national and regional development
priorities. Article 10, when read in conjunction with Article 12, which provides for
the CDM, appears to confer a right to choose the fuel and energy technology most
appropriate to a country's economic agenda, so long the subset of projects that
seek CERs would reduce GHG emissions below a business-as-usual baseline.
Clearly "clean coal" technology is an option both under a country's general
development policy and under the CDM, even if another technology would
facilitate a greater reduction.230
If the selection of fuels and energy technologies were made entirely on the
basis of logic and developmental criteria, it would be driven in large part by the
local mix of available fuels.73' In Sub Saharan Africa, biomass is currently the
224. NOTE ON IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 13, at § 1. 1.
225. Energy In Sub Saharan Africa, supra note 83, at 6.
226. Cheng, supra note 7, at 59.
227. Id. at 61; Udombana, supra note 11, at 305-18.
228. Cheng, supra note 7, at 61.
229. United Nations Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, U.N.G.A. Res.
1803 (XVII), reprinted in 2 L.L.M. 223 (1963). For discussion of the developed countries' GHG
emissions policies as a form ofenvironmental imperialism, see, e.g., Drumbl, supra note 49, at 849-50.
230. The prevalence of lower environmental standards and priorities in the developing countries
has fueled a "meaningful participation" debate in the developed countries. The implicit assumption is
that countries whose development policies entail lower environmental standards will overwhelm the
emissions cutbacks of developed countries. Critics from the developed world note that emissions
anywhere have a global impact, and suggest that a failure to create comparable restrictions on the
developing countries' emissions and policy choices could render "American concessions completely
ineffectual. Thomas et al., supra note 34, at 173.
231. See Jae Edmonds, Atmospheric Stabilization: Technology Needs, Opportunities, and Timing,
U.S. POLICY ON CLIMATE CHANGE: WHAT NEXT9 53 (Aspen Institute 2002),
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dominant fuel.232 There is limited access to traditional commercial energy sources
such as oil, gas, and hydropower, which are localized and require substantial
233infrastructure for delivery. Sunlight is abundant everywhere, but there are
financial barriers to developing a solar energy industry 2 34 Coal is currently mined
primarily in South Africa, but there are plans to develop coal deposits m other
areas and build coal-fired power plants to diversify and unprove the reliability of
the continent's energy supply and promote use of local resources. 3 However, in
the absence of sophisticated and expensive technology (a potential incentive for a
CDM investment), coal emits substantially more greenhouse gases and other
pollutants than most other fuels.
23 6
V THE FRAMEWORK OF THE LARGER EQUITY DEBATE: DEVELOPED v DEVELOPING
WORLDS
Kyoto's unique approach is of unique interest to fossil fuel industries because
it unplicates them in both the problem and the solution to climate change. C0 2 is
the greenhouse gas of most crucial concern in the context of the effort to achieve a
sustainable global industrialization. 37 Fossil fuels, particularly coal, have been
targeted as the "primary source" of industrial CO2 emissions.
238
Some CO 2 -reduction strategies are particularly galling to the fossil fuel
industry, such as proposals to finance the development of the industry's
competitors by pollution taxes, remove fossil fuel subsidies, create incentives for
consumers to switch to renewable fuels, and redirect government aid to the
renewable fuel industry 239 Another proposal (now defunct) was to end the Clean
Air Act exemptions enjoyed by certain coal-fired power plants in the United
States. 2 40 Thus, it is not surprising that within the Kyoto Protocol's "carrot-and-
stick approach,"24 1 it is the "stick" that first caught the industry's eye. The Kyoto
http://www.aspenmstitute.org/aspeninstitute/files/Img/EdmondsEEEClimate.pdf (last visited Mar. 29,
2004).
232. Spalding-Fecher et al., supra note 69, at 64; Energy in Sub-Saharan Africa, supra note 83, at
2.
233. Spalding-Fecher, supra note 69, at 64.
234. Id.
235. See INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, COAL IN AFRICA N 2001, at
http://www.ieaorgFextbase/stats/coaldata.asp?country=Afnca&SubmitA--Submit (last visited Mar. 28,
2004) for chart describing coal usage in 2001. See ENERGY INFORMATION ADMiNiSTRATION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2003: COAL (May 1, 2003), available at
http:lwww.eia.doe.govloaf/ieo/coa.htni, for U.S. projections of coal development in various regions.
236. See, e.g., COAL. AMERICA'S PAST, supra note 78, at 2, describing the disproportionate
contribution of coal-burning power plants to CO2 emissions in the electric utility industry.
237. Jonathan Baert Wiener, Designing Global Climate Change Regulation, in CLIMATE CHANGE
POLICY: A SURVEY, supra note 6, at 151, 153-58.
238. Clare Breidinich, Daniel Magraw, Anne Rowley & James W Rubm, Current Developments:
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 92 AM. J. INT'L
L. 315, 317 (1998).
239. See, e.g., Ottinger & Williams, supra note 178, at 359-60; Hanafi, supra note 213, at 460.
240. Mallery, supra note 111, at 471-76.
241. See Glenn Wiser, Kyoto Protocol Packs Powerful Compliance Punch, 25 BNA
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Protocol has generated a war of words between developing and developed
countries,242 with the rhetoric from the developed countries driven in large part by
their fossil fuel industries.243
A. The Developed Countries: U.S. Battlefront
Several major salvos in the battle have come from the United States-a
country that is important because it is poised to become a major exporter of energy
technology and because its refusal to participate might well scuttle the Kyoto
Protocol. 244 The energy industry's viewpoint, reflected early and often in the
United States political system, is that the Protocol would devastate not only the
fossil fuel industry, but all industries that use large amounts of energy or petroleum
products, as well as the workers and local governments that depend on those
industries.245
In 1997 the U.S. Senate unanmously passed a resolution opposing U. S.
participation in any climate change treaty that would harm the U.S. economy or
fail to require "meaningful" participation by developing countries.2 4 The
resolution was supported by an energy-industry organization, the Global Climate
Coalition, which had previously spearheaded a massive public relations campaign
regarding the competitive impact of the Protocol's "more favorable" treatment of
developing countries.
247
One hot-button issue for environmentalists is the pervasive presence of
largely "invisible" regulatory subsidies that create a misleading appearance of cost-
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT REPORTER 86 (Jan. 16, 2002), available at
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/INER-Compliance.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2004).
242. Mallery, supra note 111, at 481.
243. See Hanafi, supra note 213, at 450, citing the position of the Global Climate Coalition, "a U.S.
consortium representing largely fossil-fuel business interests.
244. See, e.g., U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT ROUNDUP OF INTERNATIONAL PRESS STORIES ON THE
U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM THE KYOTO PROTOCOL (Apr. 5, 2001), at
http://www.clirnnet.org/news/bushroundup.html.
245. Thomas et al., supra note 34, at 173.
246. The Byrd -Hagel Resolution, Congressional Record, S8 13-8I3 t (daily ed. July 27, 1997).
See Armin Rosencranz, U.S. Climate Change Policy, in CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: A SURVEY, supra
note 6, at 221,221-234, for further discussion and context. The Senate as whole, and the sponsors of
the resolution have had change of heart. After the Bush Administration cited the Byrd-Hagel
Resolution in rejecting the Kyoto Protocol, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed new
resolution, declaring that Byrd-Hagel should not "cause the U.S. to abandon its shared responsibility to
help find solution to the global climate change dilemma. Leome Haimson, Climate Change
Negotiation History, in CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: A SURVEY, supra note 6, at 523, 528.
247. See Hanafi, supra note 213, at 450 (citing the Global Climate Coalition "a U.S. consortium
representing largely fossil-fuel business interests, which predicted "massive job losses" and spikes in
the pnce of necessities). Oil industry experts suggested that Kyoto would force a 20% reduction in oil
use and "major lifestyle changes by consumers in the developed countries. Skip Maryan, R. Casey
Olson, Crystal Ball Gazing: An Outline of Issues Facing the Energy Industry in the 21' Century,
INTERNATIONAL OIL AND GAS LAW, CONTRACTS AND NEGOTIATIONS, Part No. 7 (Sw. Legal
Found./Rocky Mt. Min. L. Found. 1996), cited in ERNEST E. SMiTH, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
PETROLEUM TRANSACTIONS 49 (Rocky Mt. Min. L. Found. 2d Edition 2000).
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248effectiveness. 8 For example, loopholes in the U.S. Clean Air Act confer a
competitive advantage on older coal-burning plants that use outmoded technology
and a competitive disadvantage on other power plants that are subject to newer,
higher environmental standards.249 Such regulatory subsidies promote additional
private and public investment in coal facilities and create a more favorable ratio
between dollars invested and electricity output (investment cost per kWh).250 This
effect is a potential selling point to developing countries, which can be enhanced
further by government-subsidized technology development. 2 1
Government-subsidized technology development tends to reflect both an
industry export agenda and the global trend toward deregulation of the utility
industries in the developed countries. Coal companies m the developed countries
are well positioned to take advantage of the opportunity presented by the CDM,
due to the increasing consolidation and internationalization of the industry and a
trend to do business through foreign affiliates.52 Moreover, in response to
deregulation, coal companies, which supply the fuel that currently dominates the
electricity mdustry, 253 seek to reduce their price risk by diversifying their customer
base.2M One way to do this is to export more coal, 55 which has encountered
increasing opposition from environmentalists in developed countries and is now
primarily a local or regional fuel due to high transportation costs. 256  Industry
involvement in developing new technologies that decrease transportation costs and
reduce environmental Impacts helps to promote the export model for coal.257
An export agenda is apparent in the energy-industry cooperation that occurred
248. COAL. AMERICA'S PAST, supra note 78, at 8.
249. UP IN SMOKE, supra note 147, at 10, citing Clean Air Task Force, Testimony of Armond
Cohen, before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy
and Power.
250. See MARSHALL GOLDBERG, FEDERAL ENERGY SUBSIDIES: NOT ALL TECHNOLOGIES ARE
CREATED EQUAL 8-9 (July 2000), a research report produced for the Renewable Energy Policy Project,
at http://www.repp.org/repppubs/articles/resRptll/subsidies.pdf, see also COAL. AMERICA'S PAST,
supra note 78, at 8-9.
251. See, e.g., Robert M. Margolis & Daniel M. Kammen, Energy R&D and Innovation:
Challenges and Opportunities, in CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: A SURVEY, supra note 6, at 469, 486 et
seq. For discussion of Australian subsidies, see CHRISTOPHER RIEDY, SUBSIDIES THAT ENCOURAGE
FOSSIL FUEL USE IN AUSTRALIA (Institute for Sustainable Futures, Working Paper CR 2003/01, January
2003), at www.isf.uts.edu.au/publications/CR_2003_paper.pdf.
252. CHALLENGES OF ELECTRIC POWER RESTRUCTURING FOR FUEL SUPPLIERS, supra note 253, at
9. See also Energy Information Administration, Chapter 6, Recent Trends in International Investment
and Trade, in COAL, PRIVATIZATION AND GLOBALIZATION OF ENERGY MARKETS, at
http://www.itcilo.it/actrav/actrav-english/telearn/global/ilo/firane/coal.htm (n.d., last visited May 8,
2004).
253. See, e.g., COAL. AMERICA'S PAST, supra note 78, at 8
254. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, CHALLENGES OF
ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY RESTRUCTURING FOR FUEL SUPPLIERS 27, at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/electncity/chg-str-fuel.pdf (Sep. 1998).
255. Id.
256. INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM TRANSACTIONS, supra note 247, at 45. Due to high
transportation costs, only about 13% of hard coal production is traded internationally.
257. Id. At the current rate of technology development, experts do not anticipate a global coal trade
similar to the market for oil will evolve in the foreseeable future for coal. Id.
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after George W Bush was elected to the U.S. Presidencyin 2000. Bush decisively
repudiated the Kyoto Protocol after his election in 2000, citing the Protocol's
impacts on the competitiveness of U.S. industries and the lack of adequate, cost-
effective technology to reduce GHG emissions. 258 The Bush Administration then
stepped up government funding for coal technologies vis-A-vis the funding for
renewable energy technologies.259 This current emphasis on coal technology
derives both from a policy to reduce dependence on imported oil and an export
agenda: One of President Bush's persistent themes is that coal, which is plentiful in
the U.S., can be used as a primary industrial fuel without causing pollution or
climate change and that the "clean coal" approach should be exported to
developing countries.26
What is frequently not mentioned is the poor fit between clean coal
technology and the needs of the rural poor in African and other developing
countries. Subsidized fossil fuel technologies do not benefit rural populations that
have little prospects of being connected to a developing country's electrical grid.261
Indeed, it might be "far less costly to subsidize the energy needs of the poor
directly than to subsidize fuels for all users. 262 An ovemding investment in new
fossil fuel technologies also would eliminate the possibility of a beneficial
"leapfrog effect." 263 Subsidizing governments frequently invoke the interests of
the poor, but subsidies to established industries tend to reflect pressures from
privileged sectors of a society seeking cost containment and from companies
seeking to maximize their profits.2
B. The Developing Countries
In response to the developed countries' arguments that they would be unduly
disadvantaged by the Kyoto Protocol and that the CDM is not a sufficient offset to
that disadvantage, the developing countries have fired back several equity-based
arguments that the CDM is unduly favorable to developed countries. They suggest
that the CDM is fundamentally flawed because it allows developed countries to
buy their way out of their obligations to reduce own emissions. 265 The theory is
that the CDM safety valve dissipates the political will to seek out less carbon-
intensive forms of energy development and economic growth.
256
One of the developing countries' most interesting arguments concerns a
258. Rosencranz, supra note 246, at 227; Thomas et al., supra note 34, at 173.
259. COAL. AMERICA'S PAST, supra note 78, at 6-8; Coal Is Central to Energy Policy, Bush Says,
CARE (COALITIoN FOR AFFORDABLE AND RELIABLE ENERGY) (Feb. 15, 2001), at
http://www.careenergy.com/news/articleview.asp?iArticie=36..
260. See Coal Is Central to Energy Policy, Bush Says, CARE (COALITION FOR AFFORDABLE AND
RELIABLE ENERGY) (Feb. 15, 200 1), at http://www.careenergy.com/news/articieview.asp?iArticle=36.
261. Ottmger & Williams, supra note 178, at 344.
262. Id. at 344-45.
263. Id. at 354.
264. Id. at 344.
265. See, e.g., A Southern Perspective, supra note 22, at 375.
266. After Buenos Aires, supra note 192, at I(c).
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loophole in the Protocol's technology-forcing scheme. The Kyoto Protocol,
essentially a technology-forcing instrument as well as a social-justice document,
contemplates that the binding GHG caps will force international energy companies
to look for new markets and new ways to enhance their profits, thereby altering
"the future growth and pattern of world energy demand."267
Paradoxically, however, the CDM might actually tend to prevent the global
community from progressing beyond the fossil-fuel technology that has caused the
global warming problem. Because it is structured as a market-driven mechanism,
the CDM directs investment toward projects that minimize cost, effort, and risk for
multinational corporations.268 The easiest, cheapest emission credits are in simple
technologies, such as coal-washmg, that attempt to clean up fossil-fuel energy
269systems. CERs earned by coal washing cost three dollars per tonne; those
earned by creating zero-carbon energy systems cost twelve-to-fifteen dollars per
tonne.270
According to the late Anil Agarwal, a prominent environmental activist from
India, this market reality could lock the developing countries into a fossil-fuel
development path whether they want it or not, and incidentally turn the CDM into
a subsidy to export the most environmentally destructive industries in the
developed world.271  This fossil fuel lock-m effect might be particularly
detrimental to Africa, where the 95% of the rural population not yet hooked in to a
massive, costly electrical grid is uniquely positioned to benefit from a range of new
energy technologies tailored to a rural environment.2 2 International investment in
the developing country's expansion of a traditional electricity grid directs scarce
funding away from the villages in favor of the urban areas and helps to force the
developed country into the role of a long-term captive fossil-fuel customer.7 3
Absent this lock-in effect, rural African villages might bypass the antiquated fossil
fuel technology entirely.
274
Another equity issue that zeroes in on the CDM is the "low-hanging friat"
argument: the CDM allows the developed countries to cherry-pick the easiest
options for GHG reduction in the developing countries.27 5  Later, when the
developing countries have reached relatively high levels of energy efficiency, the
developed countries no longer have any incentive to buy emission credits from
267. INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 19-20 (1998), cited in
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM TRANSACTIONS, supra note 247, at 46.
268. A Southern Perspective, supra note 22, at 386.




272. Odingo's Report, supra note 114. For information on the proportion of African households
without electrcity, see WORLD BANK, CAN AFRICA CLAIM THE 21sT CENTURY? 137 (Apr. 2000),
available at http://www.rrojasdatabank.net/afica2 i/chapter_5.pdf, cited in Udombana, supra note 11,
at 304. See also A CENTERPIECE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL, supra note 99, at § 2.2.
273. See Back to Basics, supra note 269.
274. Id.
275. Boiling Point, supra note 71, at 78.
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them due to rising incremental costs. 2 7 6 Nevertheless, further emission reductions
will be required in part because of the developed countries' failure to develop
domestic and CDM technology for GHG reduction, at which point the developing
countries will be left with only the most difficult, expensive options; these will cost
the poor countries up to thirty times more than the credits the wealthy developed
countries purchased to fulfill their own GHG-reduction obligations. 77  A
developed country may bank emission credits without regard to its already high
per-capita rate of largely "luxury" emissions, while developing countries with low
per-capita "survival" emissions do not have the same privilege.
278
There is also an intergenerational equity issue. The low-hanging fruit
phenomenon places the developing countries in a position of "discounting their
future" if they take advantage of the CDM.279 Future generations will have to
make further reductions, at much higher costs, than the costs of the options sold
cheaply to the developed countries. 280  Moreover, the long banking period for
cheap credits could mean, ironically, that the developed countries could still be
using these cheap credits at a tume when the developing countries would be forced
to make higher-priced reductions. 28'
Perhaps most startling equity paradox is a cost-benefit argument sometimes
used to bolster the status-quo fossil-fuel development pattern.282 According to one
global warming economist, "the total and long-term cost of emitting an extra ton of
carbon today is the equivalent of $7.50"-allegedly far less than the economic
benefit.283  However, this figure is predicated in part on a country-specific
valuation of the projected loss of life. Lives lost in tropical zones characterized by
a high poverty rate, lower earning capacity, and shorter life spans are assigned a
lower value than the lives in countries such as the U.S., which receive the bulk of
the benefits of fossil fuel combustion.2" Because a disproportionate number of the
deaths attributable to global warming will occur in such regions, the costs of fossil-





279. A Southern Perspective, supra note 22, at 384-85.
280. Boiling Point, supra note 71, at 78.
281. Id.
282. See Douglas A. Kysar, Some Realism About Environmental Skepticism: The Implications of
Bjorn Lomborg The Skeptical Environmentalist for Environmental Law and Policy, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q.
223, 262-67 (2003).
283. Id., citing BJORN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE REAL
STATE OF THE WORLD 306 (2001).
284. Kysar, supra note 67, at 265.
285. Id.
286. See, e.g., Dr. Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Racism and "Invisible Communities, 96 W
VA. L.R. 1037 (1994).
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VI. ROLE OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
CDM projects may be undertaken either by private corporations or by
government entities; indeed, the involvement of private actors is one of the treaty's
defining features. 28 7 In practice, however, the power to take the initiative will lie
mainly with private corporations, due to a major shift in the nature of capital flows
from the developed to the developing countries. In recent years, private
investment has become the dominant mode of transfer as official development
assistance (ODA) has declined precipitously. 288 ODA, which comprised 56% of
worldwide financial flows m 1990, had plummeted to 14% by 1996.289 Moreover,
the share of ODA that flows to utilities, energy, and transportation infrastructure
declined from 23% in 1975-80 to 15% in 1995-2000.290 This shift away from
public investment might undermine some of Kyoto Protocol goals given the profit-
making onentation of private investors, the weak governance of multinational
corporations in international law, Africa's relatively weak bargaining position vis-
a-vis these investors, and the weakness of African institutions that might be
expected to exercise control over investors.
In the most general terms, Africa has been disadvantaged thus far by the shift
to a private mode of wealth transfer. Although increased private investment has
more than offset plummeting ODA at a global level,29 1 Africa has not attracted its
share of this capital.292 In absolute terms, FDI increased in Africa increased
between 1990 and 1996; however, FDI increased far less in Africa than
elsewhere. 293 The increased investment was concentrated m twenty-five to thirty
countries with superior infrastructure and perceived profit potential-and 80%/0
flowed into just twelve developing countries. 294 Africa is essentially running in
place, falling behind other countries because it needs capital to attract capital in an
investment milieu where "globalization is propelled by capital--the potential of a
given stock of assets to deploy new production ,295
The problem is that Africa's small and weak markets "are not attractive to
investors unless there is a longer-term incentive," according to Afican CDM
designers. 296  Thus, Africans are attempting to create CDM opportunities with
some profit potential other than the certified emission reduction credits, projects
with "self-financing capacity" and the ability to attract continued corporate
287. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 12(9).
288. U.N.E.C.A. ECONOMIC REPORT ON AFRICA, supra note 10, at 29-30.
289. Yamm, supra note 36, at 65.
290. U.N.E.C.A. ECONOMIC REPORT ON AFRICA, supra note 10, at 29. This would seem to
minimize the intended effect of the Kyoto Protocol's financial additionality criterion, which theorizes
that CDM projects will not displace ODA.
291. The overall flow of public and private funding has "expanded by 184 percent since 1990"
because of greatly increased corporate investment. Yamn, supra note 36, at 65.
292. See A CENTERPIECE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL, supra note 99, at § 3.1.
293. Id.
294. Yamm, supra note 36, at 65.
295. Udombana, supra note 11, at 306.
296. Brew-Hammond, supra note 173, at 76.
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financing of related projects. 29 7 One example is Africa's structural reform of its
energy sector.298 State utilities are being pnvatized on a large scale, and these
under-financed state utilities present opportunities for relatively easy
improvements in efficiency as well as the profit-making lock-m effect identified
by Agarwal. 29
However, this strategy to attract foreign investment might conflict with some
of Africa's other economic development prionties, namely its effort to improve the
lot of the rural poor. It is not cost effective to extend the electrical grid into
sparsely populated areas. Even if traditional grid-style delivery were economically
feasible in rural areas, the desperately poor residents could not afford the power in
a privatized economic environment where citizens must "pay for everything."3°
Furthermore, when CDM investment is focused on cleaning up an existing
fossil-fuel grid system, there is no guarantee that private investors will provide the
latest technology unless the host country has a strong bargainng system and
stringent emission regulations. There is an unfortunate history of corporate
transfers of outmoded technology that they cannot use at home whenever "it is
cheaper to do so and there are no regulations or supervision to prevent the use of
such harmful technology 
3 01
This is likely to continue m the African energy development sector because
power plant operators have no incentive for ongomg use of clean coal technologies
unless national regulations raise the cost of emitting carbon and other pollutants
above the cost of using the technology 302 Even if "clean coal" technology is made
available, the African countries might find themselves unable to take advantage of
it. If the Umted States' experience is any guide, a spike in natural gas prices or the
reality of regulatory or other costs of "clean coal" technology will promote an
increased use of "dirty" coal capacity (which currently exist in abundance in South
Africa) and the construction of new facilities that can compete with these "dirty"
facilities' low production costs, rather than expensive "clean coal" facilities. 303
Africa's consumers have little economic clout, and its regulatory enforcement
capacity is low. In the U.S., even with far stronger, more environmentally oriented
consumer markets, it has proved impossible to get power plant operators to use
completely available technology in the absence of the necessary regulatory
297 Timothy Afful-Koomson, Paul Opoku-Mensah, Participatory Implementation and
Governance of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Projects in Afrtica, in AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES
ON THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM 35, 37.
298. Spalding-Fecher et al., supra note 69, at 64.
299. See A CENTERPIECE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL, supra note 99, at § 3.1. See also Back to
Basics, supra note 269, and U.N.E.C.A. REPORT, supra note 10, at 35-36.
300. Udombana, supra note 11, at 316-17.
301. M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 47 (Cambridge
University Press 1999) (1994).
302. Can Carbon Sequestration Solve Global Warming? TERRADAILY, Feb. 25, 2003, citing
Howard Herzog, pnncipal research engineer at Massachusetts Institute of Technology Laboratory for
Energy and the Environment, at http://www.spacedaily.com/news/greenhouse-03d.html (last visited
Mar. 24, 2004).
303. UP IN SMOKE, supra note 147, at 4.
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incentives. °
There is another problematic factor m the international legal framework. One
African scholar has suggested that Africa "has been more acted on than actor,
largely because existing international law norms do not 'bmd states and global
actors to promote the right to development globally' and, in particular, in
Africa. 30 5  There are several international policy documents that instruct
corporations to respect a host country's development priorities. The International
Chamber of Commerce Guidelines for International Investment state that
international investors "[sihould ensure in consultation with the competent
authorities that the investment fits satisfactorily into the economic and social
development plans and priorities of the host country "3  The voluntary OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises state that corporate investors "should take
fully into account" the policies of the host country and "contribute to economic,
social, and environmental progress with a view to achieving sustainable
development. 30 7 However, these policies are largely voluntary and aspirational.
Moreover, there is an emerging international human right to development in
accordance with a people's indigenous priorities.30 8  The Umted Nations Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples3°9 recognizes the potential
conflict between international development projects and the right of indigenous
people "to development in accordance with their own needs and interests.,
31 0
However, human rights claims have been asserted against corporations primarily m
situations involving major atrocities associated with resettlement projects, not in a
primarily economic context.311 The emerging right to development consistent with
a people's development priorities does not provide a basis to force a corporation to
forgo the most favorable profit opportunities.
Article 10 of the Kyoto Protocol, which requires all "parties" to take regional
development priorities into account, is similarly unhelpful m binding multmational
corporations to formulate projects that reflect the wishes of developing country
partners that do not have a strong bargaining position based on profit potential.
Corporations are of course not parties to the Protocol.
It is a disquieting reality that much of the momentum and policies for the
304. Id.
305. Udombana, supra note 11, at 305, citing UNDP HuMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000, 9
(1999).
306. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
SECTION 1. Investment Policies (Nov. 29, 1972).
307. OECD, Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterpnses, Annex I,
Guidelines for Multinational Enterpnses, available at http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2000doc.nsf/
4f7adc2l4b9a685c2569faOO5dOce7/ci25692700623b74cl256991003b5i47/$FILE/00085743.PDF
(2000). The voluntary nature of the gudelines is set forth in Ch. 1, Concepts and Pnnciples.
308. Somarajah, supra note 300, at 45.
309. Resolution 1994/45, Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, E/CN.4/1995/2,
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56, at 105 (Aug. 26, 1994).
310. Preamble, Paragraph 5, 8.
311. See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied 532
U.S. 941 (2001).
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impending industrialization in the developing world come from a cooperation
among a few highly developed countries and their multinational corporations.312
The developing countries' perception of this "partnersup, initially rooted in the
colomal era, has given rise to a "dependency" theory of international investment;
which posits that the dominant players in the developed world create investment
regimes that keep developing countries in a subservient role.3" 3  Modem
permutations include the view that developed countries' global warmmg policies
are a thinly disguised attempt to hamper the developing world's industrialization-
to "safeguard ongoing polluting behavior in developed countries [by preventing]




A related fear is that a climate-change regime dominated by the developed
countries will disseminate the worst aspects of capitalism and globalization,
unduly promoting privatization and undermining homegrown prescriptions for
alternative development paths. 3i 5 There is some cause for skepticism about the
"clean coal" climate-change strategy formulated in developed countries for
consumption abroad, at least in the sense that it will limit the options for Africa.
One U.S. company, identified as the "largest single source of greenhouse gases in
the western world, ' 0i 6 has begun investing heavily in "clean coal" plants for large
customers such as China.1 7 This overall trend, which will indeed limit the options
available to Africans in the countryside, is bolstered by government-funded
technology development programs3 is and reflects heavy campaign contributions by
the coal mdustry.s 9
VII. CONCLUSION
The main issue posed by the foregoing factors is how to promote equitable,
environmentally sound economic development where it is needed most. The
African countries are the crux of this problem. It is in Africa that all of the
challenges come together, presenting the best opportunity for restructuring the
Protocol and the CDM in a creative way.
312. Udombana, supra note 11, at 305.
313. Sornarajah, supra note 300, at 43 et seq.
314. Drumbl, supra note 49, at 849-50.
315. Udombana, supra note 11, at 305. In addition to the economic clout of the developed
countries at the policymakmg level, climate-change science and technology is formulated in the
developed world and funded by governments and large corporations and therefore tends to reflect their
interests. See A Southern Perspective, supra note 22, at 379-80.
316. Susan Joy Hassol, Randy Udall, A Change of Climate, ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
39 (2000).
317 Bruce Yandle and Stuart Buck, The Bootleggers, Baptists, and the Global Warming Battle, 26
HARv. ENvTL. L. REV. 178, 215 (2002).
318. COAL. AMERICA'S PAST, supra note 78, at 7.
319. Dan Morgan, Coal Scores with Wager on Bush, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2001, at A5, available
at http://www.cleanenergy.org/energy/coal/bush.html. (last visited Mar. 29, 2004). See also Ken Ward,
Jr., Bush Hauls In Coal Contributions, THE CHARLESTON GAZETTE, July 24, 2000 (discussing
campaign contributions by the mining, utility, and railroad industries); Holly Bailey, Read My Lips: A
Look at Coal Mining Industry Contributions to Bush and the GOP MONEY IN POLITICS ALERT, Mar.
14, 2001, available at http://www.opensecrets.org/alerts/v6/alertv6_l l.asp (last visited Mar. 29,2004).
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These largely undeveloped countries possess a not-to-be-missed opportunity
to leapfrog over the archaic fossil fuel technologies that have caused global
environmental problems. However, their opportunity might indeed be missed
because the small, undeveloped markets and widespread poverty of these African
countries deter foreign investment in the best technologies and encourage resource
exploitation, a higher-than-necessary level of pollution, and investment in low-
level technologies, especially those related to coal. These investments go hand in
hand with the prospect that African countries might be locked m to expensive coal
and other fossil-fuel energy systems that will deter creative investments well into
the future.
The developed countries' suggestions for maintaining the credibility of
Kyoto's joint implementation philosophy have included requiring developing
countries to "sign on to some form of commitment" to a graduated scheme of
320emission-reduction obligations to secure the support of the developed countries.
Such suggestions seem to miss the point of the developing countries' equity
arguments almost entirely. Another, perhaps more feasible solution is for the
energy industry, rather than the African countries, to simply adapt. As the mdustry
has noted, "change brings opportunities, and the Kyoto Protocol, which includes
mechanisms to promote compliance on a cost-effective basis, may even provide
benefits. ,,32i Despite their vocal public objections, the major fossil fuel companies
have already begun to invest in offsets. 22
There are a number of feasible pathways from African energy development
under the CDM. Large-scale and costly clean coal and other fossil-fuel
technologies are useful for large-scale commercial development. Small-scale and
decentralized energy technologies are uniquely suited to populations that will
otherwise be overlooked. In accordance with international law, Africans should
choose their own development path and set of associated problems. Perhaps the
key point is that there be "challenges and opportunities" for Africans to seize.
3 23
However, the African energy dilemmas also point out a need for greater
awareness in the developed world. The Africans have presented several creative
suggestions. Some of these suggestions, such as the emission-avoidance approach
and a possible restructuring of the CER market, offer improvements both in the
flow of funds and technology to Africa and in the affordability of sustainable
development worldwide. Currently, technology development is being guided
along a "clean coal" pathway This pathway should be reexamined in the context
of the fossil fuel lock-in effect identified by Agarwal and the potential common
interest in the development of small-scale energy technologies with applications in
both developing and developed countries. The Kyoto Protocol presents an
opportunity to drop our belief that technology transfers benefit only the developing
320. Hanafi, supra note 213, at 473.
321. Gray E. Taylor, Global Climate Change Agreements-Do the Storm Clouds Have Silver
Lining?, 45 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. § 2.01 (1999).
322. Id.
323. Moussa Cisse, Yuoba Sokona & Jean-Philippe Thomas, Introduction to NOTE ON
IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 13.
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world.324 The key premise of the Protocol and its CDM is the feasibility of a "win-
win" outcome.325
324. Id. at 65.
325. Hanafi, supra note 213, at 443.
SEX, POLITICS, AND RELIGION: THE CLASH BETWEEN
POLAND AND THE EUROPEAN UNION OVER ABORTION
Alicia Czerwmnski °
I. INTRODUCTION
Poland's anti-abortion law is one of Europe's most stringent. 1 Given the
European Union's (EU) pro-choice legislation, Poland's recent accession into the
EU in spring 20042 will likely cast its abortion law into the spotlight. The
following account foreshadows this clash.
In June 2003, Polish protestors greeted the Dutch ship, "Women on Waves"
with eggs and paint bombs, as it entered a Polish port.3 Women on Waves is a
mobile abortion clinic 4 that enters ports in countries that prohibit abortion, boards
women, and sails to international waters where physicians perform abortions. 5 The
ship typically travels into countries at the request of local women's organizations
and gives women the option to receive safe, professional, and legal abortions.6
Because Women on Waves sails under a Dutch flag, Dutch law, which permits
abortion, applies.7
Polish women were to be the first group to receive abortions aboard the ship.8
The ship previously entered an Irish harbor in 2001, but no abortions occurred
aboard the ship because Women on Waves failed to obtain an abortion treatment
Juns Doctor, 2004, University of Denver College of Law; B.S. 1998, Utah StateUniversity; M.S.
expected 2005, Columbia University. Special thanks to Professor Ved Nanda and Zach Detra for their
insight and encouragement. The author also wishes to thank her parents for their constant support and
promoting her interest in this area and her husband Ryan Link, for showing her the other side of an
issue.
1. Corinne Deloy, Referendum on the European Union in Poland 7, June 2003, available at
http://www.robert-schuman.org/anglais/oee/pologne/referendum/default.htm.
2. Id.
3. Poland: Abortion Boat' Stirres Up Controversy, INDYMEDIA NL, June 22, 2003, at
http://indymedia.nl/en/2003/06/12512.shtml (hereinafter Abortion Boat).
4. Protests Greet Abortion Boat, EXPATICA.COM-NEWs & COMMUNITY FOR EXPATRIATES IN
THE NETRERLANDS 9, June 23, 2003, at http://www.expatica.com/main.asp?HRSite=&pad=2,
18&itemid=32247.
5. Id.
6. Abortion Boat, supra note 3.
7. Id.
8. Protests Greet Abortion Boat, supra note 4.
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permit. 9 Although a spokeswoman for Women on Waves failed to confirm whether
any Polish women actually terminated a pregnancy aboard the ship, the event cast
Poland's anti-abortion law into controversy 10
The amval of Women on Waves in Polish port initiated a debate among
Polish citizens that foreshadows the clash between Poland's strict anti-abortion law
and the EU's pro-choice policy. Although Poland and the EU's abortion policies
conflict, reconciliation is possible by including a Protocol to Poland's accession
treaty that would guarantee Poland the right to assert its national abortion law over
EU law. Reconciliation could also be achieved by asserting moral sovereignty, the
use of the political process, including legislation, to make citizens "fundamentally
better creatures."" However, after further analyzing the conflict and possible
methods of reconciling Polish and EU law, this paper concludes that reconciliation
would produce a devastating outcome by eroding democracy, women's
fundamental rights, and gender equality- therefore, this paper prescribes that
Poland adopt the EU's pro-choice policy As a result of so doing, Polish women
will have increased constitutional protections against gender discrimination, and
increased protection of privacy Furthermore, Poland will promote democracy
within its borders, and those of the EU.
Section II of this paper examines Poland's tumultuous history Specifically
this section explores: Poland's long ties to Chnstiamty and the role the Catholic
Church plays in Poland; the history of Poland's abortion law under communism
and democracy- and Poland's accession into the EU. In Section III, this paper
discusses the legal effect of the EU's pro-choice policy This section demonstrates
that although the EU's policy is non-binding, Poland would be bound to adopt the
EU's policy as community law through the European Court of Justice's (ECJ)
mterpretation of case law. Section IV explores how Poland and the EU can
reconcile their conflicting viewpoints regarding abortion. Poland can maintain its
abortion law by following Ireland and Malta's example of adopting a protocol to
its accession treaty Poland can also exercise its abortion law under the principle of
moral sovereignty Alternatively as already stated above, this paper suggests in
Section V and concludes in Section VI by recommending that Poland adopt the
EU's pro-choice policy given the devastating effects the current anti-abortion law
has on democracy, women's fundamental rights, and gender equality
II. BACKGROUND
In order to understand the conflict between Poland and the EU's abortion
laws, it is necessary to first examine Poland's Catholic history and the history of
Poland's abortion law.
9. Id.
10. Abortion Boat, supra note 3.
1. Paul Johnson, Is Totalitarianism Dead? Beware of the "New Left" 21, HUMAN LIFE REVIEW
(Spring 1989).
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A. Poland's Catholic History
Poland originated in the 10th century.' 2 The intermingling of politics and
religion in Poland was observable early on as parishes and castles were established
side by side. 13 Poland's predominant denomination is and always has been
Catholicism.14 The image of the "Polish Catholic, however, did not actually
emerge until the 17th Century 15 Poles place an important role on religion, using it
to defme their national identity16 and consider being Catholic as "one of the most
important features of belonging to the Polish nation." 17 Currently over mnety-five
percent of the Polish population is Catholic. 18
Poland's tumultuous history has made its ties to the Catholic Church stronger
as Poles often relied on the Catholic faith and Church to strengthen their national
identity and to increase the country's stability. Poland's geographical location has
been the source of much of its political instability 19 As a vast plain bordered by
Russia and Germany, Poland was a "natural arena" for surrounding armies.20 Its
access to the Baltic also made it a highly sought-after country 21 In its infancy
Poland formed ties to Christianity in 966 A.D. when Prince Mieszko and his court
were baptized.22 The Prince converted to Roman Christiamty to reap the political
and cultural benefits of the religion and to avoid war with Germany and the Roman
Emperor Otto. 23 During the fourteenth century, as Poland became infiltrated by
powerful Germans and was threatened by the Teutonic Knights, Poland formed an
alliance with the Lithuanian empire.24 This alliance was formed when the Polish
King Jadwiga, a female Christian,25 married the pagan Grand Duke Jagiello of
12. ADAM ZAMOYSKI, THE POLISH WAY: A THOUSAND YEAR HISTORY OF THE POLES AND THEIR
CULTURE 10 (1988).
13. Id. at 13.
14. Krystyna Daniel, The Church-State Situation in Poland After the Collapse of Communism,
1995 BYU. L. Rev. 401,402 (1995).
15. Franoise Le Moal, Tolerance in Poland: Political Choice and Tradition, in THE TRADITION
OF POLISH IDEALS 53 (1981). It was during this time that the Catholic Church became source of
national pride for Poles. Id. Ironically, while Catholicism was becoming source of national pride in
Poland, the power of religion was declining throughout the rest of Europe as tolerance increased during
the Enlightenment. Id. at 54. Also, Poland's strong ties to Catholicism in the seventeenth century
occurred at a time when internal disorder weakened the country and a century after Poland's "golden
age, when Poland was once among the richest and most powerful states in Europe. Enlargement:
Relations With Poland, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/poland/index.htm.
16. ZAMOYSKI, supra note 12, at 75.
17. Daniel, supra note 14, at 402.
18. Statistics by Country by Catholic Population, (Oct. 3, 2003), available at http://www.catholic-
hierarchy.org/country/sc l.html.
19. See THOMAS BOKENKOTTER, CHURCH AND REVOLUTION: CATHOLICS IN THE STRUGGLE
FOR DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL INJUSTICE 535 (1998).
20. See id
21. Id. at 536.
22. ZAMOYSKI, supra note 12 at 10.
23. See BOKENKOTTER, supra note 19 at 535. See also ZAMOYSKI, supra note 12, at 10.
24. BOKENKOTTER, supra note 19 at 536.
25. JERZY LuKowsKi & HUBERT ZAWADZI, A CONCISE HISTORY OF POLAND 32 (2001).
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Lithuanla. 26 Although Poland's fate depended on this alliance, their marriage was
conditioned on Jagiello's promise to convert to Catholicism. 27 After Jagiello's
Lithuanian followers converted to Catholicism, the Jagiello Dynasty was able to
conquer the Teutonic Order m 1410 at the battle of Grunwald and Tannenberg. 28
This alliance became the "greatest dynastic concatenation of territory Europe had
ever seen."
29
In modem times, the Catholic Church has continued to play a major role m
Poland. When Polish political institutions were weakened, the Church functioned
as a religious institution as well as a "significant national icon., 30 The Church
played significant roles to Poles during the 123 year period when Poland lost its
independence and also during World War II 31 It was the period after World War I
when Poland became "an overwhelmingly Catholic country. 3 2
Perhaps the Church's most unique and important role m modem times
occurred during communism. Unlike other communistic countries in Europe, the
Church m Poland retained a significant level of autonomy 33 and retained total
freedom to practice.3 4 Iroically, Polish citizens were permitted to practice their
religion under communism 35 despite the fact that the Church gamed strength
during this period and contributed to the public's high dissatisfaction of Soviet
controlled governmental institutions.3 6 The collaboration between Catholic
institutions and Polish society increased during the last decade of the communist
regime. 37 In fact, the Church helped "unify and consolidate Polish society m the
struggle against communism 08 and could claim a "considerable share of
credit" m ending the communist regime in 1989 39
The Catholic Church strengthened Poles' resistance against communism by
advocating human rights and social justice.40 Pope John Paul II played a major role
in increasing independence and solidarity m Poland, his homeland, in the years
26. BOKENKOTER, supra note 19, at 536.
27. LuKowslu & ZAWADZKI, supra note 25, at 32.
28. BOKENKOTER, supra note 19, at 536.
29. LuKOwsKi & ZAWADZKI, supra note 25, at 33. The Jagielloman Dynasty stretched from
"most of East-Central Europe from the Baltic to the Adriatic and from the Black Sea eastward to the
gates of Moscow. BOKENKOTrER, supra note 19, at 536.
30. Daniel, supra note 14, at 403 (1995).
3 1. Id. Poland lost its independence in 1772 and was partitioned among Austria, Prussia, and
Russia for 123 years until 1918. The World Fact Book 2003, Aug. 1, 2003, available at
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publicatons/factbook/geos/p.html.
32. LuKOwsKI & ZAWADZKI, supra note 25, at 252.
33. Poland's People: Determined and Discriminating, at http://www.globalvolunteers.org/
Imain/poland/polandpeople.htm.
34. LuKowSKI & ZAWADZKI, supra note 25, at 252.
35. See The Polish Catholic Church and the People, at http://reference.allrefer.com/country-
guide-study/poland/poland99.htinl.
36. See J. KLOCzOwsKi ET AL., THE OuTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN
POLAND 362-70, 474-508 (Znak, Krak6w 1986).
37 Daniel, supra note 14, at 404.
38. Id.
39. MARJORIE CASTLE & RAY TARAS, DEMOCRACY IN POLAND 94 (2d ed. 2002).
40. BOKENKOTTER supra note 19, at 552.
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immediately preceding the collapse of communsm 4' and during visits to Poland
urged Poles "to unite against oppression" and to "renew the face of Poland.,
4 2
These pronouncements helped inspire the solidarity movement; solidarity was a
movement led by Lech Walesa to promote independent trade unions, freedom of
expression, and the right to strike.43 Solidarity helped create the Soviet Bloc's first
legal independent workers' union and evolved into a major social movement for
democracy and capitalism, leading to the downfall of communism in Poland in
1989.4 Walesa recognized the Catholic Church's important role in promoting
solidarity and believed "solidarity wouldn't have survived without the Church."
45
At the beginning of the Solidarity movement in 1980, leaflets promoting free trade
umons were distributed at both factones and churches.46 When the shipyard
workers led the first strike against communism m Gdansk, Catholic symbols, from
the Virgin Mary and Pope, to crosses, were visible everywhere. 7 Solidarity
banners also found their way into Catholic Churches," one of the only places Poles
could publicly gather.49 Solidarity's growing influence m Polish society climaxed
in 1989 when Solidarity received representation in the lower house of Polish
parliament, the Sejm.'0 This event marked the beginning of the Polish Third
Republic and resulted in the ultimate collapse of communist Poland.51
After communism, Poland established a parliamentary democracy and in 1997
passed a democratic constitution. 2 Although Poland's political regime changed,
the Catholic Church continued to play a role m Polish society and politics.' 3 The
Church played a significant role in lobbying Poland's new government for anti-
abortion legislation. The Church's ability to influence the Polish political process
demands attention, for despite Poland's high Catholic population, the majority of
Poles (sixty percent) oppose its anti-abortion law. The following section explores
the lustory of Poland's abortion law and discusses how the law reflects Catholic
beliefs in spite of Poland's new democratic government.
B. History of Poland's Abortion Law
Although Poles retained their ability to practice Catholicism during
41. Pope's Visit to Former Victory Square Recalls Solidarity Launch, CNN.COM, June 13, 1999,
at http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9906/13/pope.Ol/.
42. Id.
43. LuKOwSKi & ZAWADZKi, supra note 25, at 273.
44. Pope's Visit to Former Victory Square Recalls Solidarity Launch, supra note 42.
45. LECH WALESA, THE STRUGGLE AND THE TRIUMPH 292 (Arcade Publishing, Inc. trans. 1992)
(1991).
46. BOKNEKOTrER, supra note 19, at 553.
47. Id at 555.
48. LUKOwSKi & ZAWADZKI, supra note 25, at 277.
49. BoKEN OIrER, supra note 19, at 562.
50. Id. at 567.
51. LUKOwsKi & ZAWADZKI, supra note 25, at 280.
52. POL. CONST. art. 2.
53. LuKowsKi & ZAWADZKI, supra note 25, at 286.
54. Id.
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communism, the communist regime guaranteed a woman's right to an abortion on
demand.5 5 By contrast, in 1993, only four years after becoming a democracy, the
Polish government passed a restrictive abortion law that prohibited abortion on
social grounds.56 Although this anti-abortion law was overturned by a 1996 law
that permitted abortion through the twelfth week of pregnancy,57 the Polish
Parliament reinstated the 1993 restrictive law only a year later m 1997 "'
The 1997 anti-abortion law, which is the current law, 59 reflects Catholic
beliefs. The Parliament withdrew the liberal 1996 law based on the Constitutional
Tribunal's decision that Article 38 of the Polish Constitution, which guarantees
legal protection of life to every human-being, implies the protection of "life at
every stage." 6 The present abortion law limits abortion to cases involving rape or
incest, a threat to a woman's life, or a damaged fetus.6i In practice, however,
obtaining an abortion even in these circumstances is seldom permitted.62
After being adopted, the current abortion law's strict requirements
significantly decreased the number of legal abortions per year. While abortion rates
were as high as 199,400 per year under communism,63 they dramatically fell
during democracy from 82,137 m 1989 to only 140 in 2 002.
64 With the exception
of 1997 abortion rates have drastically decreased every year during democracy 
65
Alarmingly, the number of abortions actually occurrng through illegal methods is
as high as 200,000 a year.66
55. GAZETA WYBORCZA, August 22, 1994, at 4. Many women used abortion during communism
as a family planning method due to a lack of subsidized family planning programs in Poland.
56. See Shana Penn, Poland Backs Away From Liberalizing Abortion Laws, WOMEN ENEws
(Feb. 7, 2003), at http://Iists.partners-tntl.net/pipermail/neww-nghts/2003-February/000807.html
(hereinafter "Poland Backs Away"). The 1993 law permitted abortion only where there was rape or
incest, a threat to the woman' life, or where the fetus was damaged. Id.
57 Federation for Women and Family Planning, Independent Report Submitted to the United
Nations Human Rights Committee on Gender Discrimination 2 (1999), available at
http:lwww.waw.pdi.net/-polfedwo/english/hrc.htn.
58. Ian Traynor, Abortion Issue Threatens Polish Admission to EU, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 30,
2003.
59. Federation for Women and Family Planning, supra note 57.
60. Id. See also POL. CONST. (1997) art. 38, which states: "The Republic of Poland shall ensure
the legal protection of the life of every human being.
61. Poland Backs Away, supra note 56.
62. Federation for Women and Family Planning, supra note 57, 6. The medical community's
personal beliefs and their ignorance of the anti-abortion act have forced women with serious medical
problems to give birth. Id
63. Win. Robert Johnston, Historical Abortion Statistics, Poland, Sept. 25, 2003, at
http://www.johnstonarchive.net/policy/abortion/ab-poland.html.
64. Id
65. The nse in abortion rates in 1997 was probably the result of the liberalized abortion law of
1996. Although the 1996 law was overturned in 1997 by a law restricting abortions, the 1997 law was
not enforced until 1998. Federation for Women and Family Planning, supra note 58.
66. Mindy Kay Bncker, Anti-Abortion Group Inspired by Slovak Push, PRAGuE POST, Apr. 10,
2003, available at http://www.praguepost.com/P03/2003/Art/0410/pnnt-template.php.
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C. Poland's Accession into the EU
On May 1, 2004 Poland is expected to join the EU.67 The majority of Poles
voted to join the EU6" despite fears that the EU promoted a liberalism that could
"destroy Polish deep religious roots and the Polish Catholic Church. 69
Notwithstanding the EU's liberal position, Pope John Paul II, a Pole, urged his
countrymen to vote for EU membership as a way to balance the EU's liberalism
with Poland's conservative values. 70
In 2002, the EU urged all candidate countries to liberalize their reproductive
nghts legislation. 71 Although the Polish government initially agreed to liberalize
reproductive rights upon admission in the EU, Poland bowed to Church pressure
and requested that the EU recognize its anti-abortion law.72 Poland changed its
position to ensure that its large catholic population would vote for EU
membership.73 The EU has recognized that Poland is a "central player" m its
enlargement plan.74 Because several of the candidate countries expected to accede
to the EU with Poland also have significant Catholic populations,75 Poland's
method of reconciling its abortion laws with the EU's policy will likely influence
these and future member countries.
III. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN POLAND AND THE EU'S ABORTION LAWS
A direct conflict exists between Poland and the EU's position on abortion.
Article 38 of the Polish Constitution prohibits abortion and states, "The Republic
67 The World Fact Book, supra note 31. In 1994, Poland submitted its application for EU
accession to the European Commission. Relations with Poland, at http://www.europaeu.int
/commlenlargement/poland/index.htm. Poland began negotiating full EU membership in 1998 after
joining NATO. Id Poland's accession was part of the Nice Council's Enlargement Strategy to enlarge
the EU with Central and Eastern European countries. Embassy of the Republic of Poland, The Eastern
Policy of the European Union in the Run-Up to the EU's Enlargement to Include the Countries of
Central and Eastern Europe-Poland's Viewpoint, available at http'/www.polandembassy.org/
Policy/p4-5.htm.
68. Poland Says Big Yes to EU, BBC NEws, June 9, 2003, available at
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetoos/pnnt/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hieurope/2973738.stm.
69. Jagoda Urban-Klaehn, European Union's Shortcomings in Eyes of Polish Euro-Skeptics, Final
Remarks (M7), BELLA ONLINE, (Feb. 9, 2003), at http://www.bellaonline.com/articles/art8206.asp. Poles
find the EU to be liberal because the EU's taxation system, which gives benefits to single parents and
unmarried couples, promotes homosexual mamage and sexual freedom.
70. Traynor, supra note 58.
71. Poland Backs Away, supra note 56.
72. Id
73. Id. About 77.5% of Poles voted in favor of the referendum to join the EU with the voter
turnout reported around 59 /o. A 50% turnout was necessary to validate the referendum. Id.
74. Deloy, supra note 1. Poland is the largest and most populated of the ten countries, primarily
from Eastern Europe, expected to join the EU in spring 2004. Poland Says Big Yes to EU, supra note
68.
75. Countries with a large catholic population and strict abortion laws include Poland, Slovakia,
Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Abortion not Considered in Enlargement
Talks, EUObserver.com, at http://www.euobserver.con/index.phtnl?/o20selectedtopic=l 5&actio.
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of Poland shall ensure the legal protection of the life of every human being. 76 The
Polish Constitutional Tribunal interpreted this Article to imply the protection of
"life at every stage." 77 In contrast, the EU is pro-choice. Although the EU lacks
direct legislation legalizing abortion, the EU publicly endorses abortion as the
"best practice" for women's reproductive health. 78The EU also exerts political
pressure to get member states to legalize abortion. 79 The following sections
examine this conflict and explore how, despite the fact that the EU's law is non-
binding, Poland would be bound by community law to promote abortion as set
forth in SPUC v. Grogan.
80
A. The EU's Pro-Choice Policy
Poland's abortion law is the most restrictive abortion law in Eastern Europe.8 1
Along with Ireland's law, it is among the strictest abortion laws throughout
Europe.82 The European Parliament's position, which was evident early on,
distinctly differs from Poland's by endorsing freedom of choice.8 3 In 1995 the EU
issued the following statement, "it is critically unportant that individuals and
couples can access reproductive health and family planning information and
services "84 As recent as July 2002 the European Parliament voted to adopt
the Van Lackner report on sexual and reproductive rights.85 As a result of the vote,
the European Parliament passed a resolution suggesting that "in order to safeguard
women's reproductive health and rights, abortion should be made legal, safe, and
accessible to all."8 6 The resolution also recommended accessibility to the morning-
after pill.8 7 While the European Parliament voted to adopt the Van Lancker
resolution as being the "best practice" for women's reproductive rights and health,
the resolution fails to be binding on member states.8 8 Rather, the responsibility of
passing reproductive health legislation lies with the individual member states.8 9
76. POL. CONST. art. 38.
77. Federation for Women and Planning, supra note 57.
78. Anne Van Lancker, Report on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights, 2001.
79. Patrick Fitzmaunce, Note & Comment, Attorney General v. X A Lost Opportunity to Examine
the Limits of European Integratio, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1723, 1732 (200 1).
80. See generally Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child v. Grogan and Others, [1997]
317/92 (Transcript) (It. S.C.) (interpreting EU law) [hereinafter Grogan].
81. Traynor, supra note 58.
82. Deloy, supra note 1.
83. The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children, European Parliament Votes to Promote
Abortion, at http://www.spuc.org.uk/releases/20020703.htm [hereinafter European Parliament Votes].
84. Statement of European Union, HE. Mr. Manfred Kanther, U.N. Population Division, Dept. of
Economic and Social Affairs, 94-09-05, §2, 5 (1994).
85. European Parliament Votes, supra note 83.
86. Van Lancker, supra note 78.
87. European Parliament Votes, supra note 83.
88. Van Lancker, supra note 78.
89. Id.
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B. The Legal Effect of the EU's Abortion Policy
Despite the EU's pro-choice stance, abortion and health services fail to be
within the EU's competency. 90 Even with Poland's impending accession to the EU,
there is no "direct challenge from Brussels to Poland's abortion laws 01
Regardless, Poles still face a challenge from the EU. Even though the EU
lacks competency regarding abortion and health services, the EU promotes
freedom of choice. Presently except Ireland, the EU and all of its member states
endorse abortion.92 Because most EU member states have already legalized
abortion, new members fear that the EU may require them to legalize abortion in
the future.93 This fear is legitimate, for even though the European Parliament has
repeatedly stated it does not favor abortion as a method of family planning, it has
adopted five resolutions since 1994 calling for the legalization of abortion. 94 While
these resolutions are non-binding they are a "means of exerting political
pressure. 95
Moreover, although the EU's abortion policy is non-binding, it still poses a
threat to Poland because EU law is supreme over national law. 9 If abortion
becomes community law, Polish courts would be obligated to give full effect to
this law under Article 5 of the Maastricht Treaty.97 As a member state, Poland
cannot interpret any EU directive or regulation under its national laws but would
have to refer to the ECJ to interpret such matters.98 EU laws that are binding and
have precedence over national law but do not regulate abortion may still indirectly
promote abortion. For instance, member states may be subject to taxes which are
then used to fund abortions. 99 Promoting abortion even indirectly conflicts with
Poland's abortion law and its conservative Catholic beliefs.
In order to be binding, the EU's abortion policy must be based on primary
legislation, secondary legislation, or case law, the combination of which form the
acquis communautaire.i°° Candidate states "must adopt, implement and enforce
90. European Parliament Votes, supra note 83.
91. Traynor, supra note 58.
92. Carmel Attard, The Unborn Child, (July 29, 2002), at httpJ/www.mic.org.mt/
EUINFO/sector/unbomchild.htm.




96. Fitzmaunce, supra note 79.
97. Article 5 "imposes constitutional obligation on national courts to give full effect to
Community law and from ECJ decisions interpreting the Treaty so that EU law is directly effective and
superior to national law. Id. at 1737-38. This provision conflicts with article 8 of the Polish
Constitution which states that Polish law is the supreme law of the land.
98. Id.
99. John Rossiello, European Union Funds Abortion Over Education, NewsMax.com, (Nov. 19,
2002), at http://www.newsmax.com/cgi-bin/pnnterfriendly.pl?page=http://www.newsmax-com/
archives/articles/2002/11/19/82832.shtml.
100. Acquts Communautaire, DEUTSCHE WELLE (July 12, 2002), at http://www.dw-
world.de/english/0,3367,/o20 1430_A_707549,00.htrnl. The Acquis communautare refers to the entire
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all the acquis to be allowed to join the EU."' 0 ' Case law that is binding on Poland
includes judgments by the ECJ.10 2 Poland would therefore be bound by the Court's
decision in Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd v.
Grogan. 1
0 3
Grogan was the first case in which a member state, Ireland, referred a case to
the ECJ regarding a direct conflict between national and community abortion
laws. 104 Although the ECJ failed to address this direct conflict, its decision laid the
framework whereby ECJ case law would override a national constitution's ban on
abortion.
0 5
In Grogan theplaintiff sought a preliminary injunction in the Irish High Court
against defendants alleging they violated Article 40.3.3 of the Irish Constitution.'"
The plaintiff accused defendants, three student unions m Ireland, of violating the
Irish Constitution by publishing pamphlets containing information about abortion
clinics m the United Kingdom. 0 7 The defendants argued that their right to
disseminate such information was derived from their "legal economic right to
receive information about services available in other member states ",108 The
defendants claimed this right under Articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty of Rome, 109
which guarantees one the right to travel to avail oneself of services in other
member states. " 0
While the Irish High Court agreed with defendants' argument, it referred three
issues to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.' The first issue was whether abortion
was a "service" as provided for in Article 60 of the European Economic
body of European laws and typically refers to the preparations by the 12 candidate countries in their
accession process. Acquis Communautaire, BBC NEWS, (Apr. 30, 2001), available at
http:/lnews.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in-depth/europe/euro-glossary/1216329.stm. Primary legislation refers to
treaties and agreements similar in stature to treaties. Primary law is created by "direct negotiations
between member state governments; such agreements may be ratified by national parliaments.
Secondary legislation is made through regulations, directives, decisions, and recommendations and
opinions. All but the latter are binding upon member states. Case law is also binding on member states
and is based upon judgments from the European Court of First Instance and the European Court of
Justice. LUR-Lex, at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/about/pap/process and players2.html.
101. Acquis Communautaire, BBC NEwS, (Apr. 30, 2001), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in-depth/europe/euro-glossary/1216329.stm.
102. Id.
103. Grogan, supra note 80.
104. Donald A. MacLean, Note, Can the EC Kill the Irish Unborn?- An Investigation of the
European Community's Ability to Impinge on the Moral Sovereignty of Member States, 28 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 527, 554 (1999).
105. Allison M. Clifford, Comment, Abortion in International Waters Off the Coast of Ireland:
Avoiding Collision Between Irish Moral Sovereignty and the European Community, 14 PACE INT'L L.
REv. 385, 405 (2002).
106. Article 40.3.3 of the Irish Constitution guarantees the right of life of the unborn.
107. Grogan, supra note 80.
108. Clifford, supra note 105, at 402-403.
109. In 1991 the Maastricht Treaty replaced the Treaty of Rome. Id. at 405.
110. Id. at 402-403. Articles 59 and 60 referred to in this note are currently 49 and 50. Id
111. Grogan, supra note 80.
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Community Treaty 112 The ECJ ruled it was. 1 3 The second issue was whether a
member state could prohibit the distribution of information regarding the identity
location, and means of abortion clinics m another member state.114 The final issue
was whether a right existed m community law granting a person in a member state
where abortion was constitutionally prohibited the right to distribute information
about abortion m another member state where abortion is pernitted." 5 Regarding
the latter two issues, the ECJ held:
It is not contrary to community law for a Member-State in which medical
termination of pregnancy is forbidden to prohibit students [or] associations from
distributing information about the identity and location of clinics in another
Member-State where voluntary termination of pregnancy is lawfully carried out
and the means of communicating with those clinics, where the clinics in question
have no involvement in the distribution of the said information.l 16
Scholars have interpreted the ECJ's comment to mean that although abortion is a
service and thus may be subject to community law, there must be "an econonuc
nexus between [the information provider] and an abortion provider i17
Because the information provider in Grogan was not the clinic itself but student
unions, no nexus existed. Ireland's prohibition therefore was not a restriction
"within the meaning of Article 59 [currently Article 49] of the Treaty ,,i8 Thus
national law, not community law applied. " 9
In deciding the latter two issues, the ECJ failed to directly address the
conflicting abortion laws between two member states.120 Its decision regarding
abortion as a service within Article 60 of the Rome Treaty does imply, however,
that Poland would be subject to community law if the appropriate nexus exists. The
ECJ's decision that community law may apply threatens Poland's anti-abortion law
and its citizens' Catholic beliefs.
IV RECONCILING THE ABORTION LAWS
Considering the umqueness of abortion and the diversity between member
states, it may be difficult for the ECJ to dictate whether a member state should
legalize abortion. Scholars have argued that abortion is "special" because it places
the absolute right of the unborn as guaranteed by some member constitutions






117. Clifford, supra note 105, at 404; MacLean, supra note 104, at 557 (1994).
118. MacLean, supra note 104, at 557
119. Grogan, supra note 80. However, because the Irish High Court and the ECJ failed to issue an
express order refusing or enjoining the injunction, the plaintiff appealed to the Irish Supreme Court and
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120. MacLean, supra note 104, at 557.
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member's constitution. 121 Member states' legal and social orders are so diverse that
it is impossible for a "uniform European conception of morality" to exist.' 22 Thus
it may be impossible for the European Court of Justice to choose which of these
rights is a community right.123 The decision therefore, whether to legalize abortion
should be left to member states that owe a democratic responsibility to its
citizens. 1
24
The following sections demonstrate how national law, instead of community
law, can ultimately determine whether abortion is permissible. Poland's abortion
law can supersede community law if Poland adopts a protocol to its accession
treaty similar to Ireland's and Malta's. Poland can also claim moral sovereignty as
a basis for its national law to supersede community law.
A. The Irish and Maltese Models
Grogan demonstrated that Poland cannot restrict its citizens from receiving
services including abortion. 25 In order to maintain its anti-abortion law member
states should negotiate a special provision in its individual accession treaty.126
Presently only one member state, Ireland, has done so. 27 Malta, a country
expected to accede to the EU the same time as Poland, is also expected to negotiate
special provisions in its accession treaty to preserve its national anti-abortion
law. 12
8
Article 40.3.3 of the Irish Constitution guarantees the right of life to the
unborn. 129 After the ECJ's decision in Grogan, the Irish government sought a way
to prevent EU law from overriding its constitutional protection of the unborn.1
3 0
Grogan involved the ECJ's interpretation of the laws under the Treaty of Rome.'
3 '
Shortly after Grogan, the Maastricht Treaty replaced the Treaty of Rome.
132
Ireland annexed Protocol No. 17 to the Maastricht Treaty to state:
The High Contracting Parties have agreed upon the following provision, which
shall be annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaties establishing
the European Communities. Nothing in the Treaty on European Union, or in the
121. Human Rights in the Union Legal Order- Review of Community Measures-The Conundrum of
"High and "Low Standards, at http://wwwjeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/96/9602-I.html.
122. See also Peta Gaye-Miller, Note, Member State Sovereignty and Women's Reproductive
Rights: The European Union's Response, 22 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 195 (1999).
123. See id.
124. See Fitzmaunce, supra note 79, at 1752.
125. See Grogan, supra note 80; see also MacLean, supra note 104, at 527
126. Abortion not Considered in Enlargement Talks, supra note 75; see also Clifford, supra note
105, at 410 (stating that a Constitutional Amendment is required to ratify the Maastncht Treaty).
127. Treaty on European Union and Final Act, 31 I.L.M. 247, 362 (1992) (annexing Protocol No.
17 to the Maastncht Treaty and to the Treaties Establishing the European Communities).
128. Malta-EU, supra note 93.
129. IR. CONST. art. 40.3.3 (1937).
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Treaties establishing the European Communities, or in the Treaties or Acts
modifying or supplementing the European Communities, or in the Treaties or Acts
modifying or supplementing those Treaties, shall affect the application in Ireland
of Article 40.3.3. of the Constitution of Ireland.
33
Protocol 17 "directs the European Court of Justice to defer to Irish law insofar as
there may be a conflict between Community law and the application in Ireland of
Article 40.3.3. of the Constitution."'1
34
Like Ireland, Malta negotiated a protocol on abortion to its accession treaty.
35
This legally binding protocol is enforceable in the ECJ.136 The protocol states:
"Nothing in the Treaty on European Union, or in the Treaties establishing the
European Communities, or in the Treaties or Acts modifying or supplementing
those Treaties, shall affect the application in the temtory of Malta of national
legislation relating to abortion.' 137 Unlike Ireland's protocol which merely refers
to its constitutional provision banning abortion, Malta's protocol directly mentions
abortion. 38 Malta enacted its protocol as a "faithful reflection of the values of the
Maltese people."'1
39
In order to maintain its abortion law, Poland should enact a protocol like
Ireland's and Malta's. Similar to Ireland's constitutional provision, Article 38 of
Poland's constitution prohibits abortion. To date, however, Poland lacks a
protocol whereby its abortion law would ovemde community law. As Malta's
protocol demonstrates, a protocol may be enacted to reflect the values of its
citizens; Poland has failed to seek such a protocol even though a large number of
its citizens view EU membership as a threat to its Catholic values.140
B. Reconciling Abortion Laws through Moral Sovereignty
Poland can also assert moral sovereignty to reflect the values of its Catholic
citizens. Moral sovereignty, as developed by Rousseau, is the belief that the
"political process can be used to make men and women fundamentally better
creatures." 14 1 "In the case of sexual politics, the object is to use the legislative
process to rewrite the rules of sexual behavior. 142 The Polish Government used
its political processes to support Catholic pro-life beliefs in promulgating and
interpreting Article 38 of the Polish Constitution. Article 38 ensures "the legal
protection of the life of every human being. The Polish Tribunal interpreted this
133. Treaty on European Union and Final Act, 31 I.L.M. 247, 362 (1992) (annexing Protocol No.
17 to the Maastricht Treaty and to the Treaties Establishing the European Communities).
134. Clifford, supra note 105, at 406.
135. Id.
136. Busuttil, supra note 93.
137. Clifford, supra note 105, at 406.
138. Busuttil, supra note 93.
139. Id.
140. Urban-Klaehn, supra note 69.
141. Johnson, supra note 11.
142. Id
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Article as implying the "protection of life at every stage. 143 Although Poland
used its legislative processes to promulgate and interpret Article 38, it failed to
legislate special provisions m its individual accession treaty to prevent community
law from ovemding its anti-abortion law.
In the event of such a conflict, Poland should assert moral sovereignty, a
principle reflected m the preamble of the draft of the EU's constitution
(Constitution). 44 The Constitution says within its first few lines that the Union
recognizes its "spiritual and moral heritage."' 4 5 The EU should recognize its
"spritual and moral heritage" by supporting the diverse spiritual and moral beliefs
held by its member states.. Article 111-181 of the Constitution even states that the
"Union shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the member states, while
respecting their national and regional diversity " 146 The Union shall also ain
for the "conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European
significance." 147 Additionally, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union (the
Charter), which is part of the Constitution, encompasses the principle of moral
sovereignty and respect for the Union's "spiritual and moral heritage. ' ' 14 The
Charter declares that the Union respects the "diversity of the cultures and traditions
of the peoples of Europe as well as the national identities of the Member
States. ,,49
Because Poland's national identity derives from Catholicism'S° the EU should
permit Poland to maintain its abortion law. Catholicism has "defined the Polish
nation for over a thousand years, including long periods m which no Polish state
existed."'1' Poland has also maintained its values "through long periods of foreign
and authoritarian rule." 152 By recogmizmg Poland's Catholic influence the EU can
also promote Europe's Christian heritage. Christianity helped unify Europe and
"inspired the democratic ideal and human rights of modem Europe."'153 Finally, the
EU should recognize Poland's role as Europe's moral compass. 54 Poland's brutal
istory taught Poles the "essential wisdom and strength of European values." 155
Moral sovereignty also promotes democratic principles as reflected in the
143. Federation for Women and Family Planning, supra note 57.
144. Draft Treaty Establishing Constitution for Europe, Preamble, July 18, 2003, CONV 850/03.
145. Id. Although the preamble refers to Europe's moral and spirtual heritage it does not directly
reference Europe's Chnstian heritage. Pope John Paul II recently urged EU leaders to include a clear
reference to Christianity. Pope Renews Appeal to EU Leaders on Constitution, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Aug. 17, 2003.
146. Draft Treaty Establishing Constitution for Europe, art. 111-181, July 18, 2003, CONV
850/03.
147. Id.
148. Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, July 18, 2003, CONV 850/03.
149. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union, preamble, in Draft Treaty Establishing
Constitution for Europe, July 18, 2003, CONV 850/03. July 18, 2003, CONV 850/03.
150. Daniel, supra note 14, at 401-402.
151. CASTLE & TARAS, supra note 39, at 220.
152. GEORGE SANFORD, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN POLAND 232 (2002).
153. Pope Renews Appeal to EU Leaders on Constitution, supra note 145.
154. ZAMOYSKI, supra note 12, at 395.
155. Id.
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EU's Constitution. 156 Article 2 of the Constitution states that "the Union is founded
on respect for. democracy. 157 Moral sovereignty is necessary to promote a
democratic society. 158 Sovereignty is "the ability of a nation to determine the
welfare of its own citizen ,,159 Democratic society requires the "fidelity of the
government to ideals of the moral sovereignty of the people as constitutive and the
recognition that the obedience of citizens to the state's assertions of the law derives
from the state's success in meeting these ideals."' 6 The Polish Parliament
interpreted Article 38 of its Constitution to reflect the moral ideals of its
citizenry 16 1 which is ninety-five percent Catholic. 6 2 Because the EU's Constitution
claims to recognize the "specific contribution" of member churches,16 it should
recognize Poland's abortion law.
The EU's goal for "greater political and cultural integration" has created
concern among many European states that they would lose their national
identity. 164 Poles share this concern and fear a loss of sovereignty, especially since
they were only recently freed from a repressive communist regime. The EU's
Constitution states that the EU "shall take cultural aspects into account to
respect and to promote the diversity of its cultures."' 66 The EU's Constitution
further says, "The Union shall respect the national identities of the Member States,
inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional." i67 Because
the EU is predominantly liberal,ita the EU can promote diversity and democracy
within the Union by supporting Poland's law and thus fulfills its constitutional
purpose to create a diverse and democratic union.
In sum, a constitutional protocol and moral sovereignty provide the basis
whereby Poland's abortion law can withstand conflicting community law
Adopting a protocol and applying the principle of moral sovereignty would
preserve Poland and Europe's unique cultural and Catholic heritage while
promoting diversity and democracy within the EU.
156. Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, July 18, 2003, art. 2, CONV 850/03.
157. Id.
158. Michael H. Hoffheimer, Hegel's First Philosophy of Law, 62 TENN. L. REv. 823, 889 (1995).
159. Yamin Zakana, Defining Sovereignty! A New Political Concept? KCOM J. (May 13, 2001),
available at http://www.khilafah.com/home/category.php?DocumentlD=1533&TaglD=l#.
160. Hoflheimer, supra note 158, at 889.
161. See Federation for Women and Family Planning, supra note 57. The Polish Parliament
interpreted Article 38 as meaning the "right of life at every stage.
162. Statistics by Country by Catholic Population, supra note 18.
163. Draft Treaty Establishing Constitution for Europe, July 18, 2003, art. 51(3), CONV 850/03.
164. CASTLE & TARAS, supra note 39, at 220.
165. Deloy, supra note 1.
166. Draft Treaty Establishing Constitution for Europe, July 18, 2003, art. 111-181, CONV
850/03.
167 Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, July 18, 2003, art. 5(1), CONV 850/03.
168. Urban-Klaehn, supra note 69. This text refers to "modem liberal.
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V WHY POLAND SHOULD ADOPT THE EU'S ABORTION POLICIES
This final section argues that although diversity and democracy within the EU
is important, Poland should first increase diversity and democracy within its own
borders by adopting the EU's pro-choice policy. The EU can only be a democratic
union if its member states practice democracy This section demonstrates the
undemocratic effect of Poland's abortion law. The law fails to reflect the voice of
the majority of Polish citizens, it threatens women's fundamental rights, and it
creates damaging stereotypes that repress women and contribute to gender
discrimination.
A. The Voice of the Polish Majority
As mentioned earlier, despite the fact that ninety-five percent of Poles are
Catholic,' 69 sixty percent of Poland's citizens oppose the Polish abortion law.17 In
addition, the majority of Poles want a secular state, 17 1 with approximately seventy-
five percent of Poland's population disapproving of the Church's political
activity 172
Poland's constitutional history also demonstrates that its citizens sought a
secular state m spite of their country's strong ties to Catholicism. 173 Poland's
constitution of 1952 guaranteed the separation of church and state. 174 Article 82 of
the 1952 constitution required statutory law to establish a church-state
relationship. 175 Articles 25(4) and 25(5) of Poland's current constitution declare
that relations between Poland, the Catholic Church, and all other churches shall be
determined by statute. 76 Thus Poland's current constitution, which was enacted in
1997 and after the fall of communism, promotes an ideologically-neutral state.
Poland can maintain its strong Catholic heritage while promoting a secular
government. According to Tocqueville, a secular democracy can promote Roman
Catholicism.t 7 7 Tocqueville asserts that "America is the most democratic country
in the world, and it is at the same time the country in which the Roman
169. Statistics by Country by Catholic Population, supra note 18.
170. Poland Backs Away, supra note 56.
171. CASTLE & TARAS, supra note 39, at 220.
172. Daniel, supra note 14, at 413.
173. See generally id at 405.
174. POL. CONST. art. 82 (1952). The 1952 Constitution was Poland's first constitution asserting
Poland as an ideologically neutral country. Daniel, supra note 14, at 405. Although the 1952
Constitution was passed under a communistic regime, Poland's current constitution of 1997 promotes
an ideologically-neutral state. See R.P art. 25(4) and art. 25(5). In contrast, Poland's previous
constitutions of 1791 and 1921 used the pnnciple of primam inter pares to establish privileged role
for the Catholic Church. Daniel, supra note 14, at 405.
175. POL. CONST. art. 82 (1952).
176. POL. CONST. art. 25(4), art. 25(5) (1997).
177. See ALEXIS DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, vol. II, 30 (1945).
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Catholic religion makes the most progress. Tocqueville further states that
Catholicism fosters equality amongst people and promotes democracy.1 7 Italy, a
country with catholic ties and a similar religious history to Poland nevertheless
maintains a secular government. 79 Italy boasts a higher Catholic population than
Poland,180 yet maintains separation between church and state.
Scholars have also shown a correlation between Poland's stability as a nation
and the role of the Church. The Church's significance increased when Poland
faced a serious political crisis and democracy was unattainable. 81 With increased
democracy, however, the Church's prommence amongst Poles decreased.1
8 2
Because Poland is now democratic and free and the majority of its citizens seek
secularization, the Polish govenment should promote separation between church
and state.
B. Fundamental Rights
Poland should adopt the EU's abortion policy to ensure the findamental
rights of its citizens. Presently there is no fundamental right to an abortion.
8 3
There is, however, a fundamental right to religion. 184 Although Poles may assert
their right to religion as a basis for prohibiting abortion, the international
community has a duty to protect certain human rights and can limit religious
freedom.'8 5 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter
"ICCPR") limits religious freedom when necessary to protect fundamental rights
and one's health. Is6
178. ALExis DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, vol. i, 311 (1945).
179. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Int ' Religious Freedom Report 2002, U.S.
Dept. of State: Italy, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drllrls/irf/2002/13941.htm. Italy's 1947
Constitution established freedom of religion. Before this constitution, a 1929 Concordat recognized
Catholicism as Italy's state religion. However, in 1984 revised Concordant declared Italy a secular
state. Id
180. Over 97% of Italy's population is Catholic whereas Poland's Catholic population is 95%.
Statistics by Country by Catholic Population, supra note 18.
181. Daniel, supra note 14, at 417.
182. Id.
183. Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, Dueling Fates: Should the International Legal Regime Accept a
Collective or Individual Paradigm to Protect Women's Rights, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 227, 233 (2002).
There is a current movement among some groups who insist that the United Nations develop
"international human rights, which would include the right to abortion. Securing Our Sovereignty
(United Families International), 3 Quarter Newsletter, available at http://www.unitedfamilies.org/
secsovereignty3q2002.html.
184. Religious freedom is fundamental nght. Tus right is recognized in: the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Helsinki
Accords, the Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and Discrimimation Based on
Religion, the U.N. Charter, and The European Convention for the Protection of Human rights and
Fundamental Freedoms.
185. Shannon Renton Wolf; Making Waves: Circumventing Domestic Law on the High Seas, 14
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 109 (2003).
186. Nichol Jeannette Starr, Who Asked You?- The Appropriateness of U.S. Leadership in
Promoting Religious Freedom Worldwide, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 987, 994 (2000).
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Poland's abortion law violates the ICCPR because it threatens women's
fundamental right to liberty. 7 Some argue that "without the right to control their
own body most other rights are difficult for women to attam. ' 188 Abortion is
the only right that women alone need.' 8 9
Poland's anti-abortion law further violates the ICCPR because it severely
threatens women's health. Poland's law has not stopped abortions but forces it
underground.i90 Underground abortions have jeopardized women's health and
rights to such an extent that two U.N. committees have voiced concerns about
human rights violations. 191 The number of illegal abortions occurring each year in
Poland is estimated to be as high as 200,000.92 Such clandestine abortions are not
only very expensive, but are life threatening. 193 The law has caused tragedies m the
health and life of hundreds of thousands of women.' 94 Forcing women to give birth
against their will also results in abandonment and infanticide.1
95
Moreover, Poland's anti-abortion law violates the ICCPR because doctors
arbitrarily decide when to perform abortions, even when they are permitted under
the anti-abortion law's exception. 196 Article 17 of the ICCPR guarantees
individuals the right to be free from arbitrary or unlawful interference with one's
privacy [and] family ,,197 While Poland's abortion law permits abortion when
the mother's life or health is threatened, when a high probability of severe and
irreversible damage to the fetus exists, and when the pregnancy is a result of a
criminal act, 9i in reality, obtaining an abortion even in these situations is rare.' 99
Many doctors are either unaware of the exception to Poland's abortion law or
refuse to perform abortions when the exception is met.2"
187 Federation for Women and Family Planning, supra note 57
188. Howard-Hassmann, supra note 183, at 232 (2002).
189. Id. at 233.
190. Bncker, supra note 66.
191. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant:
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee-Polandc CCPR/C/SR.1779 (1999). Report of
the Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr. Alvaro Gil-Robles, on His Visit to Poland 11,
CommDH(2003)4, (Nov. 2002).
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193. Wanda Nowicka, Ethical Considerations on Anti-Abortion Law: Poland, September 2000,
available at http://www.rodicovstvo.sk/nowicka.htm.
194. Shana Penn, Breaking the Silence: How Poland's Abortion Law Jeopardizes Women's Health
and Rights, Tribunal on Anti-Abortion Law in Poland, available at http://www.waw.pdi.netf
polfedwo/english/news/tribunal/shana~jenn.htm (hereinafter "Breaking the Silence").
195. See Wanda Nowieka & Agata Zielinska, The Anti-Abortion Law in Poland: The Functioning,
Social Effects, Attitudes and Behaviors, Sept. 2000, available at http://www.waw.pdi.net/
polfedwo/englishfreports/report00/repO0_5.htm (hereinafter "Nowicka & Zielinska").
196. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 17, G.A. Res.
2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
197. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 17, G.A. Res. 2200,
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
198. Report of the Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr. Alvaro Gil-Robles, on His Visit to Poland
11-12, CommDH(2003)4, (Nov. 2002).
199. Id. at 12.
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In one case, a woman with an artificial heart valve died after being forced to
give brth against her and her husband's will. 20 1 In another instance, a woman with
brain cancer needed an abortion so she could continue to receive her cancer
treatment. 20 2 Her doctors refused to perform the abortion and discontinued her
cancer treatment so she could give birth.20 3 The woman tragically died within two
months after giving bith.204 Doctors also refuse to perform abortion in cases
involving rape even though abortion is permitted in such circumstances. 205 Rape is
a crime against personal freedom and violates a woman's human rights. 2° 6 In still
other cases, doctors refused to perform abortion on grounds of conscientious
objection.20 7 Doctors' reluctance to perform abortions has significantly decreased
the number of legal abortions performed to such an extent that only 140 legal
abortions occurred in 2002 .
Finally, Poland's anti-abortion law violates Article 38 of the Polish
constitution. Article 38 guarantees the protection of life of every human.209
Ironically, because the Polish Tribunal interpreted Article 38 as prohibiting
abortion, this Article now fails to protect a woman's life when she is demed a
necessary abortion. The Tribunal's interpretation also conflicts with Article 47 of
the Polish Constitution which states, "[e]veryone shall have the right to legal
protection of his private and family life, of his honour and good reputation and to
make decisions about his personal life., 210  This right is also reflected m the
European Convention on Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter
"ECHR"). 211 Article 8 of the ECHR guarantees that "[e]veryone has the right to
respect for his private and family life 212
C. Gender Discrimination
The Polish legal system and Polish society promote gender discrimination.2 13
Gender discrimination violates Article 32 of Poland's Constitution which
201. Federation for Women and Family Planning, supra note 57
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208. Johnston, supra note 63.
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211. See generally Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art.
8, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (1950).
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guarantees the equality of all persons.214 Since the fall of communism, women
have lost the benefits of equal pay for equal work, maternity, and childcare. 215 The
loss of maternity and childcare benefits forces women to assume a primary role m
the home because childcare services are insufficient and domestic services are
expensive. 6 This perpetuates the traditional stereotype of a woman as mother and
wife.
217
The widespread discrimination women face m the labor market also
perpetuates this stereotype.2 ' 8 Discrimination in the work place violates Article 65
of the Polish Constitution which states, "everyone shall have the freedom to
choose and to pursue his occupation and to choose his place of work., 219 In reality,
women seeking jobs are frequently asked to undergo pregnancy tests as a means of
eliminating pregnant women from employment.220  Women also face
disproportionate pay, earning thirty percent less than men and receiving a pension
forty percent less than men2 2i despite being more educated than men.222
Gender discrimination and stereotypes can be decreased by adopting the EU's
pro-choice policy The EU has found women's participation in the Polish private
sector to be unsatisfactory.223 The Polish government is predominantly male and
fails to address gender issues.224 Although the Polish Parliament created a sub-
committee on the equal status of women and men and recently sent legislation on
gender equality to the Polish Senate, Polish leaders did so only to meet EU
standards on gender equality 225 Gender equality requires more than merely
amending laws.226 The EU recognizes that action is necessary and announced:
Paper legislation to promote equality for women is necessary but not enough.
Governments, business, administrators, political parties, all must take more active
steps to make equality a practical reality. Up to now member states have largely
214. Article 32 of the Polish Constitution states "All persons shall be equal before the law. All
persons shall have the right to equal treatment by public authorities. No one shall be discriminated
against in political, social or economic life for any reason whatsoever.
215. Susan Smolens, Violence Against Women: Consciousness and law in Four Central European
Emerging Democracies-Poland, Hungary, Slovalaa, and the Czech Republic, 15 TuL. EuR. & Civ. L.F
i, 15 (2000-2001).
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217. See Wanda Nowicka, The Position of Women and Demographic Processes in the Countries in
Transition, Apr. 1997 [hereinafter Nowicka 1].
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221. See id.
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2 3_en.pdf.
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Program, available at http://www.karat.org/links/pages/Detailed/I 7 I.hlml.
226. Agnieszka Klich, Constitutional Developments in Poland, 1996 ST. Louis-WARSAW
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paid lip service to equality. This must change, both for women and also in the
interest of political and econouc Europe as a whole.
227
Because the EU not merely advocates but requires gender equality Poland can
increase gender equality by adopting the EU's pro-choice policy
VI. CONCLUSION
Since the fall of Communism, Poland has experienced several changes from
passing a democratic constitution to preparing for EU membership. Throughout
this transition Poland's abortion law has changed from bemg available on demand
during communism to being prohibited except in rare circumstances. The one thmg
that did not change in Poland was the Catholic Church's strong presence.
The Catholic Church's long history in Poland has formed part of Poland's
national identity. The EU, which is pro-choice, advocates the need to promote
diversity and respect for member state's national identity. By jommig the EU
Poland must adopt community law The ECJ ruled m Grogan that an mdividual of
a member state has the right to receive services including an abortion. This
conflicts with Poland's anti-abortion law. In order to preserve its anti-abortion law,
Poland could adopt a protocol to its accession treaty similar to Ireland's and
Malta's. Poland can also assert moral sovereignty, a principal recognized in the
draft of the EU's constitution.
In practice however, Poland's anti-abortion law is undemocratic. The law fails
to reflect the majority view of Poles who want to liberalize the law The law
threatens Polish women's fundamental rights to such an extent that two U.N.
Committees voiced concerns regarding human rights violations. 228 Most tragically,
the anti-abornon law threatens women's lives. Hundreds of thousands of women
have already died from being denied a necessary abortion or from seeking a
dangerous underground abortion.229  The law also perpetuates gender
discruination and stereotypes.
In sprmg 2004 Poland will embark upon a new path by jommg the EU.
Although it is important for Poland to maintam its proud Catholic identity, it is
also important for Poland to allow its citizens to live m a practicing democracy.
Such a democracy means equality- equality can be achieved through
secularization. Poland, which is viewed as a central country m the EU's
enlargement,230 can only truly contribute to the EU if its own citizens are equal.
Granting abortion rights may be the only way to equalize Polish men and
227 Women and Equal Opportunities in Europe, supra note 223.
228. See generally Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the
Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee-Poland, U.N. Human Rights
Comm., CCPR/C/SR.1779 (1999); Report of the Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr. Alvaro Gil-
Robles, on His Visit to Poland, CommDH(2003) 4 (Nov. 2002).
229. Breaking the Silence, supra note 194.
230. Deloy, supra note 1. Poland is the largest and most populated of the ten countries, primarily
from Eastern Europe, expected to join the EU in spring 2004.
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women.23' As a country that just recently freed itself from Communism, Poland
should give Polish women the freedom of choice.
23 l.Howard-Hassmann, supra note 183, at 233.
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The purpose of international labor law at the beginning of the twentieth
century and a motivating influence behind the formation of the International Labor
Organization ("ILO") was the prevention of international competition that
exploited the vacuum of labor regulation at the expense of workers.' World
governments were hesitant to institute greater protections for workers due to a
concern that doing so would make their domestic labor more expensive and
therefore less competitive with other markets where cheaper labor could be found.2
Thus, the ILO was created in part to protect national economies by promoting
enhanced protections in all member states, thereby ensuring labor protections
would be to some extent equivalent between the member states.
In 1944, the Declaration of Philadelphia reaffirmed the purpose of the ILO
following the Second World War by primarily focusing on economic and social
progress for all workers.4 In the 1970s, the notion that increasing the protections
of workers m developing nations would materially impact the competitive edge of
developed labor markets was no longer seen as a primary justification for
international labor standards.5 By the beginning of the 1990s, however, with a new
J.D. Candidate 2004, University of Denver, College of Law.
1. Nicolas Valticos & K. Samson, International Labour Law, in COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW
AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN INDUSTRIALiZED MARKEr ECONOMICs, 110 (Roger Blanpam & Chris
Engles eds., 1998) [hereinafter Labour Law]. The Treaty of Versailles created the ILO in 1919. See
Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, pt. XIII, June 28, 1919, 2
Bevans 43, 225 Consol. T.S. 188. The Treaty of Versailles was not the first international agreement
concerning labor. The first agreement was the 1890 Conference of Berlin, and later, non-governmental
institutions created private organization called the International Association of Labor Legislation. See
Jennifer L. Johnson, Public-Private-Public Convergence: How the Private Actor Can Shape Public
International Labor Standards, 24 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 291, 305 (1998).
2. ILO, ILO History, at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/history.htm (last visited, Mar.
13, 2004) [hereinafter ILO History]; ILO CONST. pmbl.
3. See ILO History, supra note 2.
4. ILO CONST. Declaration Concerning the Aims and Purposes of the International Labor
Organization, art. I [hereinafter Declaration of Philadelphia]; see also Labour Law, supra note 1, at 110.
5. See Nicolas Valticos, International Sources and International Aspects, in 15 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 1, 4-5 (1978).
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wave of globalization,6 the proposition that a labor market with significantly
greater labor protections is less competitive than labor markets having fewer
protections once again became a primary concern of ILO member states.7
The first part of this paper will argue that U.S. employers are moving "white-
collar" positions 8 overseas partially because of stronger worker protection
enforcement in the U.S. relative to developing countries and partially because the
effects of globalization have vastly enhanced the viability of exporting labor. The
second part of the paper will explore two possible avenues for enforcing higher
labor standards globally. 9 Thus, the discussion in the second part will be broken
up into two sub-parts. In the first sub-part, the presumption against extraterritorial
application of U.S. labor laws will be explored. The second sub-part will assess
whether the ILO can serve as an engine to further U.S. labor objectives. The
discussion will survey a number of ILO conventions, argue there is presently a lack
of effective enforcement of those conventions, and assess the viability of using the
World Trade Organization's (WTO's) dispute resolution process as template for
change. Finally, the third part of the paper will argue that U.S. lawmakers should
take a leadership role in the ILO, first by ratifying more ILO conventions, and
second by working to invigorate ILO enforcement mechanisms in an effort to
ensure the U.S. labor market remains competitive with developing markets.
I. WHY U.S. EMPLOYERS ARE EXPORTING LABOR ABROAD
A. A Brief History
At the turn of the century, U.S. workers and the labor they provided were seen
as mere commodities by businesses.' 0 Employers acted swiftly to prevent their
6. Globalization has been described, and will be used in this paper to refer to, the "integration of
economies and societies driven by new technologies, new economic relationships, and the national
and international policies of governments, international organizations, business, labour and civil
society. See World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, The Social Dimension of
Globalization, at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/wcsdg/globali/index.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2004).
7. See Labour Law, supra note 1, at 110.
8. The problem facing U.S. white collar workers is that countries like India and Russia have
sunilarly educated workers whose wages are substantially lower than those in the U.S. ASHOK DEO
BARDHAN & CYNTHIA A. KROLL, THE NEW WAVE OF OUTSOURCING 4 (Fall 2003), available at
http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/news/ResearchReport Fall 2003.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2004)
[hereinafter New Wave]. Thus, Multinational companies can hire those workers and use new
technologies like the Internet to further decrease operating and management costs. Id.
9. This paper will focus on the options of applying U.S. domestic labor laws to conduct abroad
and invigorating the ILO enforcement mechanisms by vesting the ILO with powers akin to the WTO
Dispute Resolution Procedures. This paper will not discuss other potential options for enhancing
enforcement of international labor standards. Among the options not addressed in this paper are
increased U.S. involvement in the ILO technical assistance program and the initiation of unilateral trade
sanctions by the U.S. For a detailed discussion of U.S. unilateral action, see Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm
Internationalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2001).
10. Terry Collingsworth, American Labor Policy and the International Economy: Clarifying
Policies and Interests, 31. B.C. L. REV. 31, 37 (1989).
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workers from forming into unions and the government was complicit in this
endeavor." Additionally, the courts at this time were wedded to the freedom of
contract theory, which held that when a worker and employer were dickering the
terms of the employment contract, the two parties had equal bargaining power.'
2
This period is now pejoratively referred to as the Lochner era and pointed to as an
example of empty formalism.' 3 In truth, the Lochner era worker did not have
anything close to equal bargaining power and both the courts and Congress came
to recognize that workers needed the assistance of the government to level the
playing field.14
Following the U.S. Great Depression, the government adopted a new
approach when it came to the everyday worker. 15 Congress passed laws making
substantial gains m protecting the ability of working men and women to organize
and bargain collectively 16 Such laws also ensured that workers received a fair
wage for their labor and created maximum limits on working hours per week.'
7
The substance of these laws represented valuable gains for workers. During the
past decade, the protections of equal opportunity the right to a fair wage, and the
freedom to organize gamed by U.S. workers generally, have been threatened by the
competition of cheap labor abroad.' 8 The danger is that the struggle endured to
win these rights will amount to a "Pyrrhic victory" because employment
protections are worthless if the worker is unemployed.' 9
While U.S. workers made great strides in terms of acquiring enhanced labor
protections over the last century, there is concern that these protections will be lost,
in part, due to the current lack of enforceable international labor standards. 20 The
U.S. worker is left unemployed, and history suggests that if they are lucky to find
21
new work, it is often for less compensation than the previous position.
Moreover, the foreign worker captures a small fraction of the value their work
creates for the multi-national corporation (MNC).2 2 Additionally, a U.S. worker
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) (holding a law regulating the hours a
baker could work in given day to ten hours day unconstitutional because it interfered with the
freedom to contract between the worker and the employer).
13. Timothy Zick, Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi-Neutral Principles and Constitutional
Truths, 82 N.C.L.REv. 115, 127 (2003).
14. See Collingsworth, supra note 10, at 37-38.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 40.
17. Id. at41.
18. Karen Vossler Champion, Comment, Who Pays for Free Trade? The Dilemma of Free Trade
and International Labor Standards, 22 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 181, 192 (1996); see also New
Wave, supra note 8, at 1.
19. Collingsworth, supra note 10, at 32.
20. See Champion, supra note 18, at 192
21. Loai G. KLETZER, JOB Loss FROM IMPORTS: MEASURING THE COSTS 33 (2001) (examining
job losses in manufacturing from 1979 to 1999 and finding that a quarter of factory workers who found
work took a cut of twenty five percent or more in compensation).
22. Christopher Farrell, Protectionism Won't End Workers' Pain, BuS.WK.ONLINE, Oct. 20,
2003, available at http://weblO.epnet.com/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2004) (noting that "for every $1.45 to
$1.47 of value created globally by offshore outsourcing, the U.S. captures $1.12 to $1.14 and the
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may be wary of exercising his or her right to organize when doing so presents the
risk that the employer will move operations abroad to take advantage of both cheap
foreign labor and the relative absence of labor law enforcement. 3 This state of
affairs stymies the rights of U.S. workers, causing a type of "race to the bottom
' 24
that the ILO was originally created to prevent.25
B. The Globalization Debate
There are a number of conflicting views on the actual impact of globalization
on the U.S. economy. Recent reports from financial and economic research firms
have been cited by mass media news reports for the proposition that millions of
U.S. jobs, particularly white-collar positions, are being lost to overseas
competition.26 The fact that a large number of jobs are being moved to other
countries, primarily India, is not really in doubt.27 The actual impact that this new
trend will have on the U.S. job market, however, has been interpreted differently
One view looks to recent U.S. history, when the offshore outsourcing trend
was hitting the American manufacturing sector.28 Indeed, recent figures compiled
by the International Economics Institute show that U.S. manufacturing workers
who lost their jobs during that period, and who were subsequently able to find
other work, were forced to accept lower wages. 29 This history may support the
proposition that a similar fate awaits U.S. workers in white-collar positions
currently losing their jobs.30
The other view has looked behind the absolute figures reported by major
media sources to show the actual job losses the U.S. labor market is likely to suffer
because of outsourcig is closer to 214 000.31 The point has also been made that
receiving country on average 33 cents").
23. Champion, supra note 18, at 192-93.
24. A race to the bottom could occur if labor markets with greater protections are willing to
sacrifice those protections to remain compeitive. Thus, instead of attempting to pull the market with
lower standards up, the protections of workers everywhere are sacrificed in an effort to gain or maintain
competlitve edge. See BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHAEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: FROM GATT TO WTO 263 (1995).
25. ILO History, supra note 2.
26. Steve Lohr, New Economy; Offshore Jobs in Technology: Opportunity or Threat, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 22, 2003, at CI (citing Forrester Research report published in November 2002 that
predicted 3.3 million services jobs in the U.S. would be outsourced to foreign countries by 2015); see
also David Zielenziger, U.S. Companies Moving More Jobs Overseas, YAHOO FINANCE, at
http://biz.yahoo.com/rb/031223/tech-techjobs_2.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2004); see also Betsy Stark,
White-Collar Exodus: High-Paying Jobs Are Moving Overseas, US. Workers Replaced by Foreigners,
ABC NEWS, at http:llabcnews.go.comlsections/wntBusmess/joblessO3O729_offshonng.html (last
visilted Jan. 9, 2004).
27. New Wave, supra note 8, at 1; see also Zielenziger, supra note 26; Stark, supra note 26;
Farrell, supra note 22.
28. See New Wave, supra note 8, at 4.
29. See KLETZER, supra note 20, at 33.
30. New Wave, supra note 8, at 6.
31. Lohr, supra note 26 (explaining that the large number of 3.3 million services jobs being
moved offshore needs to be taken in the context of normal job creation and destruction in the U.S.
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the media is looking at figures that tell an maccurate story. It has been argued that
media reports have failed to consider figures spanning the period before and after
the U.S. economy went into its recent three-year recession.32 Therefore, the
figures reported by mass media may more accurately be explained by other
economic activity aside from the influence of globalization.
33
A recent report of the World Commission on the Social Dimension of
Globalizaton 34 (WCSDG) lends support for the argument that the benefits of
globalization are being disproportionately captured by MNCs to the detriment of
35 36workers," that the situation must change, and one of the changes needs to come
in the form of more effective global institutions. 37 The report noted "[pleople are
most directly affected by globalization through their work and employment. 38
Indeed, the report cites the statements of some union leaders in industrialized
countries who lament that "[i]ncreased global competition [has] encouraged
employers to play 'fast and loose with labor practices, including the replacement
of decent employment with insecure work."
39
The debate over the true effects of globalization will likely continue to
capture the public's attention in the coming months and years. In the meantime,
invigorating international labor enforcement would protect U.S. workers most
vulnerable to overseas competition by ensuring fair competition between labor
markets. The U.S. should assume a leadership role in the ILO to advocate for such
change on behalf of its labor market and its workers.
II. TWO OPTIONS FOR ENFORCING LABOR STANDARDS INTERNATIONALLY
As discussed above, U.S. employers often move labor abroad because of the
cost savings afforded in terms of lower labor standards. Additionally,
globalization has been identified as an unstoppable force, due in part to recent
enhancements m technology and the decrease in the cost of moving goods.40 The
benefits of the global economy have, however, been falling into the hands of a
small segment of the world's population.4' Moreover, the competitive edge that
economy).
32. Catherne L. Mann, Globalization of IT Services and White Collar Jobs: The Next Wave of
Productivity Growth, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS POLICY BRIEFS 6, at 4 (Dec. 2003), at
http://207.238.152.36/publications/pb/pbO3-1 I.pdf (last visiied Jan. 4, 2004).
33. See id
34. World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, Report of the World
Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, at http://www.ilo.org/publiclenglish/wcsdg/
index.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2004) [hereinafter WCSDG Report].
35. Id. at 46 ("The increased mobility of capital combined with high levels of unemployment has
weakened the bargaining position of workers vis-a-vis employers.").
36. Id. at 2 ("The current path of globalization must change. Too few share in its benefits. Too
many have no voice in its design and no influence on its course.").
37. Id. at 79.
38. Id. at 64.
39. Id. at 21.
40. Id. at 24.
41. Id. at 2.
2004
DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
developing countries' labor markets currently hold over the U.S. because of lower
labor standards is not a salve for their problems. The result of competition where
the labor market with the lowest standards wins is that global labor standards are
undermined and all workers suffer,42 with the only true winner being the MNC.
A. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
This sub-part will focus on the extraterritorial application of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act.43 While the discussion will be limited to Title VII, it is important
to note that this particular statute represents merely a fragment of the overarching
regulatory framework in the U.S. Moreover, the presumption against the
extraterritorial application of U.S. laws applicable to Title VII is also the scheme
applied to other labor laws.4 This sub-part intends to show that the presumption
agamst extraterritorial application of U.S. domestic labor laws enables U.S. MNCs
to take advantage of relatively lower labor protections in foreign countries.
Additionally, due to the presumption's strength, it is unlikely U.S. domestic labor
laws can be used to enforce labor standards internationally
I. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was part of a cadre of legislation
intended to remedy a number of evils in U.S. society, of which the U.S. public was
made painfully aware during the Civil Rights Movement.45 The scope of Title
VII's applicability to employment outside the U.S. was the primary issue in the
Supreme Court case of EEOC v. Aramco ("Aramco"). 46 The plaintiff in Aramco,
Ali Boureslan, was a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Lebanon who had originally
been hired by and worked for Aramco in the U.S.47 Boureslan requested and was
later transferred to Aramco's offices in Saudi Arabia. 48 Aramco discharged him in
1984, and he alleged his termination was caused by religious, racial, and ethnic
discrimination by his Immediate supervisor.49 The defendant filed a motion to
dismiss with the District Court arguing that Title VII did not extend to U.S.
citizens employed by U.S. corporations abroad.50 The District Court granted the
42. See ILO CONST. pmbl.
43. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000). For a more
thorough examination of the extraterritorial application of Title VII, see Kathryn M. Murphy, Title VII
and Its Ability to Bind American Companies Acting outside the United States, 16 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L
L. REV. 593 (1993).
44. The non-extraterritonal scope of other U.S. statutes protecting rights of workers mirrors the
analysis applied to Title VII. These statutes include: the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-
219 (2000); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000); and the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
45. See generally CLAYBORNE CARSON, IN STRUGGLE: SNCC AND THE BLACK AWAKENING OF
THE 1960s (1995).
46. EEOC v. Aramico, 499 U.S. 244,246 (1991).
47. Id. at 247.
48. Id.
49. Boureslan v. Aramco, 653 F.Supp. 629, 631 (S.D. Tex. 1987).
50. Id.
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motion and dismissed the claim.5' Boureslan appealed the decision to the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the district court.5 2 The
Fifth Circuit reasoned that the absence of language addressing possible conflict-of-
law issues and the potential for broad applicability of Title VII to foreign
employers of U.S. citizens outside the U.S. counseled against interpreting Title VII
to apply extraterritonally 53
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and acknowledged that Congress
clearly has the authority under the Constitution to enforce its laws outside the
territorial boundaries of the U.S. 54 The Court went on to hold that when Congress
fails to clearly express its intent to extend laws abroad, courts should interpret such
silence to mean Congress meant the law to apply only domestically 55 This rule of
statutory interpretation is referred to as the presumption against extraterritonality.1
6
Congress quickly responded and amended Title VII that same year.57 The
amendment's impact, however, was limited m that it extended the protections of
Title VII only to U.S. citizens employed abroad by U.S. corporations.58  The
amendment also included a provision that settled the conflict-of-laws issue by
including an exception applicable in the event a U.S. corporation doing business m
a foreign country would be forced to violate the law of that country if it were to
follow Title VII. 59 Under such circumstances, the U.S. corporation is not required
to comply with Title VII.6°
Courts have addressed the presumption against extraterritorial application in
the context of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),6' the Age Discrimination m
Employment Act (ADEA),62 and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).63 The
cases addressing these acts help show the presumption's breadth and how it is
applied in labor dispute controversies. 64 The scope of the presumption against
51. Id. at 631.
52. Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1988), affig en banc, 892 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir.
1990).
53. Aramco, 892 F.2d at 1273-74.
54. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248.
55. Id. at 255.
56. Id. at 248.
57. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(b) ("It shall not be unlawful under [this section] for an employer (or
corporation controlled by an employer) to take any action otherwise prohibited if compliance
with such section would cause such employer to violate the law of the foreign country in which such
workplace is located.").
60. Id.
61. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219.
62. Age Discrimination m Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634.
63. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169.
64. Cruz v. Chesapeake Shipping, Inc., 932 F.2d 218, 231-32 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding seamen
employed on Kuwaiti vessels reflagged to gain U.S. protection during the Iran-Iraq war were not
covered by the FLSA); Reyes-Gaona v. North Am. Growers' Assoc., 250 F.3d 861, 866-67 (4th Cir.
2001) (holding the ADEA was inapplicable to foreign nationals applying for work in a foreign country
that would ultimately be performed inside the U.S., due to the presumption against extraterritoriality);
NLRB v. Dredge Operators, Inc., 19 F.3d 206, 212 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding the NLRB did have
2004
DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
extraterritorial application was tested in Chaudhry v. Mobil Oil Corporation,
where Title VII was interpreted to provide protection to aliens employed within the
U.S.
65
In Chaudhry, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals expanded upon the facts
required before the protections of Title VII will be extended to a foreign national
applying for work m the U.S. Chaudhry, a Canadian citizen, worked for Mobil in
London, England and m Doha, Qatar for eighteen years.66 Mobil terminated him in
1997 and he brought suit claiming his discharge was a retaliatory act by Mobil
because of his complaints about discrimination.6 7 Mobil filed a motion to dismiss
Mr. Chaudhry's suit on grounds that it failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.68 The district court granted the motion and Chaudhry appealed.69
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that "a foreign national who applies for a job in
the United States is entitled to Title VII protection 'only upon a successful
showing that the applicant was qualified for employment.' 70 The court explained
that in order to be qualified, the prospective employee must have been eligible for
work in the U.S. under the Immigration Reform and Control Act. 71 Chaudhry
conceded that he did not possess the documentation required by the Act, and
therefore the court affirmed the decision of the District Court.72
The foregoing discussion shows that the presumption against
extratemtoriality has two effects upon the U.S. labor market. First, because U.S.
laws are not applicable to U.S. corporations employing foreign nationals abroad, it
affords these companies access to relatively cheap foreign labor. Second, because
MNC's can readily move their labor to foreign markets, U.S. workers may be more
reluctant to enforce protections the law provides them.73
2. Contexts Outside Labor
In areas other than the labor context, U.S. courts have been more inclined to
enforce U.S. laws outside the territonal boundaries of the U.S.74  In these
junsdiction over the defendant's operations because U.S. citizens were the majority of workers
employed on the Stuyvesant and because the ship flew a U.S. flag, effectively making it part of U.S.
territory).
65. Chaudhry v. Mobil Oil Corp., 186 F.3d 502 (4th Cir. 1999).
66. Id. at 503-04.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 504.
69. Id.
70. Id. (citing Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, Inc., 153 F.3d 184, 187 (4th Cir. 1998)).
71. Chaudhry, 16 F.3d at 504-05.
72. Id.
73. See Champion, supra note 18, at 192.
74. See Stephen B. Moldof The Application of U.S. Labor Law to Activities and Employees
Outside the United States, 2001 A.B.A. SEC. LAB. & EMp L., pt. I, at 2-3, available at
http://www.bna.com/bnabooks/ababna/annual/2001/moldof.doc (last visited, Jan. 11, 2004); but see
Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications, Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1097 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying the
presumption against extrateritoriality and holding that the Copyright Act does not apply
extraterritorially).
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situations, the strong presumption against extraterritoriality, which operates to
forestall the application of many U.S. labor laws, gives way to other analytical
approaches.75 For example, U.S. law is applied to extraterritorial conduct m the
context of antitrust violations. 76 The Supreme Court has stated that the federal
anti-trust act covers foreign conduct intended to produce substantial effects in the
U.S. 77 The Supreme Court has also extended application of the Lanham Trademark
Act to conduct occurrng outside U.S. territorial boundaries.78
Yet another example is Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, where
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was faced with the issue of
whether the presumption against extraterritoriality prevented application of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA") 79 to a plan of the National
Science Foundation to incinerate food waste m Antarctica. go In Massey, the court
acknowledged the presumption against extraterritoriality, but held that it was not
applicable.8 ' The court further stated that there are at least three categories of
cases where the presumption against extratemtonality does not apply- first, "where
there is an 'affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed;' second,
"where the failure to extend the scope of the statute to a foreign setting will result
m adverse effects within the United States;" and third, "when the conduct
regulated by the government occurs within the United States." 82 In its analysis, the
court determined the NEPA was intended to regulate federal agencies' decision
making, but not the substance of those decisions.83 Thus, the court concluded that
the case did not raise an issue of extraterritorial application because the conduct
being regulated had effectively occurred in the U.S.84 The court also distinguished
the case on its facts, stating the issue of extratemtonal application was less
troublesome because Antarctica was not a sovereign territory and the U.S. had
substantial authority over it.85
The foregoing discussion highlights the fact that the presumption against
extraterritoriality has been applied differently to contexts other than labor. It also
appears the presumption has added vigor when the case is couched in the labor
context. While it is clear Congress has the power to extend application of U.S.
labor laws to conduct abroad," as the situation currently stands, it is unlikely
Congress will express its intent to extend U.S. laws abroad, because notions of
75. Moldof, supra note 74, at 2-3.
76. Edieth Yvette Wu, Evolutionary Trends in the United States Application of Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction, 10 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 1, 17-20 (1997).
77. See Hartford Fire Ins., Co. v. California et al., 509 U.S. 764, 796, (1993); see also Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582 n.6 (1986).
78. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285 (1952) (holding the Lanham Trademark Act
applies extraterritonally when defendant is a U.S. national).
79. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f(2000).
80. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
81. Massey, 986 F.2d at 532.
82. Id. at 531.
83. Id. at 532.
84. Id. at 533.
85. Id.
86. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248.
2004
DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
sovereignty and jurisdictions7 coupled with the potential for international discord
counsel against such change.88 It is therefore worthwhile to explore another option
for better enforcement of international labor standards.
B. International Labor Laws and the ILO
While there are a number of sources of international labor law, 9 the
conventions and recommendations of the ILO are currently viewed as the
foundation of international labor principles.9" Indeed, the ILO has been repeatedly
named as the international organization that should lead the charge for improving
international labor standards. 91  Yet, the ILO's valuable contribution to the
development of international standards and its ability to serve as the leader in the
future is undermined by the ILO's primary weakness: its lack of a viable
enforcement scheme. 92
I. The Structure of the ILO
The ILO is made up of three main bodies. The body most representative of
87. Sovereignty, seen as an equivalent for independence and an important element of statehood,
cames with it "a jurisdiction, prima facie exclusive, over territory [and] a duty of non-intervention
in the area of exclusive jurisdiction of other states. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 78, 287 (4th ed. 1990). Jurisdiction operates as limit on the scope of a national
court's power to hear a case or controversy brought before it and falls under the umbrella concept of
sovereignty. Id at 298.
88. See id. at 308 ("American [extraterritorial] policies have provoked strong reaction from
large number of foreign governments.").
89. Labor issues have been addressed in a number of United Nations instruments concerning
human rights. See e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810,
at 71 (1948); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A.
Res. 2106, U.N. GAOR. 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 47, U.N. Doe. A/6014 (1966), 660 U.N.T.S. 195
(entered into force Jan. 4, 1969); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doe. Al6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1971); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doe. A134/46
(1979); Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., annex, Supp.
No. 49, at 167, U.N, Doe. A/44/49 (1989); International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of
All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, G.A. Res. 45/158, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., annex,
Supp. No. 49A, at 262, U.N. Doe. A/45/49 (1990). Additionally, the European Social Charter, Oct. 18,
1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89 (entered into force Feb. 26, 1965), and the American Convention on Human
Rights, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 9 I.L.M. 99 (1970), also address labor issues. See Labour Law, supra note
1, at 114.
90. WCSDG Report, supra note 34, at 82.
91. Id., WTO, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(96)/DEC (Dec. 19, 1996), 4, 36
I.L.M 218, 221 (1997) [hereinafter Singapore Ministerial Declaration]; see also XI Summit of the
Heads of State and Government of the Group of Fifteen (May 30-31, 2001), 17, available at
http://www.un.orglesa/ffd/themes/gl5-2.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2004) ("We also strongly reiterate
that non-trade issues such as labour standards should not be included in the WTO agenda.").
92. GEORGE TSOGAS, LABOR REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 44, 54 (2001); see also
Johnson, supra note 1, at 307.
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the member states is the International Labour Conference (ILC). 93 The ILC
normally meets once a year and is the body that adopts ILO conventions and
recommendations.94 The ILC consists of representatives who are selected by
member states. 95 The ILO also has a Governing Body. The Governing Body
consists of fifty-six members; twenty-eight represent member governments, while
the other twenty-eight are equally divided to represent the interests of workers and
employers equally 9 Finally, the ILO has a permanent secretariat called the
International Labour Office.97
There are two ostensible enforcement procedures available to assist members
and employers or workers put pressure on member countries that have ratified an
ILO convention, but that have had a poor record in implementing the convention.
The first procedure is a complaint.98 Complaints may, however, only be made by a
member state against another member state if both countries have ratified the
convention at issue. 99  The second procedure is called a representation.' 00
Representations are made either by employers' or by workers' organizations on the
grounds that the member state has failed to implement a ratified convention. 1'
The enforcement powers of the ILO have been viewed as insufficient,
however, to meet the task of protecting the rights of workers.'0 2 Support for this
proposition is found m ILO Committee on Freedom of Association cases.10 3
Indeed, in some cases, a few of which will be discussed below, the Committee fails
to make any concrete determination due to a lack of sufficient mformation.'°4
93. See Labour Law, supra note 1, at I11.
94. ILO conventions are similar to codified law in the U.S. Conventions are binding upon
member states that have ratified the convention. Id. Recommendations are analogous to comments
following a code section. The purpose of recommendations is to clarify and further develop the policy
expressed in the convention. Id. Recommendations are non-binding by design. Id.
95. Id., there are a total of four delegates from each member state: two represent the member
state's government, one advocates for the interests of workers and another one advocates for the
interests of employers. WALTER GALENSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION: AN
AMERICAN ViEw 11 (1981).
96. Labour Law, supra note 1, at 111.
97. Id.
98. ILO CONST. art. 26.
99. Id.
100. Id. art. 24.
101. Labour Law, supra note 1, at 125.
102. TSOGAS, supra note 92, at 54.
103. See Complaint Against the Government of India Presented by the Centre of Indian Trade
Unions, Case No. 2228, Rep. No. 331, (ILO Committee on Freedom of Association 2003), available at
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2004) [hereinafter India 1], see also Complaints against
the Government of the Uited States Presented by the Amencan Federation of Labor and the Congress
of Industrial Organizations and the Confederation of Mexican States, Case No. 2227, Rep. No. 332,
(ILO Committee on Freedom of Association 2003), available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/ (last visited
Mar. 14, 2004) [hereinafter AFL-CIO].
104. India 1, Case No. 2228, Rep. No. 331, 468; AFL-CIO Case No. 2227, Rep. No. 332, 616.
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2. Survey of Relevant Conventions
To date, the ILC has adopted 185 conventions105 and 194 recommendations'0 6
addressing a host of labor related issues. One of the main problems facing the ILO
in formulating its standards is the need to account for the vast differences between
economic and social conditions in member countries. 10 7 At the same time, the ILO
seeks to pass conventions advancing upon existing common practices in an effort
to improve the overall conditions of the average worker.'is In order to achieve
these goals, the ILO often uses conventions to create a floor for labor protections
and simultaneously promotes higher standards through its recommendations. 109 A
discussion of select ILO conventions, and their application in states like India, will
provide an example of how the ILO's weak enforcement powers are a stumbling
block for effective protection of all workers.' "
The ILC adopted the Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of
Employment and Occupation in 1958.'1 The term discrimination includes: "any
distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion,
political opinion, national extraction or social origin, which has the effect of
nullifying or impaing equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or
occupation."' 2 Other classes of workers, like the aged and those with disabilities,
are not explicitly protected by the convention, but ratifying member states have the
discretion to extend protection to those classes of workers as well.ii 3  The
convention also provides that exclusion for a specific position based upon the
"inherent requirements" of the job will not be considered discrimination. 1 14 The
convention further provides that any member state ratifying the text is obligated to
implement the text as part of its national policy." 5 The selection of appropriate
convention enforcement and implementation methods are left to the ratifying
105. See International Labour Organization Internet Library, at
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/cvlist.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2004) (note that not all ILO
conventions are currently in force).
106. See International Labour Organization Internet Library, at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/
reclist.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2004).
107. See NiCOLAS VALTICOS, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR LAW 49-52 (1979).
108. Id. at 50 ("mhe purpose of standards is not simply to harmonize legislation, but primarily to
promote generalized progress.").
109. Id. at 44-45.
110. Note that this paper will focus on conventions where U.S. law covers the same subject matter
in an effort to show that some ILO conventions largely mirror protections already afforded workers in
the U.S.
11. See Convention No. 11l Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation, at http://www.ilo.orglilolex (last visited Mar. 14, 2004) [hereinafter Discrimination
Convention].
112. Id. art. l(l)(a).
113. Id. art. l(l)(b) ("[Sluch other distinction, exclusion or preference which has the effect of
nullifying or impairng equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation as may be
determined by the Member concerned after consultation with representative employers' and workers'
organisations, where such exist, and with other appropriate bodies.").
114. Id. art. 1(2).
115. Id. art. 2.
VOL. 32:4
IN PURSUIT OF U.S. LABOR OBJECTIVES
member state's discretion. "1
6
The U.S. has not ratified the ILO Convention Concerning Discrmination.
1 7
However, Title VII gives U.S. workers protections analogous to those recited in
the ILO convention. Title VII provides for enforcement through individual
lawsuits filed by persons who have been the victims of discriminatory treatment or
impact. ' 8 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission can also initiate
actions against employers who have allegedly committed acts of discnmination.1
9
Title VII protects the same classes of people from discrummatory treatment as the
ILO convention. 120 Title VII also includes a defense for employers, similar to the
ILO convention exclusion for jobs with "inherent requirements, called the "bona
fide occupational qualification."'1'
Unlike the U.S., India has ratified the Convention Concerning
Discrimination. 2 2  The Indian government ratified the ILO Convention
Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation in 1960.23
As part of the ILO's enforcement scheme, it periodically dispatches observers to
countries that have ratified its conventions, and the Committee of Experts on the
Application of Conventions and Recommendations ("CEACR") publishes a report
of these observations. 14 In 2003, the CEACR released its report on observations
in India concerning the implementation of the Convention Concerning
Discrimmation.125 The report noted that the Indian government had made some
progress toward improving discrimination against women, but added that there
remained substantial room for improvement.' 26 Specifically, the report found that
discrimination continued in the form of restricted access to education for Indian
116. Id.
117. To date, the U.S. has ratified fourteen ILO conventions, only twelve of which remain in force.
These twelve are: Officers' Competency Certificates Convention No. 53, Shipowners' Liability
Convention No.55, Minimum Age (Sea) Convention (Revised) No. 58, Certification of Able Seamen
Convention No. 74, Final Articles Revision Convention No. 80, Abolition of Force Labour Convention
No. 105, Tnpartite Consultation (International Labour Standards) Convention No. 147, Labour
Administration Convention No. 150, Labour Statistics Convention No.160, Safety and Health in Mines
Convention No. 176, and Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention No. 182. See List of Ratifications
of International Labour Conventions: United States, at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex (last visited Mar. 16,
2004) [hereinafter U.S. Ratifications].
118. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(l), 2000e-2(a)(2).
119. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4(g)(6), 2000e-5(a).
120. Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e-2(a)(2).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l).
122. The degree of enforcement of the ILO convention in India will be discussed because India is
the destination of a substantial number of outsourced U.S.jobs. See Stark, supra note 27.
123. See List of Ratifications of International Labour Conventions: India, at
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2004) [hereinafter India Ratifications].
124. See VALTICOS, supra note 107, at 242.
125. See CEACR, Individual Observation Concerning Convention No. 111, Discrimination
(Employment and Occupation), 1958 India (ratification: 1960) (2003), at
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females. 127 Furthermore, the fact that women constitute only a small minority of
the formal workforce was indicative that discrimination continued to exist in the
labor market.' 28 This conclusion is also supported by statistical figures compiled
by the statistics division of the United Nations, which show Indian women only
represented about seventeen percent of the non-agricultural workforce m 2001.129
The ILC adopted Convention Number 26, Concerning Minimum Wage-fixing
Machinery, in 1928.130 The convention provides that a ratifying country must
apply or maintain a regulatory scheme for jobs where the rate of compensation is
exceptionally low. 13 1 The convention additionally requires a ratifying country to
institute a complaint process by which workers who have been under compensated
may seek the appropriate compensation required under national law. 132
The U.S. has not ratified this Convention. 33 The Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA") is the U.S. statute most analogous to this Convention, and it provides for
a minimum wage as well as setting the maximum hours for work in a given
week. 134 If an employee exceeds the maximum hours and is not otherwise exempt,
then the employee is entitled to receive overtime pay at the rate of one and one-
half his or her base wage rate. 135 The enforcement procedures m the U.S. are
highly developed and provide for a private cause of action for workers m addition
to enforcement by the Secretary of Labor.
36
The Indian government ratified ILO Convention Number 26 m 1955.137
Similar to the status of implementation found with regard to the Convention
Concerning Discrimination, the CEACR found in 2003 that the Indian
government's implementation of this Convention was lacking. 38 In its report on
observations in India, the CEACR found there was no established national
minimum wage, 139 but the government had passed a law creating a national "floor-
level" wage.' 4° The report also found varying minimum wage rates in different
states in India. 14 The national government explained that decentralized legislation
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. United Nations Statistics Division Millennium Indicators, at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/ (last
visited Jan. 7, 2004).
130. See Convention No. 26 Concerning the Creation of Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery, June
16, 1928, at http://www.ilo.orglilolex/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2004) [hereinafter Wage-Fixing
Convention].
131. Id. art. 1.
132. Id. art. 4.
133. See U.S. Ratifications, supra note 117.
134. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207
135. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).
136. 29 U.S.C. § 216(c).
137. See India Ratifications, supra note 123.
138. CEACR, Individual Observation Concerning Convention No. 26, Minunum Wage-Fixing
Machinery, 1928 India (ratification: 1955) (2003), at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english
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was necessary due to the different living cost rates in each state. 42
Another problem the report uncovered was the influence corporations were
exerting on the Indian state governments' legislative process. 143 This pressure
created industry specific wage rates below the states' own established mmunum
wage. 44 The state governments' explanation for this discrepancy was that
employers have threatened to relocate their businesses to other neighboring states
where the minimum wage is lower. 45 Finally, the report explained that recent
changes in some Indian states' regulations deny labor inspectors charged with the
task of momtorng mmunum wage legislation application the power to carry out
their mspections.' 46 This state of affairs highlights the lack of bite in current ILO
enforcement processes. A country ratifying a convention has an obligation to
implement the ratified convention, but there is no effective means of ensuring it
actually accomplishes the goal.
The foregoing discussion of a few ILO conventions supports two points.
First, the ILO's observation and reporting mechanisms are not sufficient to ensure
countries that have ratified conventions live up to their obligations. Second, the
discussion also shows U.S. laws analogous to the surveyed conventions currently
extend essentially the same protections to U.S. workers. 47
3. ILO Enforcement Lacks Bite
All member countries are required to protect certain rights represented by ILO
conventions, regardless of ratification. 1 Freedom of association is one of the key
rights protected by the ILO's 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work. 49 The right of association is unique in the context of the ILO.
Since the ILO's purpose was reaffirmed at the Declaration of Philadelphia in 1944,
the right of workers to associate for the purpose of organizing has been considered
fundamental.'5" Furthermore, if member states have violated the right of
association, they are subject to the complaint procedures before the Committee on
Freedom of Association. 15'






147. See infra Part III for a discussion on the significance of the second point
148. See ILO, Declaration of Fundamental Rights at Work, 2, available at
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/ (last visited, March 6, 2004) [hereinafter Declaration of Fundamental Rights].
149. Id., see also TsoGAs, supra note 92, at 51-52.
150. See ILO CONST. Declaration of Philadelphia.
151. See VALTICOS, supra note 98, at 249 (explaining that the Committee on Freedom of
Association is a nine person committee appointed by the Governing Body from among its own
membership. Three of the members represent the interests of governments, three represent employers,
and three represent workers.).
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the rights of workers to associate.1 2 In the U.S., the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) is the statute most analogous to these ILO conventions and confers upon
covered U.S. workers the right to associate, organize, and bargain collectively 153
Both the U.S. and India have been subject to the Committee on Freedom of
Association's complaint procedures.'54 These cases help emphasize the point that
the enforcement procedures of the ILO lack bite. In both cases, the Committee
found there was insufficient information and merely tasked both countries with
further fact finding.
55
The American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO) together with the Confederation of Mexican Workers
(CTM) brought the case against the U.S. 156 The complaints alleged the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. National Labor
Relations Board157 divested millions of immigrant workers of their protection
under the law ensuring their freedom of association."8 In the Hoffman decision,
the Court held that the NLRA does not extend to an undocumented immigrant who
was dismissed from his position for exercising rights protected under the Act.
59
The Committee identified the case's issue as a question of whether the Hoffman
Court's decision limited the remedies available to undocumented workers to such
an extent that the protection of such workers' freedom of association no longer had
any real meaning. 16° The U.S. government's reply to the complaint was quick to
point out that the Hoffman decision was very narrow, applying only to the remedy
of back-pay 161 The Committee noted, however, that with back-pay unavailable,
the only remedies still available were a cease and desist order and possible
contempt sanctions if the employer failed to comply.' 62  The Committee
determined that the U.S. position was insufficient to ensure the fundamental right
of freedom of association.
1 63
It was in the Committee's recommendations, however, where its lack of true
enforcement power is revealed. The most the Committee could muster was to
recommend that the U.S. government "explore all possible solutions, including
amending the legislation to bring it into conformity with freedom of association
152. See U.S. Ratifications, supra note 117; see also India Ratifications, supra note 123.
153. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169.
154. See CITU I, Case No. 2228, Rep.No. 331; AFL-CIO, Case No. 2227, Rep. No. 332.
155. AFL-CIO, Case No. 2227, Rep. No. 332., 613; See Complaint Against the Government of
India Presented by the Centre of Indian Trade Unions, Case No. 2228, Rep. No. 332, IN 751(a), (c)
(ILO Committee on Freedom of Association 2003), available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/ (last visited
Mar. 14, 2004) [hereinafter CJTU l1] Note that while the cases cited here will be discussed in this
paper, there are many more Freedom of Association Cases. See Freedom of Association Cases,
available at http://www.ilo.orgilolex/ (last visited Mar. 14,2004).
156. AFL-CIO, Case No. 2227, Rep. No. 332, 551.
157 Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
158. AFL-CIO, Case No. 2227, Rep. No. 332., 555.
159. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 149.
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principles with the aim of ensuring effective protection for all workers against
acts of anti-union discrimination in the wake of the Hoffman decision."'6 The
Committee found the U.S. legal position left millions of workers effectively
unprotected, yet it could merely make a recommendation that the U.S. "explore all
possible solutions.
The second case is one involving the Indian government and instances of anti-
union activity in that country. 65 In this case, the Centre of Indian Trade Unions
(CITU) filed a complaint with the ILO alleging anti-union discrimmation.
66
Specifically, the complaint alleged that the Development Commissioner of one of
India's Export Processing Zones (EPZ) had personally warned workers they could
lose their jobs if they joined a trade union.' 67 Additionally, the complaint claimed
that the workers of one EPZ had gone on strike and that both the employer and the
state police took actions to "brutally suppress" and "terrorize" the workers. 68
Finally, the complaint alleged the employer had taken retaliatory action by
terminating a number of the workers viewed as instigators of the strike. 169 The
Government's response denied the allegations as untrue and explained some
workers were later terminated because of "indiscipline, irregularity and failure to
learn."'170  The Committee initially found it had insufficient information and
instructed the government to provide more detailed information.' 7' The Indian
government followed up with a communication dated August 5, 2003, and attached
a report from the Development Commissioner of the EPZ at issue in the case. 72
After reviewing the report, the Committee was once again left with
insufficient and non-responsive information from the Indian government. 73 The
Committee, however, merely requested that the Indian government take efforts to
conduct a thorough investigation of the incident.174 Ultimately a statement CITU
made in its complaint-that its only true recourse for protection was the Chief
Justice of the Indian Supreme Court- appears to have been an accurate
assessment of the Committee's mability to provide meaningful assistance. 
1
75
The foregoing cases show the complaining parties received no dispute
resolution and no Commitee statement on what remedial measures either country
would be required to perform. The absence of meaningful enforcement arguably
encourages member countries to disregard even ratified ILO conventions and
violate the fundamental right of association. 176 In order for the ILO to effectively
164. Id. 613.
165. See C1TUI, Case No. 2228, Rep. No. 331.






172. C1TUI, Case No. 2228, Rep. No. 332., 733.
173. Id. 740, 742, 745.
174. Id. 75 1(a).
175. See CITUI, Case No. 2228, Rep. No. 331, 455.
176. Tsogas, supra note 92, at 54 (stating that governments "suffer no penalties when
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improve working conditions and ensure fundamental rights of workers are
protected, it must be vested with powers that will give its enforcement bite.
4. The WTO as a Model for Enforcement Powers
This section will provide a brief overview of the enforcement scheme
employed m the WTO. Following the overview, the paper will argue that the
WTO's enforcement powers should be used as a model for ILO enforcement, thus
ensuring workers' rights are protected. The ancillary benefit of such enforcement
powers is that they will promote a greater degree of fair competition between the
U.S. and foreign labor markets because egregious practices amounting to unfair
competition could be effectively combated.
a. The WTO Enforcement Processes
Early dispute resolution procedures employed under the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),117 which preceded the WTO, relied primarily upon
negotiations between member states to resolve disputes.1 7 8 This process eventually
gave way to the more formal legalistic procedures of adjudication. 179 The change
was motivated by two factors. First, parties to a dispute often met with significant
delays and problems in enforcing their negotiated settlement; second, there was a
need for increased dispute resolution process legitimacy iSO
During the Uruguay Round, the enforcement procedures of international trade
took steps' 8 ' toward their current form; two years later, 182 those changes were the
foundation for the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes.is Under the WTO's dispute resolution rules, a member
state may bring a complaint before the WTO's dispute resolution body- following a
hearing, the losing party may appeal the decision. '4 Decision enforcement is
usually accomplished by withdrawal of trade concessions or compensation for
harm resulting from violations of trade sanctions.
8 5
These processes allow WTO member states to resolve disputes primarily
[conventions] are breached").
177 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947 T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187
[hereinafter GATT]; see also Lawrence D. Roberts, Beyond Notions of Diplomacy and Legalism:
Building a Just Mechanismfor WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 AM. Bus. L. J. 511, 512 (2003).
178. See Roberts, supra note 177, at 512.
179. Id. at 513-18.
180. See id. at 516-17
181. Conciliation Improvements to the GATT, Apr. 12, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 61-67
(1990) [hereinafter Improvements].
182. Roberts, supra note 177, at 517-23.
183. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Umaguay
Round): Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, MTN/FA II-A2
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because the WTO includes meaningful and effective enforcement provisions. 8 6 If
a member country is subject to repercussions for violating its obligations under the
WTO, it is the threat of such a result that promotes compliance.
b. The WTO as an Example for the ILO
The ILO needs an enforcement scheme that is robust and effective like that of
the WTO if it is to be successful in both setting international labor standards and
ensuring they are followed. However, an enforcement process similar to that
available to WTO member states will be difficult to achieve. There are two
primary reasons for this difficulty First, developing countries view enhanced
labor regulation as a form of protectionism that will wrest one of their primary
competitive advantages, luring MNC investment through cheap labor, from
them. 187 Second, the Director General of the ILO has stated that use of coercive
economic enforcement mechanisms is beyond the jurisdiction and institutional
expertise of the organization. 18
ILO member states that are developing countries will likely resist the
implementation of more effective enforcement mechanisms because it will threaten
one of the few competitive advantages they currently possess to attract MNC
mvestment. 8 9 Their reasoning, however, is faulty because it is susceptible to the
counter-argument that foreign investment is not currently beneficial to developing
countries' workers because most of the value created by their labor is not captured
by the local economy.' 90 Rather, the large profits MNCs obtain by exploiting
foreign workers are exported along with the goods or services to the U.S.
market. 191 Thus, as the situation stands today, foreign workers lose because they
fail to retain any significant portion of the wealth they help create, and U.S.
workers lose because they are unable to retain employment. The only interest
winning in the current vacuum in enforceable labor legislation is that of MNCs.
With the increased enforcement power of the ILO would come an ancillary
benefit to the U.S. labor market: fair competition abroad. Of course, identifying
this situation as beneficial is problematic; it lends credence to the argument that the
U.S. would only pursue such a course because of protectiomst motivations.i92
There is, however, a distinction between protectionism and unfair international
labor competition. As stated m the introduction to this paper, one motivating
reason the ILO was created was to ensure that member countries could take actions
186. See Steve Charnovitz, Symposium, The Boundaries of the WTO: Triangulating the World
Trade Organization, 96 AM. J. INT'L .L. 28, 29 (2002) ("[The WTO has become magnet for
expansionist ideas because it is perceived as powerful and effective.").
187. See TSOGAS, supra note 92, at 28, 44-45; see also Singapore Ministerial Declaration, supra
note 91, 4,36 I.L.M. at 221.
188. TSOGAS, supra note 92, at 47.
189. Cf id. at 45 (noting that developing countries have been against linking labor standards to trade
because they view it as motivated by protectionism).
190. See Lohr, supra note 26.
191. See td.
192. See TSOGAS, supra note 92, at 45.
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to protect workers without fear that other countries would be free to undercut the
market. 93 Additionally, requiring a country to adhere to its ratified obligations
under an ILO convention is not protectionist, but rather a demand that such
countries honor their commitments. If a country finds a convention it ratified
unfair or protectionist, it is free to denounce the convention.' 94 Therefore, U.S.
policy would be one of fair competition rather than protectionism.
The reluctance of the ILO to take on economic enforcement powers is at odds
with its Constitution, which states that member states ratifying ILO conventions
have a binding obligation to undertake actions toward implementation. 9' As
discussed above, the absence of enforcement has allowed member states to ratify
conventions without fear of repnsal if they subsequently fail to implement. 196 This
state of affairs undermines the ILO's goals of promotmg economic and social
justice. 197 Indeed, lack of meanmgful enforcement has, in some cases, rendered
both conventions and the Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work essentially empty promises.19 The ILO should not balk at obtaining the tool
of enforcement, which will enable it to effectively carry out its goals.
III. U.S. LEADERSHIP IN THE ILO AND ENHANCED ENFORCEMENT
This section will discuss two connected actions the U.S. should take m order
to enhance the ILO's viability as an international organization which
sunultaneously works to protect the interests of the U.S. labor market and the
rights of workers abroad. First, the U.S. should take a leadership role m the ILO
by ratifying as many conventions as possible in the near term. Second, the U.S.
should work toward enhancing the ILO's enforcement powers. As part of this
second step, the U.S. should make efforts to vest the ILO with trade sanction
enforcement powers similar to the WTO's enforcement powers.
A. U.S. Ratification of ILO Conventions
The U.S. has failed to ratify a significant number of ILO conventions.
Indeed, the U.S. rate of ratification is on par with countries like Afghanistan'" and
Indonesia.2 °0 One reason for the failure of the U.S. to ratify a number of ILO
193. See Labour Law, supra note 1, at 110; ILO History, supra note 2.
194. See Labour Law, supra note 1, at 123; see also VIRGINIA A. LEARY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
CoNvErrioNs AND NATIONAL LAW 10 (1982).
195. ILO CONST. art. 20; see also LEARY, supra note 194, at 10; see also TSOGAS, supra note 92, at
51.
196. See, e.g., Discrimination Convention, supra note 111; Discrimination Observations, supra
note 125; Wage-Fixing Convention, supra note, 130; Wage-Fixing Observations, supra note 138; AFL
CIO, Case No. 2227, Rep. No. 332; CITU 1, Case No. 2228, Rep. No. 331.
197. See Labour Law, supra note 1, at 110.
198. See CITU I, Case No. 2228, Rep. No. 331, 455 (noting the CITU stated in its complaint that
its only true recourse for protection was the Supreme Court of India).
199. See List of Ratifications of International Labour Conventions: Afghanistan, at
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2004) (listing fifteen ratifications).
200. See List of Ratifications of International Labour Conventions: Indonesia, at
VOL. 32:4
IN PURSUIT OF U.S. LABOR OBJECTIVES
conventions is the concern that ratified ILO conventions could conflict with
national and state laws. 20' Moreover, under the current machinery in place, no ILO
convention is forwarded for ratification if such ratification would require a change
in U.S. federal and state laws.
202
Under the U.S. Constitution, adopted treaties become the "supreme Law of
the Land., 20 3  The U.S. has recently begun to insert reservations into treaties m
order to: prevent conflicts between ratified treaties and the Constitution; clarify
that U.S. ratification does not carry with it an obligation to change domestic laws;
and render treaties non self-executing, meaning U.S. courts do not need to enforce
the treaty unless Congress passes laws making the treaty enforceable. 20 4 These
practices undermine the credibility of U.S. leadership m foreign affairs because the
U.S., through such qualified ratification, is arguably acting to remove the treaty
201obligations while simultaneously sitting in judgment over other countries.
Notably, this practice is not possible with ILO conventions, because ILO
convention ratification must be unqualified. 206 The failure of the U.S. to ratify ILO
conventions might be explained by the recent U.S. practice of qualified treaty
ratification, which is not available for ILO conventions.
Yet, where the international standard expressed by ILO conventions would
extend analogous protections as those already afforded under current U.S. laws,
then the U.S. should not be hesitant to ratify.20 7  Indeed, as discussed above,
current U.S. law extends equal or greater protections to U.S. workers than those m
a number of ILO conventions. 20 8  Thus, the U.S. should not find ratification of
such conventions problematic. For example, the Convention Concerning
Discrimination in Employment and Occupation is narrower than current U.S. laws
concerning discrimination.2 9 Indeed, the ILO convention calls for the protection
of fewer classes of persons than are protected by the combination of Title VII, the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities
http://www.ilo.org/iolex/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2004) (listing sixteen ratifications).
201. Advisory Committee on Labor Diplomacy, Second Report to the Secretary of State and the
President of the United States, Dec. 31, 2001, at http:/Iwww.state.gov/g/drl/rls/lO043pf.htm (last visited
Jan. 7, 2004) [hereinafter Second Report].
202. See Advisory Committee on Labor Diplomacy, Minutes, Dec. 19, 2001 at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/1i253pf.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2004).
203. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2, see also TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS:
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 1 (2001).
204. Louis Henkm, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker,
89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341 (1995).
205. Id. at 344.
206. Labour Law, supra note 1, at 123.
207. See Justine Nolan & Michael Posner, International Standards to Promote Labor Rights: The
Role of the United States Government, 2000 COLuM. Bus. L. REv. 529, 535 (2000) (arguing the U.S.
should take action to ratify ILO Conventions); see also Richard B. Lillich, The Constitution and
International Human Rights, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 145, 154 (Louis
Henkm et a]. eds., 1990) (arguing the exchange of ideas concerning human rights needs to be a "two-
way proposition if the United States, as well as other countries, is to prosper over the long haul")
208. See supra notes 111-36 and accompanying text.
209. Compare Discrimination Convention, supra note 111, art. I(a)-(b), to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2).
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Act.
210
The Advisory Committee on Labor Diplomacy recognizes the need for the
U.S. to take a leadership position in international labor matters.211 The Committee
acknowledged that some developing countries have referred to the lack of U.S.
ratification as a reason why they have either failed to ratify conventions or have
not adequately implemented the protections called for by the convention.212 The
view of the Advisory panel is that the U.S. could make substantial progress m its
ability to advocate for enhanced labor standards m all countries if it assumed a
leadership role in the ILO.2 i3 A leadership role, however, requires ratification.
The U.S. is hardly in a position to proselytize the benefits of enhanced labor
protection to the rest of the world if it has failed to bind itself by the same set of
rules.
If the U.S. seeks to level the playing field between the domestic labor market
and those abroad, then an effective long-term solution is ratification of as many
ILO conventions as possible. Once the U.S. has taken the step of ratification, it
will be in a better position than it is today to advocate for increased worker
protections. 214 This approach represents sound foreign policy as well, because
U.S. interests could be protected through its participation in an internationally
established organization that counts among its membership nearly every country
on the globe.2i 5
B. Giving ILO Enforcement Bite
By binding itself to ensure its workers have the same minimum labor
standards as other ILO member countries, the U.S. will also be in a better position
to advocate for enhanced ILO enforcement powers. In this leadership role, the U.S.
could advocate to vest the ILO's Committee on Freedom of Association with
powers similar to the WTO's enforcement powers.
It is important to note that many scholars have discussed the concept of
creating links between the WTO and the ILO in one form or another.21 6 During the
1996 WTO Singapore Ministerial Conference, part of the agenda was determining
210. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17; 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634; Equal Opportunity for Individuals
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (2000) (this act is often publicly referred to as the
Americans with Disabilities Act).
211. See Advisory Committee on Labor Diplomacy Minutes, Dec. 19, 2001, at
http:llwww.state.govlgldrllrls/1 1253pf.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2004).
212. See Advisory Committee on Labor Diplomacy Minutes, Oct. 4, 2001, at
http://www.state.gov/g/drlI/10044.pf.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2004).
213. See id.
214. See Labour Law, supra note 1, at 125 (noting that ILO complaint procedures require
ratification by both the complaining and defending country).
215. See List of Member Countries, at http://www.ilo.org/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2004).
216. See Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization and the Protection of Workers Rights, 3 J.
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 131, 169 (1999); Nolan & Posner, supra note 211, at 535; Daniel A.
Zaheer, Note, Breaking the Deadlock: Why and How Developing Countries should Accept Labor
Standards in the WTO, 9 STAN. J. L. Bus & FiN. 69 (2003).
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whether a formal link should be created between the WTO and the ILO.217 In the
Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WTO member countries decided against
creating a link between trade and labor standards, opting to leave labor issues to
the ILO. 2ia This decision, however, left labor issues m the hands of an international
organization without effective enforcement powers.219  Additionally the notion
that the WTO should not take on labor issues was reaffirmed m a Joint
Communique from the Eleventh Conference of the Heads of State and the Group
of Fifteen,220 as well as m the Doha Ministerial Declaration.22'
Most of the thikmg in this area argues that the link between trade and labor
should vest the WTO with the authority to resolve labor disputes.222 Alternatively
it is also argued that the ILO and WTO should be joint actors m enforcing
international labor standards. 223 In light of the Singapore Ministerial Declaration,
the Joint Communiqud, the Doha Ministerial Declaration, and the recent report
from the WCSDG, the ILO should be vested with enforcement efforts independent
of the WTO. 224 The foundation for sanctions-based enforcement arguably already
exists in Article Thirty-Three of the ILO Consitution.225 In addition to the
decision m the Singapore Ministerial Declaration, the Joint Commumqud, and the
Doha Ministerial Declaration, which show that WTO members are recalcitrant to
link the ILO to the WTO, there is arguably an additional reason why enforcement
should be vested m the ILO alone.
The WTO's primary objective is arguably focused on the liberalization of
trade, 26 and there may be times when protecting labor by limiting trade may create
an institutional conflict of interest. The idea that the WTO may at times have
217. See Howse, supra note 223, at 133-35.
218. Singapore Ministerial Declaration, supra note 91, 4, 36 I.L.M. 221.
219. See Susan Tiefenbrun, Free Trade and Protectionism: The Semiotics of Seattle, 17 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMP L. 257, 275 (2000).
220. XI Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Group of Fifteen, Joint Communique
(May 30-31), 17, at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/themes/gl5-2.htm (last visited, Mar. 6,2004).
221. WTO, Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/I (Nov. 14, 2001), 8, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tewto_e/ministe/mm01e/mindecle.htm (last visited Mar. 16,2004).
222. Howse, supra note 223, at 170; Nolan & Posner, supra note 223, at 535; Zaheer, supra note
223, at 100.
223. Daniel S. Ehrenberg, From Intention to Action: An ILO-GATT/WTO Enforcement Regime for
International Labor Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 163
(Lance A. Compa & Stephen F Diamond eds., 1996).
224. But see id. at 164 (noting that the ILO has balked at the idea of linking enforcement of labor
standards to trade because it was seen as "beyond the expertise and mandate of the organization"); see
also Tsogas, supra note 92, at 47.
225. ILO CONsT. art. 33 (stating that "the Governing Body may recommend to the Conference
such actions as it may deem wise and expedient to secure compliance if member state fails to
comply with recommendations of Commission of Inquiry or a decision from the International Court of
Justice); see also Zaheer, supra note 18, at 84.
226. See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. It 1 (stating that the scope
of the WTO shall "provide the common institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations
among its Members m matters related to the agreements "); see also id, art. III 2 (stating that the
functions of the WTO shall "provide the forum for negotiations among its Members concerning their
multilateral trade relations in matters dealt with under the agreements "); see also WCSDG Report,
supra note 34, at 113.
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institutional conflicts of interest is supported by findings in the WCSDG report,
which noted that some WTO policies are m some ways inimical to developing
countries' interests because they reflect an unfair balance in favor of economically
227powerful nations. The report further stated some WTO policies pose a limit on
developing countries and their ability to take advantage of opportunities for
economic growth.228 These examples provide support for the notion that if the
WTO were given the mandate to enforce labor rights, the WTO's institutional
interest in liberalizing trade might conflict with enforcing labor standards calling
for more restrictions, to the detriment of some ILO members. The WTO's success
in increasing respect for the rule of law and belief in the efficacy and legitimacy of
its enforcement powers counsels in favor of using the WTO as the model for
invigorating ILO enforcement. 2 29 However, it may be time for the ILO to consider
using that model independent of the WTO.
The ILO's conventions, recommendations, and Declaration of Fundamental
Principals and Rights at Work all represent policies protecting the interests of
workers irrespective of their location on the globe. 23 0 Providing the ILO with an
effective means of ensuring all ILO member states live up to their commitments is
sound global policy. Indeed, the WCSDG in its recent report recognized the
fundamental importance of protecting the rights of workers both in industrialized
and developing countries and added that the most effective way to accomplish the
goal was to follow the model established by the ILO.23 ' Yet, the ILO's standards
only have value for everyday workers if there is an effective enforcement regime
that delivers on the promises embodied in ratified conventions and the Declaration
on Fundamental Principals and Rights at Work.
IV CONCLUSION
MNCs today have ready access to foreign labor markets and take advantage
of the current vacuum in enforceable labor regulation to obtain cheap labor and
easy access to the wealthiest market in the world. The problems U.S. workers face
are compounded by the ever-present threat that if they choose to exercise the
protections available under U.S. laws, their employer could leave them
unemployed. Today the ILO's conventions represent the international standard of
fundamental labor laws. The only short fall of the ILO is its lack of bite in terms
of enforcement. While member states have ratified various conventions, they are
not subject to enforceable repercussions if they fail to take steps necessary to
implement the protections. The U.S. is in a position to change the current
situation, but it must be willing to overcome some hurdles. One available course is
for the U.S. to ratify as many ILO conventions as possible and to work toward
empowering the ILO in a manner similar to the WTO. This path would help to
227. WCSDG Report, supra note 34, at 81.
228. Id.
229. See Chamovitz, supra note 186, at 29 ("[Tlhe WTO has become a magnet for expansionist
ideas because it is perceived as powerful and effective.").
230. ILO CONST. pmbl.
231. See WCSDG Report, supra note 34, at 82.
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ensure that the U.S. labor market and its workers are not harmed by unfair
competition in the new global economy

A CASE STUDY IN MULTINATIONAL CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY




Multinational corporations often wield more power than many of the world's
nations, the immense wealth and political influence of multinationals make them
powerhouses m the global economy These domineering enterprises are often able
to undertake profit-making endeavors, particularly involving the consumption or
extraction of natural resources, in developing nations with little or no regulation
and often without meeting social and cultural responsibilities to the local
communities and environments adhered to in the United States (U.S.). The eastern
half of the Ecuadonan Amazon, known as Oriente, is one of the richest bioregions
on the planet, and a rich source of oil that has been exploited by multinational oil
companies for thirty years.' Oil extraction in the Amazon has led to contamination
of the waters and land, deforestation, and resulted in sickness in indigenous
communities, threatening some communities with cultural extinction.2 The jungle
of Ecuador will be extinguished in its entirety within forty years at the present rate
of deforestation however, the oil extracted and sold m the global marketplace is the
foundation of Ecuador's economy and is therefore promoted by the Ecuadorian
government as the key to development. 3  Despite initial opposition by the
Ecuadorian government, indigenous peoples of Ecuador formed grassroots
resistance movements educating and galvanmzmg local communities against
Second year law student, Umversity of Denver School of Law; Baccalaureate degree in English and
Social Science, University of Southern Colorado; Professional experience in the fields of law,
international travel, real estate investments and public relations in environmental remediation. The
author would like to acknowledge the professors who have guided her academic pursuits and the friends
and family who have guided her personal growth.
1. Peter Lippman, Introduction: Environmental Assault and Grassroots Resistance, The
Advocacy Project, Defending the Amazon, at http://www.advocacynet.org/cpage view/
amazonoilintroduction 17 58.html (last visited Mar. 17 2004). See Rights Violations in the
Ecuadorian Amazon: The Human Consequences of Oil Development, The Center for Economic and
Social Rights, Mar. 1994 at x, available at www.cesr.org/publications.htm (last visited April 4, 2004)
[hereinafter CESRI.
2. Lippman, supra note 1.
3. Id.
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exploitation, which led to citizens of Ecuador and Peru filing two putative class
actions against Texaco (now ChevronTexaco4 ) alleging the oil company polluted
ram forests and rivers m those two countries, causing environmental damage and
personal injuries.5 The litigation surrounding the now consolidated cases has been
touted as "the antiglobalization trial of the century ,6 Although environmental
contamination and human rights violations are central to the legal case, the
fundamental issue underlying this landmark case is corporate responsibility, in
particular, the accountability of multinational corporations operating in developing
and underdeveloped countries where regulation is often far more lax than standards
a corporation operating in the U.S. would be held to.
This paper takes the position that multinational corporations have social and
environmental responsibilities to the peoples and environs from which their
enterprises profit that demand legal remedy when breached. As a case study in
multinationals operating without accountability, this paper details the
developments and implications of the case against ChevronTexaco throughout
more than a decade of litigation and discusses generally the barriers to redress
encountered by plaintiffs, such as the Ecuadorian and Peruvian plaintiffs,
attempting to bring suit against multinationals operating in a global market.
Section II discusses the background of ChevronTexaco's operations in Ecuador
and the political and economic environment at the time of operations as well as the
impacts of these operations to the natural and cultural environment in Ecuador and
Peru and the potential liabilities incurred as a result. Section III analyzes the cases
brought against ChevronTexaco for their allegedly sub-standard waste disposal
techniques that resulted in environmental and cultural devastation. Section IV
highlights the associated case now pending in Ecuador, which was brought
following the U.S. federal court's dismissal of the U.S. suit. Section V looks to the
future of Ecuador's oil development as an economic force following the
ChevronTexaco debacle. Section VI outlines the new laws and regulations that will
shape oil extraction in the future by empowering indigenous peoples to have both
information and meaningful participation in the processes. Section VII considers
generally the barriers encountered by plaintiffs attempting to gain access to redress
for wrongs committed by multinationals in foreign jurisdictions, and Section VIII
proposes solutions for improving means of redress as a mechanism for demanding
multinational accountability in an international context. Section IX calls for
universal standards to be established through collaborative efforts of the
international community to demand multinational social, cultural and economic
accountability in the environs within which they operate.
4. In 2001, Texaco became ChevronTexaco following a merger between the two companies. See
infra text accompanying note 68. In this paper, the name Texaco is used for activitlies before 2001 and
ChevronTexaco is used for activities following 2001.
5. See Aguinda v. Texaco (Agumda ), 1994 WL 142006, 6 (SDNY April 11, 1994). See also
Ashanga v. Texaco, Inc., Dkt. No. 94 Civ. 9266 (S.D.N.Y filed Dec. 28, 1994).
6. Marc Lifsher, Chevron Would Face $5 Billion Tab For Amazon Cleanup, Expert Says, WALL





The matter of environmental contamination by Texaco, a U.S. domiciled
multinational corporation, m Ecuador was facilitated by a combination of legal,
political and economic factors. In the 1970's and 1980's, "environmental
protection was virtually nonexistent m Ecuador" as "the first environmental impact
assessments were only introduced in Latin America in the 1990's.,, 7 Economics
was a key factor for both the Republic of Ecuador, who leased the land within the
sensitive rainforest region to Texaco for exploitation as a source of wealth for the
state, and Texaco who gamed high profits with no government regulation or
oversight. 8 Government corruption was also a factor in the despoiling of the
Amazon as "most of the time Texaco was in Ecuador, the government was
unrepresentative and corrupt. Local people, whose forest was leveled and whose
water was polluted, were completely unaware of what oil exploration would do to
them."9 Thus, the issue that arises is what responsibilities do corporations seizing
such prime profit-making opportunities have to the ecosystems, societies, and
economies within which they operate. Corporate accountability, a topic much
debated since the Enron scandal, should extend beyond accountability to board
members and stockholders to "those most directly affected by their operations."10
Thus, underlying the legal technicalities of the ChevronTexaco case is the more
critical issue of multinational corporate accountability for the welfare of whole
societies from whom they profit.
Texaco s Operations in Ecuador
In 1964, the Ecuadorian government invited Texaco to develop the country's
first oil field in the Oriente and Texaco's Ecuadonan subsidiary, Texaco Petroleum
Company (TexPet), commenced oil exploration." In 1967 Texaco found oil near
the Columbian border, an unspoiled jungle region of Ecuador that was, at the time,
inhabited by indigenous tribes and missionaries. 12 Texaco began drilling in the
Oriente as part of consortium in which Gulf Oil Corporation (Gulf) and Texaco
owned equal shares with the Ecuadonan government-owned PetroEcuador
7 The Advocacy Project, From the Editors: Corporate Responsibility on Trial, 16 AMAZON OIL
5, Mar. 11, 2001, at http://www.advocacynet.org/newsview/news_192.html (last visited April 4, 2004)
[hereinafter From the Editors].
8. Judith Kimerling, The Environmental Audit of Texaco's Amazon Oil Fields: Environmental
Justice or Business as Usual? 7 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 199, 201 (1994).
9. From the Editors, supra note 7.
10. Id.
Agumda v. Texaco, Inc. (Aquinda IX), 303 F.3d 470, 473 (2d Cir. 2002). The first oil field was
located in a 200 square mile region of the Amazon's Oriente region. See Amazon Watch, Ecuador, The
Chevron-Texaco Toxic Legacy: Timeline - The Case Against ChevronTexaco, at
http://www.amazonwatch.org/amazon/EC/toxico/
index.php?pagenumber=5 (last visited Mar. 15, 2004).
12. T. Christian Miller, Ecuador- Texaco Leaves Trail of Destruction: As ChevronTexaco Faces
Major Lawsuit, Evidence Portrays a Company and Nation that for Years Showed Little Concern for
the Environment, L. A. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2003, available at
http://www.corpwatch.org/news/PNDjsp?articleid=9249 (last visited April 4, 2004).
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acquiring a twenty-five percent share in 1974.13 PetroEcuador became the
14majority stakeholder in 1976 when it acquired Gulf s interests. By 1980, in
addition to drilling hundreds of wells, the consortium had constructed the 312-mile
trans-Ecuador pipeline traversing the Andes and built access roads throughout the
jungle.15 TexPet operated the oil pipeline and handled all drilling operations until
PetroEcuador assumed responsibility for the pipeline m 1989 and for drilling
operations in 1990.16
Techniques Employed by Texaco
Between 1971 and 1992 when Texaco ceased operations in Ecuador, Texaco
had drilled 339 wells in over a million acre concession and extracted roughly 1.4
billion barrels of crude oil from the Amazon.17 Texaco's operations generated
more than 3.2 million gallons of waste each day and accidental spills from the
pipeline released an estunated 16.8 million gallons of crude into the Amazon River
- all discharged without prior treatment or followup monitoring. 18 The "drilling
muds" produced during Texaco's oil extraction contain "water, oil, heavy metals
and chemicals used m drilling."' 9 U.S. government studies have shown that
drilling muds such as those dumped in unlined pits near the wells in the Oriente,
can contain "toxic levels of benzene, a known carcinogen, and lead, which can
impede mental development in children." 20 Additionally, Texaco used dirt pits to
separate the oil from water, which produced a waste called "produced water, a
brine that was dumped into nearby streams. 2' According to studies of produced
water in the U.S., it also contains "high levels of benzene and arsemc. 22 These
wastes from Texaco's operations are blamed for the devastation of streams, rivers,
and wetlands in the Amazon basm, impacting both Ecuador's and Peru's
indigenous inhabitants.23
In response to a request from Ecuador's Minster of Energy and Mines for an
environmental audit of the oil fields in 1994, Texaco asserted that during the
company's years of operation they complied with all laws and regulations along
with the company's "operating practices which often go beyond the environmental
laws and regulations of countries around the globe. 24  In sharp contrast to
13. Aguinda X, 303 F.3d at 473.
14. Id., See Texaco Inc.'s Memorandum of Law in Support of its Renewed Motions to Dismiss
Based on Forum Non Convemens and International comity at 15.
15. Miller, supra note 12.
16. Aguinda IX, 303 F.3d at 473.
17 Kimerling, supra note 8, at 205.
18. Id. The volume of crude spilled from the trans-Ecuador pipeline alone exceeds that of the
Exxon Valdez, the largest oil spill in U.S. history, which dumped approximately 10.8 million gallons of
oil into the Prince William Sound. Id. at n.28.




23. Agumndal, 1994 WL 142006 at 1.
24. Kimerling, supra note 8, at n.5 (citing Letter for J. Michael Trevino, Vice President of Texaco
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Texaco's practices, however, "large [U.S.] operators had mostly abandoned the use
of unlined dirt pits to dispose of drilling muds" by the mid-1980s due to more
stringent disposal regulations for oil waste prompted by growing health and
environmental impact concerns.25 Less than five percent of oil wastes in the U.S.
were dumped into dirt pits in 1985, according to a survey by industry trade group
American Petroleum Institute. 26 Most drilling muds were shipped to special off-
site disposal centers and while most U.S. states with petroleum activity banned the
discharge of oil wastes into freshwater streams m the 1940s and 1950s, the U.S.
federal government banned such dumping nationwide m 1979 with only very
limited exceptions.27 Alternatively, oil companies in the U.S. and many other
countries were reinjecting waste into the ground.2i
According to the interviews and documents produced during discovery in the
U.S. case, "Texaco dumped waste water directly into streams and the jungle
instead of using disposal methods safer for the environment and public health that
became common in the United States dunng the 1970s and 1980s. Oil company
officials regarded those methods as too expensive to be cost-effective in
Ecuador.,29  A 1976 Texaco memorandum indicated that "the Ecuadorian
government wanted the pits drained and covered because they collapsed in heavy
rams and released contaminated water" but warned that such action would be
"considerably more costly ,,30 Although the Ecuadorian pits were never drained,
Texaco officials maintain the pits were promptly repaired.3' Michael Econmides,
coauthor of The Color of Oil, stated, "That's an obviously bad practice. They
would never have done that in the United States.",32  Judith Kimerling, an
environmental law professor and author of Release of Amazon Crude, which first
exposed the impact of Texaco's oil developments in 1991, said, "The big picture is
that we know from experience around the world that it's irresponsible to just dig a
hole, dump your waste and walk away. That's exactly what Texaco did m
Ecuador.,33 The plaintiffs suit alleges "[tihe waste, a chemical stew of heavy
metals such as arsenic and carcinogens such as benzene, increased levels of cancer,
infant mortality, spontaneous abortions, headaches, stomach ailments and skm
diseases [and that] the effects of pollution also harmed crops and
livestock.
3 4
Petroleum Company, to K. Bandell, ramforest activist (Aug. 5, 1993) (on file with the Harv. Hum. Rts.









34. Lifsher, supra note 6.
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Health and Cultural Impacts
Nearly 2.5 million acres of pristme rain forest were opened up to land
speculation, colonization, deforestation, ranching, logging and agn-mdustry as a
result of Texaco's access roads forcing the indigenous Tetetes off their land and
dispossessing the indigenous Cofan of their traditional temtory '5 In addition to
being displaced, the deforestation and pollution have severely degraded the
indigenous peoples' hunting and fishing territories leading to malnutrition and
pushing them to the brink of extinction.36 Furthermore, exposure to outside
influences has destabilized indigenous communities and exposed them to
epidemics of foreign diseases, prostitution and alcoholism.37
In an Affidavit of the Secoya Tribe, Elias Piaguate, offers the following
testimony*
We are a traditional people of fishermen and hunters who for centunes have
depended on the river and land in order to survive.
The effects of what Texaco has done have been disastrous for us. Because of the
contamination caused by Texaco in the river, we can no longer fish; use water
from the river to cook or drink; wash our clothes in the river; or bathe peacefully
in the nver Before Texaco came, a hunter spent three hours finding food for
this whole family. Now, with the low number of animals, a hunter can go out for
the whole day and not find even a little animal. We do not have enough food and
we are undernourished.
Our health has been damaged seriously by the contamination caused by Texaco.
Many people in our community now have red stains on their skin and others have
been vomiting and fainting. Some little children have died because their parents
did not know they should not dnnk the river water.
38
In April of 1993, a Harvard public health study found that oil-related
contaminants in the drinking, bathing and fishing water samples contained
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) ten to one-thousand times greater than
USEPA's safety guidelines.39 The study concluded that "[tihe presence of high
levels of toxic compounds and oil-related injuries indicate that the exposed
35. Kimerling, supra note 8, at 206. Displacement is widely believed to have hastened their
extinction as a people. Id. at n.32 (citing Interview with Luis Carrera, President of the Environmental
Advisory Commission to the President of the Republic, in Quto, Ecuador (Jan. 26, 1994)).
36. Id. at 206-07. Other adverse impacts include the destruction of crops, forest resources, and
habitat, erosion, sedimentation of surface waters, and soil degradation. Id at n.30.
37. Kimerling, supra note 8, at 207
38. Affidavit of the Secoya Tribe Given by Elias Piaguaie, Agurnda IX., (No. #93-CV-7527). See
Amazon Watch, Ecuador: The Chevron-Texaco Toxic Legacy: The Legal Case Against Chevron Texaco,
at http://www.amazonwatch.org/amazon/EC/toxico/index.php?page_number-4 (last visited April 4,
2004). Indigenous tribes of Huaorani, Quichua, and Secoya were also forced off their territorial lands
by Texaco's expanding infrastructure. Kimerling, supra note 8, at n.33.
39. CESR, supra note I at Executive Summary.
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population faces an increased risk of serious and non-reversible health effects such
as cancers and neurological and reproductive problems. °
A study published m 2002 by Miguel San Sebastian, a Spanish
epidemiologist, found that people living in countries with oil drilling faced
significantly higher risks of cancer, especially stomach, rectum and kidney cancer
for men, and cervix and lymph node cancer for women.41 The report was produced
after San Sebastian examined 985 cases of cancer in the Amazon reported to a
central health registry between 1985 and 1998.42 According to San Sebastian,
"What the studies show is that something is happening there. But it's tough to
make the direct link that the oil is causing these cancers., 43 San Sebastian's study
was criticized by Jack Siemiatycki, a University of Montreal professor of
epidemiology and authority on environmental causes of cancer, who said "[t]here's
no more than a hint of link" between cancer and oil exposure. 44 San Sebastian's
1999 Yana Curt Report acknowledged that his study of San Carlos where Texaco
built more than thirty wells was not enough to prove the devastating health effect
of Texaco's operations throughout the region, but did find that males were at risk
for cancer of the larynx, bile ducts, liver, stomach, melanoma and leukemia
associated with a high risk of mortality from such diseases. 45 A health study
published by the Ecuadorian Union of Popular Health Promoters of the Amazon
(UPPSAE) found that individuals exposed to oil had higher occurrences of
abortion, elevated rates of fungal infection, dermatitis, headache, and nausea.46
While the science as to the cause of the devastating health crises in the Oriente is
disputed, it is clear that both the health and cultures of the indigenous peoples have
been damaged by ChevronTexaco's oil operations there.
Texaco's Economic and Political Sway on The Republic of Ecuador
Texaco used its immense economic resources and political ties to maintain
their operations with little to no government oversight or regulation. According to
T. Christian Miller, a writer for the Los Angeles Times that reviewed discovery
materials and conducted interviews of litigants, discovery documents reveal that
"Texaco executives dined with presidents and ministers, the U.S. Embassy
gave Texaco access to top officials during trade missions, [and] Texaco handed
out contracts to current and former Ecuadonan military officials. One memo notes
the benefits of continuing a contract with a former Ecuadorian navy officer.,
47
40. Id.




45. Dr. Miguel San Sebastan, Yana Curt Report Summary, Sept. 1999, available at
http://www.texacorainforest. com/case/index.htm (last visited April 4, 2004) (Two medial doctors in
collaboration with the Department of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene of the University of London
conducted the public health study of the inhabitants of San Carlos.).
46. CESR, supra note 1, at 9 (The study examined 1,465 people in ten communities with 1,077
residing in oil-containuated areas and 388 m non-contarminated areas.).
47 Miller, supra note 12.
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Texaco used its economic superiority to manipulate its often strained relations with
the Ecuadorian government. "On a few occasions, when the disputes got especially
nasty, the company withheld payments to the government for the oil it was
shipping out."
48
Conversely, Texaco also issued multimillion-dollar loans with generous terms
to the economically-challenged Ecuadorian government. When Ecuador's
president made an urgent plea following a devastating earthquake m 1987 Texaco
agreed to supply an interest-free $33 million loan.49 Officials noted that it would
help the company acquire a contract extension. 50  Economic forces weighed
heavily in Texaco's favor as a means of manipulating environmental regulation of
its operations, and m turn, the Republic of Ecuador used the pretext of an improved
economy to justify exploiting its own people and their habitats.
The Ecuadorian government's regular budget cuts for environmental
programs are representative of their lack of concern for the environmental impact
of Texaco's drilling operations. Government-owned PetroEcuador, a partner in the
consortium, played a supporting role in the devastation of the Amazonian Oriente
region. Texaco manager, Rene Bucaram, said, "the state oil company erased the
budget line for environmental operations to save money" and Texaco "would
follow suit by suspending its 37.5% share of the funding required m the
consortium deal.' Memorandums produced through discovery showed that m
some years Texaco's budget was zero for environmental tasks.52 "Nine out of
twelve months, [the government] cut the costs for environmental work," and
Texaco had no qualms with cutting its budget in response.5 ZPetroEcuador's
president and former Texaco worker said Texaco "should have followed the same
standards they were following in the United States, but the authorities here were
not demanding it. Texaco did what the authorities asked, the mmmium required.
Back then, nobody talked about the environment." 54  Ecuadonan government
officials said they were unaware of the environmental damage taking place at the
time. They said Texaco "assured them that it was using the best technology
available." 55 Retired Gen. Rene Vargas, who headed Ecuador's Energy Mimstry
m the early 1970s, claimed, "If they had done m the U.S. what they did here, they
would have been made prisoners. They knew it was a crime. 56 The responsible
parties have been pointing fingers at one another for over a decade, meanwhile the
indigenous peoples whose health, cultures and habitats were all-but destroyed by
the consortium's activities m the Oriente have received no reparations.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. ("Texaco's public relations image is in need of improvement, which will be attended to
immediately, said one memo written by a Texaco executive after the quake).
51. Id.
52. Id.




56. Id. ("Call us ignorant, call us ingenious, I accept it. We just didn't know, said Vargas).
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Texaco's Departure from Ecuador
PetroEcuador acquired complete ownership of the Consortium in 1992 when
TexPet relinquished its interests in the operation. 5' Upon termination of the
concession, Texaco conducted two audits to assess the unpact of the consortium's
operations on soil, water and air, and assess compliance with environmental laws,
regulations and generally accepted operating practices.58 A summary of one of
these audits reported that during the consortium's two decades of operations,
"some activities were potentially noncompliant with Ecuadorian law" and samples
from five rivers determined that the discharge of produced water had altered their
chemistry to be higher in salt, oil and particulate waste.59 The summary further
noted contamination at 25% of the well sites visited, but characterized the damage
as limited. 60 Despite these findings, Texaco asserts that the audits conclude there
was no lasting or significant environmental impact from the consortium's
operations. 6 1 A close review of the audits' criteria and basic assumptions reveals
that the absence of specific quantitative standards by which to measure Texaco's
compliance, Texaco could conduct its operations "in accordance with any level of
compliance [it] felt appropriate or necessary." 62 Additionally the critena's adopts
a compliance standard defined by oil industry practices in tropical regions (remote
Third World countries) rather than compliance standards based on environmental
and public health inpacts.
63
In March 1995, after two lawsuits were filed in a U.S. federal court against
Texaco for pollution caused in the Oriente and Peruvian lands downstream, Texaco
negotiated an Agreement for Environmental Reparations with the Ecuadonan
government which resulted in a $40 million dollar cleanup in exchange for a Final
Release of Claims and Delivery of Equipment and negotiated a settlement with
Municipalities in the drilling region that released Texaco from any future
obligations or liabilities.64 While ChevronTexaco contends that its $40-million
cleanup in response to the audits was designed to ensure that there was no lasting
environmental damage, Steven Donziger, a lawyer for the plaintiffs, said, "It's like
treating skin cancer with makeup. They never dealt with the underlying
problems. 65 Plaintiffs' claims that the cleanup effort was deficient are supported
by a local environmental group associated with the plaintiffs whose survey of the
waste pits cleaned by Texaco "found that nearly all continued to have oil residue or
57. Agumda IX, 303 F.3d at 473.
58. ChevronTexaco, Environmental Remediation, at http://www.texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador/
en/overview/#a4 (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
59. Miller, supra note 12.
60. Id.
61. ChevronTexaco, supra note 58.
62. Kimerling, supra note 8, at 217 (citing HBT Agra Limited, Final Assessment Criteria for an
Environmental Evaluation of the Petroecuador Consortium Oil Fields, 27-28 (Oct. 1992)).
63. Kimerling, supra note 8, at 217.
64. ChevronTexaco, Environmental Remediation, at http://www.texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador (last
visited Mar. 15, 2004).
65. Miller, supra note 12.
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other contamination." 66  Remediation by Texaco prior to its departure from
Ecuador, although strongly criticized by plaintiffs as inadequate, is heavily relied
upon by Texaco as excusing it from over twenty years of social and environmental
irresponsibility 
67
After a merger in 2001, Texaco became ChevronTexaco, the second largest
energy company in the world.68 The newly formed company did not deny
dumping production wastes into the Amazonian environment, but claimed their
waste disposal techniques at the tune were consistent with oil industry practices in
other tropical countries such as Angola, Brazil, Columbia, Indonesia, Mexico, and
Nigeria.69  In other words, they employed disposal practices used i
underdeveloped nations that had little to no environmental regulatory standards
rather than the more stringent health-based standards imposed by the U.S.
ChevronTexaco dismissed the health claims in the Oriente as unsupported by any
credible, substantiated scientific evidence." 70
Moreover, the company denied responsibility for any environmental damage
based on their position as a minority partner and their claim that operations were
controlled by the state-owned oil company PetroEcuador and TexPet (Texaco's
Ecuador subsidiary), as well as approved by the Ecuadonan government.7'
Although ChevronTexaco maintains that its only involvement in Ecuadorian oil
development was through indirect investment in its subsidiary, TexPet, the
affidavits of plaintiffs' witnesses indicate that "the most important contract for
field operations were approved and signed in the United States" and company
policy demanded that authorization be sought regarding annual budgets and
expenditures. 72 Despite ChevronTexaco's claim of only indirect involvement in
Ecuador, lax environmental regulatory structures and a complicit Republic of
Ecuador desperate for direct foreign investment created oil operation that gave rise
to substantial liabilities.
Potential Liabilities for Reparations in the Oriente
Plaintiffs against Texaco sought money damages and extensive equitable
relief to redress contamination of the water supplies and environment including:
financing for environmental cleanup to create access to potable water and hunting
66. Id.
67 ChevronTexaco, supra note 64.
68. Amazon Watch, Ecuador: The Chevron-Texaco Toxic Legacy, at
http://www.amazonwatch.org/amazon/EC/
toxico/index.php?pagenumber=5 (last visited Mar. 17, 2004). On Oct. 9, 2001, Chevron and Texaco
completed the merger that formed ChevronTexaco. ChevronTexaco, Chronology of Events: Texaco
and Ecuador Chronological Overview, at http://www.texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador (last visited Apr. 10,
2004).
69. ChevronTexaco, Response to Claims, at http://www.texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador/
en/response to clanis/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2004) [hereinafter ChevronTexaco Response to Claims].
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at Silva Af. 2-3.
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and fishing grounds; renovating or closing the Trans-Ecuadonan Pipeline; creation
of an environmental monitoring fund; establishing standards to govern future
Texaco oil development; creation of a medical monitoring fund; and injunction
restraining Texaco from entering into activities that risk environmental or human
injuries, and restitution.7 3 Dave Russell, an Atlanta-based toxics specialist and
U.S. expert consultant to the plaintiffs estimated that "[c]leanmg up toxic wastes in
the Ecuadorian Amazon region could cost ChevronTexaco Corp. more than $5
billion and take as long as ten years."74 According to Russell, "The damage is to
the entire ecosystem and the only way to effectively curtail pollution would be
to dig up, transport and mcmerate millions of tons of contaminated soil. Such a
project would dwarf any decontamination effort ever undertaken.,
75
U.S. CASES: AGIENDO & JOTA V TEXACO
A putative class action suit against Texaco, Inc., Aguinda v. Texaco (Agumnda
1), was filed in November of 1993 in federal court m New York by a team of U.S.
lawyers headed by Ecuadonan-Amencan Cnstbal Bonifaz, and Joseph C. Kohn, a
Philadelphia lawyer, on behalf of plaintiffs compnsed of mestizo settlers, members
of the Cofan, Siona, and Secoya indigenous communities or the Sucumbios and
Orellana provinces, in the north of the Oriente. 76  New York was chosen by
plaintiffs as the home of Texaco's international headquarters where many of the
decisions regarding oil operations in Ecuador were made.77 The suit alleges abuses
by Texaco that include large-scale disposal of inadequately treated hazardous
wastes and destruction of tropical ram forest habitats in the Amazon basin resulting
in harm to indigenous peoples living in the rain forest and to their property, and to
the stability of Amazon basin habitats. 78 Lead attorney Bonifaz, formerly a
chemical engineer, described the environmental destruction as an "apocalyptic
environmental nightmare unlike any the ramforest has ever seen."79
Fearing the suit against Texaco would deter future international investment in
Ecuador's oil development, the Ecuadorian government initially opposed the suit.
In December 1993, Texaco moved for dismissal on grounds of failure to join the
Republic of Ecuador, international comity, and forum non convemens.80 Texaco
also submitted a letter addressed to the U.S. Department of State from Ecuador's
ambassador to the U.S. stating that Ecuador regarded the suit as "an affront to
73. Jota v. Texaco Inc. (Agunda IV), 157 F.3d 153, 156, n.2 (2nd Cir. 1998).
74. Lifsher, supra note 6.
75. Id ("To put this in perspective, you're looking at something, sizewise, larger than the
Chemobyl disaster, said Russell.).
76. Complaint, Agumda v. Texaco, Inc.(Aquinda ), Dkt. No. 93 Civ. 7527 (S.D.N.Y filed Nov.
3, 1993); The Advocacy Project, The Fight for the Amazon: In the New York Courts, 16 AMAZON OIL
5, Mar. 11, 2001, at http://www.advocacynet.org/news-view/news_192.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
See also Agumda IX, 303 F.3d at 473.
77. Agumda IX, 303 F.3d at 473 (noting plaintiffs' allegations that Texaco's Ecuador activities
were "designed, controlled, conceived, and directed through its operations in the United States.").
78. Agumdal, 1994 WL 142006 at 1.
79. The Fight for the Amazon: In the New York Courts, supra note 76.
80. Agumda IX, 303 F.3d at 474.
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Ecuador's national sovereignty "81 Despite Texaco's assertions that Ecuador's
courts would be a more convenient forum for litigation, Judge Broderick issued a
groundbreakmg decision upholding the plaintiffs' clain that Texaco's dumping m
Ecuador could be in violation of international law and reserved decision on
Texaco's motion to dismissing stating:
[t]he extent to which any actionable conduct falls into these categories
cannot be determined absent discovery to permit definition of the actual
events, if any, which are violative of law enforceable by the courts of the
United States, and what relief, if any, would be appropriate. It is thus
unclear at this point whether or not any indispensable parties are currently
omitted from the complaint.8 2
In December of 1994, lawyers representing Peruvian individuals, Jota, and
indigenous communities filed a companion class action suit based on the same
grievances and alleging the pollution spread downstream to Peru.8 3 Jota plaintiffs
alleged they would suffer personal injuries and property damage as a result of
"negligent or otherwise improper oil piping and waste disposal practices" and
based their claims on "theories of negligence, public and private nuisance, strict
liability, medical monitoring, trespass, civil conspiracy, and the Alien Tort Claims
Act (ATCA)." 4
The death of Judge Broderick in February 1995 changed the course of the
Aguinda I suit, which was then assigned to Judge Barrington Parker for completion
of discovery and was again transferred to District Judge Jed Rakoff, who found the
previous courts afforded the plaintiffs "unusual leeway."
85
U.S. District Court and Second Circuit Court ofAppeals Play Hot Potato
First U.S. District Court Decision
In November 1996 following discovery, Judge Rakoff granted Texaco's
motion and dismissed the Aguinda complaint on grounds of international comity,
forum non conveniens, and failure to join indispensable parties proclaiming
Ecuador's courts would be a more convenient forum for the litigation.8 6 In
response to the court's declaration that the Sovereign Immunities Act barred the
court's assertion of jurisdiction over either Ecuadorian entity, the government of
81. Id.
82. Aguinda 1, 1994 WL 142006 at 7, 10.
83. Ashanga v. Texaco, Inc. (Jota) Dkt. No. 94 Civ. 9266 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 28, 1994)(onginal
complaint was labeled Ashanga, but is since known as Jota). See also Aguinda IX., 303 F.3d at 474.
84. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc. (Agunda VIII), 142 F Supp. 2d 534, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Aguinda
IX., 303 F.3d at 473.
85. Agumda v. Texaco, Inc. (Aguinda 11), 945 F Supp. 625,627 (S.D.N.Y 1996).
86. Aguinda II, 945 F Supp. at 628 (The court noted that the plaintiffs' failure to join
PetroEcuador and the Republic of Ecuador as parties would make granting equitable relief




Ecuador filed a motion to intervene and plaintiffs simultaneously filed a motion to
reconsider the court's dismissal.8 7 The Republic of Ecuador's affidavit stated that
it was motivated to "protect the interests of the indigenous citizens of the
Ecuadorian Amazon who were seriously affected by the environmental
contamination attributed to the defendant company" and agreed to "procure the
necessary mdeninization in order to alleviate the environmental damage caused by
Texaco."88 The Ecuadonan government did not, however, waive sovereign
immunity with regard to claims asserted by the Jota plaintiffs or counterclaims
made by Texaco. 89 Both motions were denied m the decision to dismiss. 9° After
the second complaint (Jota) was dismissed in 1997 the citizens of Ecuador and
Peru appealed.9'
First U.S. Appeal
In October 1998, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded
Judge Rakoff's decision instructing the District Court to independently re-weigh
the relevant factors for a forum non convemens dismissal and review international
comity "in light of all the then current circumstances, including Ecuador's position
with regard to the maintenance of this litigation m the United States forum." 92 The
Court of Appeals articulated an intent to ensure that Texaco would submit to
jurisdiction in Ecuador.93
Following the Court of Appeal's decision, the citizens of Ecuador and Peru
moved for recusal of Judge Rakoff on grounds that the judge's attendance at an
expense-paid seminar sponsored by organizations that received funding from
Texaco after his initial dismissal of the case raised the appearance of impropnety.94
After Judge Rakoff denied the motion, Plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus and
Court of Appeals Circuit Judge Winter denied the petition finding that Judge
Rakoff did not abuse his discretion m denying petitioner's motion and that
attendance at the expense-paid environmental law seminar, given Texaco's
"indirect and minor funding role and the lack of a showing that any aspect of the
semmar touched upon an issue material to the disposition of a claim or defense in
the current litigation, [a] reasonable person would not doubt the judge's
87. Aguinda IV 157 F.3d at 158. See Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603(b), 1604
(stating foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the Courts of the United States and of
the States).
88. AgumdalV 157 F.3d at 157-58.
89. Id. at 158.
90. Id., Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc. (Aguinda 111), 175 F.R.D. 50, 50-53 (S.D.N.Y 1997) (denying
motions for intervention and reconsideration).
91. AguindalV 157 F.3dat 158.
92. Aguinda IV 157 F.3d at 159, 161. See also Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc. (Agunda V), 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (reopening the record to consider additional submissions regarding
whether the courts of Ecuador and/or Peru might reasonably be expected to exercise a modicum of
independence and impartiality).
93. AgumndalV 157 F.3d at 159.
94. See Agumda v. Texaco, Inc. (Aguinda VI), 139 F Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). See also
Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc. (In re Aguinda), 241 F.3d 194, 197, 206-7 (2nd Cir. 2001).
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impartiality m this case" and therefore, disqualification was not required.
95
U.S. District Court Decision on Remand
In the District Court case on remand, Ecuador's ambassador to the U.S.
informed the Court that the Republic of Ecuador was "not willing under any
circumstance, to waive its sovereign immunity and be subject to rulings by Courts
of the United States."96 Thereafter, Texaco renewed its motion to dismiss after
consenting to personal jurisdiction in Peru and Ecuador and stipulating that it
would waive statute of limitation defenses for the appeal period to allow plaintiffs
to file in Ecuador, and plaintiff's use of discovery acquired in the U.S. courts in
future suits.97 In a forty-six page decision issued May 30, 2001, Judge Rakoff
again granted Texaco's motion to dismiss concluding that Texaco satisfied the
burden of demonstrating an adequate alternative forum, the private and public
interest factors weighed heavily in favor of Texaco, and rejected the plamtiff's
assertions that public interest factors should be analyzed under the ATCA Law of
Nations test.98 The court also addressed concerns expressed by plaintiffs that
Ecuador's Interpretive Law 55 stipulates that its courts cannot weigh a case once it
has been filed abroad by reassuring Plaintiffs that it would be willing to reconsider
if the Ecuadorian court dismissed the suit on the basis of Ecuadonan Law 55/98.99
After considering arguments about whether the Ecuadorian court could be
impartial after a military coup that deposed President Jamil Mahuad, 1°° Judge
Rakoff said the courts of Ecuador can exercise "that modicum of independence and
impartiality necessary to an adequate alternative forum" and that "[t]he record
establishes overwhelmmgly that these cases have everything to do with Ecuador
and nothing to do with the United States. ' ' i The case was once again appealed to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Final U.S. Appeal
Attorneys for the Ecuadorian plaintiffs disagree that Ecuadorian courts
exercise the necessary independence from military involvement in civil affairs.
Citing corruption and bureaucratic obstruction in the Ecuadorian court system,
95. Agumda VI1, 139 F Supp. 2d at 439- Agumda v. Texaco, Inc. (Agunda VII), 241 F.3d at 194,
198, 206-7 (2nd Cir. 2001).
96. Agunda IX, 303 F.3d at 475; See also Aguinda VIII, 142 F Supp. 2d at 537 (District Court
decision of Judge Rakoff).
97. Agumda IX, 303 F.3d at 475.
98. Agumda VIII, 142 F Supp. 2d at 534, 537, 548, 553.
99. Id. at 546-47 (Law 55/98 was new Ecuadonan statute that attempted to preclude lawsuits
initiated in a foreign forum.).
100. President Jamil Mahuad was replaced by elected vice-president, Gustavor Noboa. U.S.
Department of State, Ecuador- Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2001, Mar. 4, 2002,
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/200l/wha/8356.htm.
101. Agumda VII1, 142 F Supp. 2d at 538, 543-44, 545-46; Reuters, Judge Dismisses Indians Suits
Against Texaco, June 1, 2001, available at
http://www.planetark.com/dailynewsstory.cfm?newsid=l 1029 (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
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plaintiffs' attorneys claim overwhelming impediments.10 2 The 1999 State Report
for Ecuador concluded that Ecuador's legal system was "inefficient and
corrupt."1 0 3 Furthermore, plaintiffs' appellate brief urged that a ruling concerning
itself only with the functionality of a foreign court as an adequate alternative forum
allows U.S. corporations to violate the Law of Nations with impunity. 14 Some of
the obstacles cited were the inadequacies of the Ecuadonan court, the inability to
compel witness testimony, prohibition of class actions, and exorbitant court filing
fees. 05 Additionally, plaintiffs point out that the largest fines for failure to comply
with a court order are between $90 and $180 U.S. dollars. 16
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered many of the
obstacles cited by the plaintiffs, but ultimately affirmed the District Court's
dismissal of the Ecuadorian and Peruvian plaintiffs' suit for forum non conveniens
with an extension of tune to file their actions in Ecuador. 10 7 The decision was
premised on the theory of forum non convenens.'1  The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit articulated the test for forum non convemens to be first,
ascertaining the degree of deference due to plaintiffs' choice of forum followed by
a determination as to whether an adequate alternative forum exits. t 9 If so, the
court must "then balance a series of factors involving the private interests of the
parties m maintaining the litigation m the competing fora and any public interests
at stake" to determine whether the defendant can meet the burden of proof
requisite to overcoming the plaintiff s choice of forum."0
In considering whether Ecuador was an adequate alternative forum, the Court
found no abuse in discretion by the District Court in its findings that Law 55/98
would not preclude a suit in Ecuador after having first been initiated in the U.S. as
the Law had been declared unconstitutional by the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court
on April 30, 2002."' The Court further found no merit to plaintiff's claims that
Ecuadonan courts were unreceptive to tort clais and with regard to the absence
of class action mechanisms stating "[w]hile the need for thousands of individual
plaintiffs to authorize the action m their names is more burdensome than having
them represented by a representative in a class action, it is not so burdensome as to
deprive the plaintiffs of an effective alternative forum."'" 2 As to the arguments of
Ecuadorian courts' corrupt influence and ability to be impartial, the court cited the
102. Brieffor Plaintiffs-Appellants, Agumda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 ( 2nd Cir. 2002) (Nos.
01-7756(L), 01-7758(Con)) at 13-14.
103. Id. at 12-13.
104. Id. at 52.
105. Id at 11-12, 28.
106. Id at 28-29.
107. Aguinda IX, 303 F.3d at 477-80.
108. Id. at 480. Forum non convemens is "[tihe doctnne that an appropnate forum - even though
competent under the law - may divest itself of jurisdiction if for the convenience of the litigants and
witnesses, it appears that the action should proceed in another forum in which the action might
originally have been brought. Blacks Law Dictionary, 290-91 (2nd pocket ed. 2001).
109. Id. at 476.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 477.
112. ld.at477-78.
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District Court's finding and noted that "because these cases will be the subject of
close public and political scrutiny, as confirmed by the Republic's involvement in
the litigation, there is little chance of undue influence being applied."' 13  The
Court, however, did agree with the plaintiffs' objection to the District Court's
allowance of only sixty days to file claims in Ecuador stating that "[iln Ecuador,
because class action procedures are not recognized, signed authorizations would
need to be obtained for each individual plaintiff. This presents a formidable
administrative task for which we believe sixty days is inadequate time."' 114 Thus,
the Court directed the District Court to modify its ruling to make dismissal
"conditioned on Texaco's agreeing to waive any defense based on a statute of
limitations for limitation periods expirmng between the date of filing these United
States actions and one year (rather than sixty days) following the dismissal of these
actions."' 15
The court also found no abuse of discretion in the District Court's conclusion
that private interests "weigh heavily" in favor of an Ecuadonan forum. i16 The
Court stated:
The relative ease of access to sources of proof favors proceeding in Ecuador. All
plaintiffs, as well as members of their putative classes, live in Ecuador or Peru.
Plaintiffs sustained their injuries in Ecuador and Peru, and their relevant medical
and property records are located there. Also located in Ecuador are the records of
decisions taken by the Consortium, along with evidence of Texaco's defenses
implicating the roles of PetroEcuador and the Republic. By contrast, plaintiffs
have failed to establish that the parent Texaco made decisions regarding oil
operations in Ecuador or that evidence of any such decisions is located in the
U.S.
1 17
Furthermore, the court noted that it would be onerous for a New York court to
handle translation issues and that "to the extent that evidence exists within the
U.S., plaintiffs' concerns are partially addressed by Texaco's stipulation to allow
use of the discovery already obtamed. ' 'iS Likewise, the Court found that the
district court was within its discretion in concluding that the public interest factors
tilt in favor of dismissal." 9 The Court did not address the two additional practical
considerations raised by plaintiffs regarding financial burden of filing fees in
Ecuador and travel advisories issued for the province in which the Ecuadorian trial
would be held stating that, "[i]t is sufficient answer that these contentions need not
be recognized when raised for the first time on appeal."' 120 The Court also passed
on the plaintiffs' plea to interpret the ATCA "to encompass their environmental
claim" and "to express a strong U.S. policy interest in providing a forum for
113. Id. at 478 (citing Aguinda VIII, 142 F Supp. 2d at 544-46).
114. Id. at 478.




119. Id. at 480.
120. Id. at 479.
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the adjudication of such clams" 121 The Court, therefore, affirmed the District
Court's dismissal subject to modification. Thus, the theory of forum non
convemens served as a mechanism to protect multinationals from liability in the
U.S. where the wrongs committed by the multinational's subsidiaries were
committed in a foreign jurisdiction.
ECUADOR CASE: REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR AND PETROECUADOR V
TEXACO
Ecuadorian Trial Proceedings Begin
The case filed in Ecuador following the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmation of the District Court's dismissal on grounds of forum non convemens,
represented the first time Texaco or any other U.S. oil company was forced to face
judgment in an Ecuadorian court.'22 This landmark lawsuit was heard in "a small
courthouse m Lago Agno, a remote town m the heart of Ecuador's oil
operations."'1
23
The trial's first phase, focusing on testimony and evidence, ended on October
27 2003 after testimony, including that of former minister of Ecuador's Ministry
of Mines and Energy who testified that a Texaco subsidiary "knowingly used
primitive waste disposal techniques m the 1970s and 1980s."' 124 Questioning of
witnesses, including experts, m an Ecuadorian trial is done by the judge working
from questions proposed by the parties' lawyers; there are no cross-
examinations.' 25 Judge Albert Guerra Bastidas questioned witnesses including
Rene Vargas Pasos, the former energy minister who dealt with Texaco's Ecuador
subsidiary m the mid-1970s.126  Pasos told the judge "Texaco designed and
managed the oil fields that fouled the region with vast quantities of oily waste..
Texaco knew its waste pits were not well-constructed, that they were" polluting
the rain forest. i27 "1 believe they were committing a crime against the region and
the country, he added. "The consequences have demonstrated this: hundreds of
people dead and sick. The water from the rvers is not good for drinking, not for
bathing. It is a disaster."'
' 28
121. Id at 480 ("Even if we were to accept plaintiffs' view of the law on both questions, the pnvate
and public interest factors that affect this case would nonetheless require that we affirm the district
court's judgment").
122. Amazon Watch, Media Advisory, Historic Trial Against ChevronTexaco Begins Tomorrow In
Ecuador- Protests At Company's Headquarters in California, Oct. 20, 2003, at
http://www.texacorainforest.org/histonctnal.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
123. Id.
124. Tom Knudson, Testimony Ends m Oil Giant's Ecuador Trial, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 30,
2003, http://www.texacoratnforest.org/oct302003.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
125. Lifsher, supra note 6.
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ChevronTexaco presented no witnesses during the first phase. 12 9 However,
"thousands of pages of previously confidential memos, studies and internal
documents that reveal the inner workings of Texaco and its majority partner, the
Ecuadorian state oil company, Petroecuador," were released. 3 An internal Texaco
letter included in the thousands of pages of documents submitted into evidence by
Plaintiffs' attorneys indicated the "oil company rejected the option of lining its
earthen waste pits to protect the environment as too expensive."i 3 A letter written
in 1980 by a Texaco manager stated, "The current [unlined) pits are necessary for
efficient and economical operation of our drilling operations. The total cost of
eliminating the old pits and lining new pits would be $4,197,958 It is
recommended that the pits neither be lined nor filled."' 13 2 Texaco "decided not
to spend the money. And the consequence of not spending money was sacrificing
peoples' lives."13 3  Other documents filed with the court detail spills from the
Trans Ecuadoran Pipeline, which canes oil over the Andes. "From 1972 to 1989,
breaks hemorrhaged 297,000 barrels of oil along the pipeline's 300-mile path.'
134
"These are not just random spills. This is the result of a decision made by Texaco
to install a type of drilling process that would lead to a systematic dumping of
toxins" 1
35
"In a statement released as the trial began last week, Ricardo Rets Veiga, the
company's vice president and general counsel for Latin America, flatly denied any
wrongdoing."' 36  Texaco representatives further maintain that that the use of
unlined pits was both legal in Ecuador at the time and standard practice in regions
with clay soil, such as the Amazon.i17 ChevronTexaco also disputes the claims of
damages to health. According to ChevronTexaco spokesman Chris Gidez, "Over
ten years of litigation have yet to produce any credible and substantiated scientific
information."'i 3s Plaintiffs claim they could not afford large scientific studies, but a
study of cancer and other health problems in one village, an area with thirty oil
wells, found "ten cases of cancer in the village, resulting in a cancer rate of more
than twice the national average."' 139  The study's analysis was labeled
"inadequate cursory and misleading" by ChevronTexaco's hired
toxicologist.14 Residents however continue to assert claims such as those of Luis
Yanza, a plaintiff and community organizer who has lived in the region for twenty-
six years, "ChevronTexaco left the environment full of toxins, the rivers, the land,
129. Lifsher, supra note 6.
130. Miller, supra note 12.
131. Knudson, supra note 124.
132. Id.
133. Id (quoting Cnstobal Bonifaz, lead U.S. Attorney).
134. Id.
135. Brooke A. Masters, Case in Ecuador Viewed As Key Pollution Fight: US. Legal Team Suing
ChevronTexaco, WASHINGTON POST, May 6, 2003, at E01 (quoting Steven Donziger, one of the
plaintiffs' lawyers).
136. Knudson, supra note 124.
137. Id.





and a lot of people are suffering. They haven't cleaned up the toxins.' 14 1
Although ChevronTexaco officials further assert that Ecuador's national oil
company set policy for the venture, and that the drilling met all of the country's
environmental requirements, Ecuador's laws were interpreted to allow dumping of
wastes versus the more expensive U.S.-mandated process of re-irjecting the oil-
contaminated water back into the well. 42 Yet again the company reverted back to
its unconditional release by the government of Ecuador following the 1998
remediation effort. 143  "ChevronTexaco's effort to shift any remaining
responsibility to the Ecuadorian government doesn't reflect legal and technical
realities at the time Texaco pioneered Amazon oil exploration m the early
1970s. As the "operating partner, Texaco had a legal obligation to employ
"best practices in respect to the environment'" 4
In the daunting second phase of the trial, the judge will conduct a personal
investigation in the field before bringing the parties back for potential further
questioning. 14' There will be "an inspection of 100 to 150" areas.' 46 In addition to
the site visits to be conducted, Judge Guerra Bastidas has yet to review the over
5,000 pages of documents obtained though discovery in the U.S. 147 "His decision,
which could be appealed to the Ecuadorian Supreme Court, is expected in six to
eight months." 14
Implications of the Ecuadorian Trial
The case in Ecuador is being watched closely by environmental and human
rights advocates as well as domestic and multinational corporations because
"[liegal experts say it could be a groundbreakmg case, establishing a new way for
environmental activists to force multinational corporations to pay for what activists
say is environmental devastation. " '4' A 2003 Washington Post article claims:
U.S.-based multinational corporations often try to get cases tried in developing
countries, a tactic that can kill the case entirely because most American plaintiff's
lawyers have neither the money nor the expertise to sue in Third World courts.
Later if the corporations lose, they often argue that the overseas legal process was
flawed or that their U.S. headquarters should not be held responsible for the errors
of a subsidiary in the developing world. 15o
Because foreign courts have previously encountered difficulties in making U.S.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Knudson, supra note 124 (quoting Cnstobal Bonifaz, the lead attorney in the U.S. for the
plaintiffs).
144. Lifsher, supra note 6.
145. Id.
146. Knudson, supra note 124 (quoting Judge Guerra Bastidas)..
147. id.
148. Lifsher, supra note 6.
149. Masters, supra note 135.
150. Id.
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multinational companies obey their decisions, the warning by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals that U.S. courts would "step back m if the company tried to
avoid a judgment imposed by the Eucadorean court" may be key to effective
adjudication of wrongs committed by U.S. multinationals m foreign
jurisdictions.' 5 ' According to Chris Jochnick, a New York lawyer who founded
the Center for Economic and Social Rights, oversight by the U.S. courts of a
foreign case "puts pressure on the Ecuadorian court system to perform, that might
be the best resolution. There are thousands of these cases, and there are only so
many the U.S. courts can handle. 152
It is unclear how the Ecuadorian court will rule on the lawsuit m view of
President Lucio Gutierez's bid to attract foreign investment m continuing
Ecuador's oil development. 153 The spokesman for the Ecuadorian embassy said
the Ecuadorian government had not taken a position on the lawsuit, but did say "it
is very clear that the people m the region have health problems and have suffered
for more than ten years. More work is needed to repair the area."'
154
THE LEGACY CONTINUES ECUADOR'S NEW OIL FRONTIERS
The case is of particular significance today as Ecuador continues to seek
foreign investment in oil development and companies such as Los Angeles-based
Occidental Petroleum and Spanish energy company Repsol YPF are utilizing the
newly opened oil pipeline to drill m untouched sections of the Amazon. 55 "With
U.S. and international oil companies now pushing deeper into Ecuador's virgin
ram forest, a review of the documents, new studies, and interviews with current
and former Texaco executives and Ecuadorian officials provide a portrait of how
the search for oil can wreak havoc on a remote place and its people.', 156 It Is
estimated that 4.5 billion barrels, the equivalent of an eight-month supply of the
U.S. oil demand, remain m the Amazon. 15 7 The new pipeline doubles the capacity
of the Amazon to Pacific Coast terminals, with which Occidental Petroleum
expects to boost production from 70,000 to 100,000 barrels per day from its new
Eden oil field located seventy miles south of Lago Agno. 158 Eden is one of the
most environment-friendly oil facilities in Ecuador with buried power lines and
filtered and cleaned rainwater 59 "It had a high cost, but it's the most responsible
thing to do," said Fernando Granizo, Eden's field manager. 160  Although the
Texaco embroilment has brought greater scrutiny and tighter regulations to drilling
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id., (Gutierrez was supported by indigenous groups in his 2000 coup that eventually led to his
election as President in 2002.).
154. Id.








operations m the Amazon, roads, pipelines, and spills are inevitable. "You can
minimize the effect. But there's no human activity that can be done without
impacting the environment. None, said Carlos D'Arlach, Oxy's regional vice
president of community relations. 161 Other environmental and indigenous rights
advocates such as Esperanza Martmes of Ecological Action, an Ecuadorian
environmental group, believe that environmentally sensitive areas and the habitat
of indigenous cultures should be completely off limits as she explains, "It's not
right to sacrifice new areas when this frontier is m such fragile temtory You can't
say something is right, just because it is legal."'
162
While the people of the Oriente await reparations for the environmental,
cultural, and medical damage imposed on their territories, the push for oil
continues. The men from the state oil company told Monica Torres, an Oriente
resident, that they wanted to drill another oil well behind her house and gave her
three sheets of tm to cover her roof as compensation.' 63Although free from
Texaco's exploitive practices, the Republic of Ecuador appears to be continuing
Texaco's legacy of maximizing profit to the detriment of the Ecuadorian people's
health and habitat.
ANALYSIS OF ECUADOR'S LEGAL FRAMEWORK. PAST AND PRESENT
Environmental Protection The Role of the Republic of Ecuador
From the inception of oil extraction operation m Ecuador environmental
protection laws, though weak and often unenforced, were m existence. A 1971 law
required oil companies to prevent pollution but contained no specific standards." 4
In accordance, Texaco's contract specifically required it to "prevent contamination
of water, air, and soil.' ' 165 In 1976, the Law for the Prevention and Control of
Contamination prohibited the contamination of the environment by pollutants
harmful to human life, health or well-being and declared "the protection of air,
water and soil resources, and the conservation, improvement and reclamation of
the environment to be in the public mterest" however, implementing
regulations for water pollution were not passed until 1989 with noise and air
regulations implemented m 1990 and 1991 respectively. 166
In 1981 a new law was enacted to establish environmentally protected zones,
which the oil companies, supported by governmental agencies, maintained
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. (Monica Torress added, "They said they were going to take out more crude to help
Ecuador,").
164. The Advocacy Project, The Fight for the Amazon: Contempt for the Law, 16, AMAZON OIL 5,
Mar. 11, 2001, http://www.advocacynet.org/newsview/news_192.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2004)
[hereinafter Contempt for the Law].
165. Id.
166. Kimerling, supra note 8, at 207-8, n.39.
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permitted the extraction of subsoil minerals. 167 Ecuador's courts decided "that the
companies did indeed have a nght to extract subsoil minerals from protected
areas."' 68  The main environmental protection agency in Ecudador was placed
under the Ministry of Energy and Mines. Petroecuador formed an internal
environmental unit, however, it functioned primarily as a public relations
service. 169
In 1977 when Petroecuador acquired a 62.5 percent share of the Texaco
consortium drilling in Ecuador and later took over drilling and pipeline operations
m the early 1990s, it continued to disregard the environment.' 70 Additionally, the
Ecuadorian Congress's committee appointed to supervise the exploitation of
resources in protected areas made no impact on oil extraction operations.
Although stricter regulations were passed in 1992 requiring re-injection of
production water, lining of waste pits, and restricted access to new settlers, these
requirements have not been enforced. 171 "Implementing regulations are
underdeveloped and enforcement mechanisms limited" due to Ecuador's
dependence on the capital and technology of multinational corporations and
"administrative agencies charged with enforcement lack human and financial
resources, political and technical support, and coordination."' 172 When political
support is granted, political instability forces the status quo as evidenced when
former President Jamil Mahuad's decreed protection for ramforests from drilling,
mining and logging was nullified by a coup that deposed him.' 7
Indigenous Peoples Right to Consultation
International laws ratified by Ecuador and the new Ecuadoran Constitution
establish rights for indigenous peoples to have a say in state decisions and projects,
such as oil extraction, effecting their territory and cultural survival. 174 However, a
1994 report from CESR found that citizens of Ecuador have no access to
information regarding oil operations or the associated health risks, and that the
country's constitutional court not provided effective relief for oil contamination
claims.175 Amazoman residents should have been accorded the right to protection
against pollution and consultation on oil exploration within their territories as
derived from international law implemented by Ecuador.
International law protects the right of all people to shelter, livelihood, and a
safe environment. Specifically, the 1976 International Covenant on Economic,
167. Contempt for the Law, supra note 164. The 1981 law is m reference to the Forestry Law for
Conservation of Natural Areas and Wildlife, R.O., No. 64, Aug. 24, 1981. See generally Kimerling,
supra note 8, at n. 118.




172. Kimerling, supra note 8, at 208.
173. Contempt for the Law, supra note 164.
174. See infra text accompanying notes 176, 178, 184.
175. CESR, supra note 1, at 27.
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Social, and Cultural Rights, ratified by Ecuador, declares that "[i]n no case may a
people be deprived of its own means of subsistence," and proclaims the "right of
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health."' 76  In addition, the 1986 U.N. Declaration on the Right to
Development reaffirms the "right of peoples to self-determination, by virtue of
which they have the right to pursue their economic, social, and cultural
development."' 177  The 1992 Rio Convention on Biological Diversity calls on
signatory governments to introduce procedures requiring an environmental impact
assessment for proposed projects that allow for public participation and requires
parties to protect and encourage customary use of resources in accord with
traditional cultural practices to the conserve or sustain resources.178
After the Ecuadorian government-sponsored preparatory meeting for the Rio
+5 conference in 1997 concluded that "Ecuador lacked legislation to promote
public participation in evaluation of development projects, legislation requiring
such participation was included in Ecuador's new Constitution, which was
implemented m 1998.179 Article 86 of the Constitution promises "to protect the
public's right to live in a healthy environment and to prevent contamination."' 18
Article 84 guarantees the "nontransferable ownerslup of communal lands, which
will be inalienable and indivisible" and "specifically guarantees indigenous
participation in the use and administration of nonrenewable resources and in the
benefits resulting from exploitation of those resources, as well as indemnification
for damages caused by that exploitation."' 1S Article 88 further guarantees
participation in state decisions affecting the environment. 8 2 Article 247 however,
preserves the state's claim over subsoil resources, including oil, and decrees that
these resources will be exploited in the national interest. 183 The Constitution is
reinforced and supplemented by the International Labor Organization'si 1989
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (ILO 169), which was ratified by
Ecuador in May 1998 and clearly states that the "Government shall: (a) [clonsult
the peoples concerned whenever consideration is being given to legislative or
administrative measures which may affect them directly "'u Article 7 specifies
176. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (xxi), 21
U.N.GAOR Supp (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, (1976) (quoted material
can be found at Art. I, Para. 2 and Art. 12, Para. 1 respectively), available at
http://www.unesco.org/education/information/nfsunesco/
pdf/SOCIALE.PDF (last visited Apr. 4,2004).
177 Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR (1986), available at
http://www.unhehr.ch/html/menu3/b/74.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
178. Convention on Biological Diversity (Rio de Janeiro), Dec. 29 1993, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79, Art.
14, Para. I(a), Art. 10(c).
179. The Advocacy Project, The Fight for the Amazon: Ignoring the Right to Consultation, 16
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The General Conference of International Labour Organisation, 76th Sess., adopted June 27, 1989, at Art.
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that "the peoples concerned shall have the right to decide their own priorities for
the process of development as it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions, and
spiritual well-being."' 8 5  Article 15 of ILO 169 specifically identifies the
significance of natural resources declaring that "[tihe rights of the peoples
concerned to the natural resources pertaining to their lands shall be specially
safeguarded. These rights include the right of these peoples to participate in the
use, management and conservation of these resources" and when "the state retains
ownership of subsoil resources, governments shall consult with" peoples whose
lands are affected to determine to what degree proposed projects will prejudice
their interests prior to any undertakings or permitting pertaining to their land.'
86
International law as adopted by Ecuador as a signatory clearly requires the
participation of indigenous communities where customarily temtonal lands are
concerned.
The new OCP pipeline project that was pushed through without public
participation, however, is an example of the government's disregard for the rights
and protections now afforded indigenous communities. 8 7  Despite Ecuador's
ownership of the subsurface resources, a recent legal finding "suggests that
indigenous people have the right under international law to veto any exploitation
without their consent. ' 'iSS The Inter-American Court of Human Rights issued a
decision August 31, 2001, ruling that "the government of Nicaragua violated the
rights of the Awas Tingni community when it granted concessions to a private
company to log on the community's traditional lands without consulting with the
community or obtaining its consent."'
18 9
This is the first binding decision that holds that indigenous peoples have
communal property nghts to land and natural resources based upon traditional
patterns of use and occupation" and that "as a result of customary practices,
possession of the land should suffice for indigenous communities lacking real title
to property of the land to obtain official recognition of that property.'
90
Because Ecuador is a state party to the American Convention on Human Rights, on
which this decision was based, the ruling could prove to be a critical legal
precedent for Ecuadonan indigenous communities seeking a voice in decisions to
extract oil within their traditional territories.191 Additionally, the decision required
6.
185. Id. atArt. 7.
186. Id. atArt. 15, Par. I &2.
187 The Advocacy Project, Defending the Amazon, LEGAL ISSUES: The Right to Consultation
and the Texaco Lawsuit, Feb. 2002, http://www.advocacynet.org/epage_vew/
amazonoillegal_l 7_63.htmil [hereinafter The Right to Consultation].
188. Id.
189. Inter-Am. C.H.R., The Case of The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua,
Judgment of Aug. 31, 2001, paras. 153b) & 155, available at http://www.utulsa.edu/law/classes/nee/
INTERAMERCT_ HUMAN RTS Mayagna.htrn (last visited Apr. 4, 2004). [hereinafter IACHR];
The Right to Consultation, supra note 187.
190. The Right to Consultation, supra note 187; IACHR, supra note 189, at paras. 149 &151.
191. The Right to Consultation, supra note 187.
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Nicaragua to establish procedures m accord with national and international norms,
which give prompt and specific official recognition and demarcation of the
indigenous community's rights to its communal natural resources and to abstain
from granting or considering any concessions to used natural resources occupied
by the indigenous peoples until land tenure issues were resolved or an agreement
between the parties was reached.1 2
While the requirements set forth in the decision could serve as a framework
for national legislation protecting indigenous temtones, the decision as a whole
serves as an affirmation that indigenous people have a collective right to their
lands, resources, and environment. Although the Ecuadorian government could
now be required, at least on paper, to include the indigenous communities in
decisions regarding whether oil extraction or preservation of the environment and
indigenous culture were in Ecuador's national interest, the indigenous communities
were neither consulted nor allowed to meaningfully participate in the state's
decision regarding oil exploration or extraction between 1971 and 1990 during the
bulk of Texaco's operations in Ecuador. Retroactive application of existing laws
and international standards and decisions to the relevant period of Texaco's
operations would be a boon for plaintiffs m the Ecuadorian trial.
Texaco, however, according to ChevronTexaco's official website on Ecuador,
argues the environmental and labor laws referenced m the lawsuit are not
applicable because according to Ecuadorian Civil Code, clans for damages must
be brought within four years of the alleged activity 193 Moreover, ChevronTexaco
notes that the laws referenced in the suit did not exist at the time of operation and
are not applicable, claiming the Ecuadorian legal system has a "general principle
of non-retroactivity of laws" and therefore, "it is not appropriate to hold operations
responsible for meeting the requirements of a law or regulation that did not exist at
the time of the operations."' 94 Neither Article 15 of Agreement 169, nor the
Constitution of 1998, nor the Environmental Management Act (issued in 1999)
were in effect in Ecuador at the time of the alleged damages.' 95
While the legal battle continues in Ecuador and human rights and
environmental activists as well as multinational operations worldwide await the
landmark decision from the Ecuadorian court, the issue of multinational
accountability and the challenges presented by lack of means of redress against
multinationals remain.
MEANS OF REDRESS AGAINST MULTINATIONALS
The suit brought against Texaco in the U.S. is typical of a relatively new
strategy employed by environmental and human rights activists to get U.S.
corporations into court for abuses committed abroad. Although many U.S. judges
are hesitant to hear disputes arising outside the U.S., the 1789 Alien Tort Claims
192. IACHR, supra note 189, at para. 158(1) & (2).
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Act, which was adopted as a means for the U.S. to prosecute pirates, became the
center of lawsuits brought against multinationals in the U.S. when a court of
appeals ruled m 1980 that the Act allowed foreigners to sue each other m the U.S.
over charges of breaking international laws or legal norms. 19 6 At the time the
Aguinda I suit was brought m 1994, it relied on Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration
stating that states have "the responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or
areas beyond the limits of national junsdicton."' 97 Judge Vincent L. Broderick's
landmark decision found it significant that U.S. laws governing hazardous wastes
may have prohibited Texaco's conduct had the alleged conduct been carried out in
the United States.198 He stated that "it is relevant as confirming United States
adherence to international commitments to control such wastes. This tends to
support the appropriateness of permitting suit under 28 USC 1350 if there were
established misuse of hazardous waste of sufficient magnitude to amount to a
violation of international law." 99 Judge Broderick's decision is the first to offer
dicta nearly recognizing a violation of the law of nations for practices inconsistent
with domestic environmental law based on non-treaty international law that "may
be treated as the 'sober second thought of the community' upon which, all law
ultimately rests." 2°° Although a significant legal victory has yet to be claimed
under this strategy a victory for the plaintiffs would create a powerful precedent
and Judge Broderick's dicta leads further down that path than prior court decisions
have dared to venture.2° '
Plaintiffs suing multinationals generally prefer developed-world courts as the
forum for lawsuits because the courts offer more independence, more plaintiffs'
attorneys are available, and the cases draw more public attention that places
pressure on companies to settle.20 2 Furthermore, the rules regarding discovery and
the relative ease of bringing class-actions suits make U.S. courts particularly
attractive to plaintiffs.20 3 Jurisdictional questions, however, have the potential to
tie cases up for years as evidenced in the Agunda case. "The legal wrangling can
go on for years." 2°  On the other side, defendants typically argue for cases to be
heard m the country where the incidents allegedly occurred as did Texaco
spokesman Chris Gidez. "The operations are there [Ecuador]. The evidence is
there. The plaintiffs are there. To think that a U.S. jury could manage this litigation
196. See David R. Baker, US. Firms Face Suits for Overseas Acts: New Twist on Anti-pirate Law
Blurs Border, Extends, Liability, SAN FRANcisco CHRONICLE, June 15, 2002, at A-i, available at
http://sfgate.
comlcgi-binlarticle.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2002/06/15/MN194282.DTL (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
197 Aguindal, 1994 WL 142006 at 6.
198. Idat7
199. Id.
200. Aguinda , 1994 WL 142006 at 6 (citing Chief Justice Harlan F Stone in The Common Law in
the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV 4, 25 (1936)).
201. Baker, supra note 196.
202. Masters, supra note 135.
203. Id.




when everything is going to be in another language and everything is in Ecuador is
preposterous. 2 5 Although U.S. courts appear to provide a means of redress for
foreign plaintiffs against the wrongs committed by multinationals globally, many
bamers exist to successfully pursuing such a lawsuit.
Barriers to Redress Against Multinationals
First and foremost among barriers to suits against multinational corporations
are economic and political mechanisms. According to Alice Palmer of the
Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development, multinational
corporations "have the greatest capacity to cause harm to people and the
environment on a global scale and to use political, financial and legal leverage to
avoid being brought to account. ' , 206  Palmer claims that "[wiorkers and local
communities seeking to hold multinationals to account for the harm they cause
invariably find that the formidable economic leverage of these corporate giants,
combined with legal and financial obstacles, works to deny them redress. 20 7 The
circumstances cited as the most common reasons for the lack of redress against
multinationals include: 1) national reluctance to enforce regulations that might
threaten foreign investment; and 2) corporate structures that place parent
corporations beyond the reach of domestic laws; and 3) local communities that
lack the financial resources to seek redress.
20 8
The Structure of Multinational Enterprises and Their Legal Implications
Multinationals are a group of related entities based in various countries such
as a parent entity in the U.S. and subsidiaries in other countries.209 Additionally,
both the parent and subsidiary may own and operate joint ventures or contract with
one another for various aspects of operations and supply.21 0 Generally, public
international law governs states, not individuals, and multinationals are afforded
the same legal status of domestic corporations that of legal persons. 1
Furthermore, because each of the entities based in different countries will be
subject to different legal jurisdictions, multinationals "can exploit jurisdictional
gaps and escape effective regulation. 212 When a wrong in committed by a
multinational in the host country, claims are made against the specific entity whose
operations caused the harm. 2 3 The corporate veil separates each corporate entity
so that the parent is screened from the liability of a subsidiary or a joint-venture
205. Baker, supra note 196.
206. Alice Palmer, Community Redress and Multinational Enterprises, 2, Foundation for
International Environmental Law and Development (FIELD), Nov. 2003.
207. Id.at 4.
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partner from liability of the joint venture's operations.21 4 Entities are separated by
separate legal personality which is a "legal construct that separates each corporate
entity from the other corporate entities within the same corporate 'family tree' ,,215
The corporate veil is pierced only by a demonstration of the requisite amount of
control is exercised by one corporate entity over another, thereby making the
controlling entity liable for the operations of the other.2 16 Thus, the multinationals
are structured in a manner that allows them to exploit gaps in both domestic and
international legal frameworks as separate legal entities afforded status as legal
persons rather than states.
Exploitation of Developing Countries by Multinationals
Multinationals often seek out developing countries (host countries) with a
large workforce and an abundance of natural resources for foreign direct
investments while maintaining the parent company m a developed country (home
country).21 7 Incentives created by countries seeking to attract foreign direct
investment from multinationals often include regulatory structures "sympathetic to
foreign investment" because the foreign investments generate jobs, economic
activity and development for the host country as was demonstrated in the Republic
of Ecuador's complicity in Texaco's oil extraction operations.218 Host countries
often have no comprehensive system of corporate regulation or the systems are
ineffective due to lack of resources to enforce existing laws, while multinational
structures allow limited recourse and present jurisdictional limitations.
219
Additionally, the host country's government may favor the economic interests
created by the multinationals investment over enforcement of regulation.
Barriers to Redress m Host Countries v. Barriers m Home Countries
Access to the appropriate administrative body or court by those harmed in the
host country by multinational operations may be limited. Ineligibility to bring a
case is encountered on the basis of standing, which varies by country but typically
requires that only the individuals demonstrating present harm having standing to
bring a complaint.220 Thus, those who may suffer harm in the future or as is often
the case with environmental harm, those demonstrating only general harm not to a
specific, affected individual may be barred from bringing suit.221 Additionally,
some countries preclude legal proceedings from being brought if legal action was






219. Id. at 8-9.
220. Id. at 7, 9.
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222. Id at 9.
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Another pervasive barrier worldwide is the economic inequity among the
parties. Even though individuals or groups may be eligible to bring suit, they may
lack the resources to pursue lengthy litigation against multinationals who generally
"have significant financial and legal resources to defend claims against them."
2
Finally, multinationals are often structured to ensure that "the entity operating in
the host state has only limited financial assets to compensate or remediate harm"
and jurisdictional limitations preclude reaching the assets of the parent entity in
developed countries where the bulk of the multinationals assets are located. 4
Even if complainants can successfully overcome all the aforementioned barriers
and acquire a judgment in the host-country against the multinational, the judgment
may not be recognized by the multinational's home state as legally enforceable.225
Significant barriers are also encountered by complainants seeking redress in a
multinational's home country The most frequently encountered barriers to redress
for foreigners in the multinational's home countries are issues of choice of forum
or venue, the structure of the multinational or corporate veil, sovereign immunity
of governments for suits involving foreign governmental bodies, extraterritorial
application of domestic laws to foreign activities, and financial resources to bring
suit in home countries. 226 Although in the U.S. the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)
allows U.S. federal courts to hear claims by foreigners for violations of
international laws by a multinationals' operations in foreign countries, "very few
cases advance beyond procedural questions to resolve substantive matters." 227
Procedural barriers were key to Texaco's victory in the Aguinda case, wherein the
theory of forum non convemens precluded the plaintiffs from having the
substantive issues heard by a U.S. court.
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO MEANS OF REDRESS AGAINST
MULTINATIONALS
Successfully achieving corporate accountability for multinationals demands
solutions that afford greater access to justice and equity as well as means of
sustamability for societies globally. While intergovernmental agreements and the
development of national regulations promote corporate accountability on a national
or intergovernmental scale, "attempts to develop a legal framework for corporate
accountability at the international level have been fragmented and limited by the
prevailing view of the international community that public international law can
bind countries but not corporations." 228 As recognized by the barriers encountered
in both home and host countries in the Agunda case discussed at length above, "it
would appear that the barriers to redress for multinational wrongs at the national
level cannot be dealt with by individual governments acting alone. 229
223. Id.
224. Id. at 7, 9.
225. Id. at 10.
226. Id at 11.
227. Id. at 10-11.
228. Id. at 4.
229. Id. at 14.
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Alternatively, an international approach could serve two primary functions: 1)
facilitate systematic reforms to national means of redress, and 2) create
international means of redress where national systems fail.23 0  Alice Palmer
proposes the first step requires governments to work together to identify those
means of redress that already exist as well as the gaps or failures m their
implementation followed by governments agreeing on a principal mechanism for
redress.23 1  Based on those principal elements identified, "an international
agreement on national means of redress for multinational wrongs" could be
implemented.232 Such an international agreement would, m addition to providing
financial and technical assistance to national governments for implementation, set
out elements for eligibility or standing, provisions of financial and legal resources
to bring suits, timing and manner of hearings, availability of remedies, and
enforcement of foreign judgments.233 Secondarily, in addition to serving a
backstop to failures in the national procedures, an international framework of
means of redress but would also require that individuals be granted access to
international channels of redress.
234
The difficulties of implementing such a mechanism lie m gaming
international consensus on the many procedural necessities such as standards,
complaint procedures, enforcement (particularly binding authority of an
international court on national governments), and defining remedies.23 5 Some non-
binding mechanisms are currently under development, such as the United Nations
Sub-Commission Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations,
which could provide the framework for an international structure.236 The most
comprehensive of the binding examples attempts to require national development
of means of redress via agreement is the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to
Information, Public Participation m Decision-Making and Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters m force since October 2001 .237The Convention sets out
procedural requirements for access to information and public participation in
environmental matters, and provides a means of redress for breaches of those
requirements or violations of any national environmental law. 23 8 The Convention








237. Id at 16; Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation m Decision-Making and
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention), The UN Economic Commission for
Europe (UNECE), June 25 1998, available at http://www.unece.org/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf (last
visited Apr. 4, 2004). The stated objective is to contribute to the protection of the right of every person
to live in an environment adequate to his or her health and wealth being and to ensure this right parties
are required to take measures to implement and enforce provisions to achieve access-to-justice. Id. at
Art. I & Art. 3, Para. 1.
238. Id. at Art. 9.
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financial and other bamers.239 Implementation of an international agreement based
on such a model would require universal acceptance to applying international laws
to individuals and multinationals, subjecting them to the jurisdiction of an
international court. While an international mechanism of providing means of
redress is essential to effective regulation of multinational activity in a global
market, this option presents the substantial challenge of gaming international
consensus on universal means of redress where global economies are implicated.
CONCLUSION
Seeking accountability of multinationals in an era of globalization has proven
a daunting task, particularly for indigenous communities lacking adequate means
of redress for wrongs committed m host countries. Although indigenous peoples
were unsuccessful at winning a favorable decision m the U.S. (home country) of
the multinational ChevronTexaco for environmental, cultural, and health damages
incurred in Ecuador and Peru (host countries), the decade of litigation has resulted
i unproved legal structures for indigenous peoples rights.
Ecuador's indigenous movements were galvanized to action which has led to
immense public attention and scrutiny of multinational oil development m Latin
America as well as tougher laws m Ecuador. Ecuador's constitution now affords
indigenous peoples the right to consultation on decisions that affect them.
Additionally, recently implemented environmental laws such as Convention 169 of
the International Labor Organization give indigenous peoples the right to decide
their own model of development. International organizations have also bolstered
indigenous rights recently with the Inter-American Court on Human Rights issuing
a ruling that indigenous peoples have communal property rights to land and natural
resources based upon traditional patterns of use and occupation.
Although progress is being made, substantial work remains within the
international community to ensure that multinationals, while benefiting
economically from global workforces and markets also fulfill their role of social
and cultural responsibility and of improving the economic stability of the markets
within which they operate. Multinationals must be held to universal standards that
ensure social and environmental responsibility and prevent cultural and
environmental devastation such as that inflicted by the ChevronTexaco debacle in
Ecuador. Whether the outcome of the Republic of Ecuador's pending case against
ChevronTexaco is decided in favor of the indigenous peoples or the multinational,
the matter has opened a Pandora's Box of legal, political and economic
implications that must be addressed on an international scale. A responsible world
economy must be attended by umversal standards for multinational accountability,
which demands consensus and collaboration from the international community
239. Id. at Art. 9, Para. 4 requires the availability of "adequate and effective remedies" that are
"fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive. (Art. 9, Para. 5 requires States party to the
Convention to consider
"the establishment of appropriate assistance mechanisms to remove or reduce financial and other
barriers to access to justice.").
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acting on grounds of good faith and good neighborliness rather than exploitation of
underdeveloped nations for profit.
Panel Discussion:
Perspectives on the Bush Administration's New
Immigrant Guestworker Proposal
MARCH 30,2004
On January 7 2004 President Bush announced his plan to give legal status to
millions of illegal immigrants m the United States.' This plan is quite ambitious.
The plan allows for the estimated 8-14 million illegal immigrant workers within
the United States to apply for a legal temporary worker status within the United
States for a given amount of time.2 The temporary worker status would
purportedly afford these currently undocumented workers the same employee
benefits given to those who are legally employed within the Umted States. In
February, the Department of Homeland Security attempted to give more form to
the proposal. Testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee
on Immigration, officials stated that workers and their families, after undergoing
security clearances, would be given temporary worker permits for a period of three
years4" workers would be allowed to renew their permits indefinitely and be
allowed to apply for permanent legal residency5- and finally, temporary workers
6would be allowed to travel in and out of the country.
The plan has stirred considerable debate since its announcement.7 In
conjunction with the University of Denver College of Law's Diversity Week 2004
entitled "Other Views: Education v. Confrontation," 8 the Denver Journal of
1. See Elizabeth Bumiller, Bush Would Give Illegal Workers Broad New Rights, N.Y. TiMES,
Jan. 7, 2004, at Al.
2. See id.
3. Id.
4. See Rachel L. Swarns, Officials Discuss Details of Bush's Immigrant Worker Plan, N.Y
TimES, Feb. 13, 2004, at A28.
5. See id.
6. Id.
7. See Richard W Stevenson & Steven Greenhouse, Plan for Illegal Immigrant Workers Draws
Fire From Two Sides, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2004, at A28. See also Rachel L. Swarns, The 2004
Campaign: House and Senate Races, Outcry on Right Over Bush Plan on Immigration, N.Y. TiMES,
Feb. 21, 2004, at Al. Cf. Jeff Madnck, The Bush Proposal on Illegal Immigrants Is Tentative but,
Important First Step, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 22, 2004 at C2.
8. The DU Law Diversity Advocates held its annual Diversity Week from March 29 to April 2,
2004. The week-long event was entitled "Other Views: Education versus Confrontation, and included
speakers, film showings, discussion sessions, panels and debates.
Diversity Week was established m 2001 to make students aware of issues of diversity, oppression
and injustice as they relate to the law and legal profession. DU law students, faculty, law student
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International Law and Policy sponsored a panel discussion on the Bush
administration's new immigrant guestworker proposal.
The panel consisted of the following members: Pat Medige, Managing
Attorney of the Migrant Farm Worker Division of Colorado Legal Services,
President of the Board of Directors for the Rocky Mountain Immigrant Advocacy
Network, and a member of the Board of Directors, El Centro Humanitario Para
Los Trabajadores (Humanitarian Center for Workers); Regina Germam, Visiting
Professor, Immigration Clinic, University of Denver College of Law- and Mariana
Diaz, Consul for Political and Economic Affairs, Consulate General of Mexico in
Denver. Starting on the next page, the following comments and outlines are
elaborations on the discussion that occurred that day.
Kirpal Singh
organizations, community members and legal professionals were invited to participate in and attend the
event.
Each spnng, the Diversity Advocates organization seeks to assess the issues and concerns plaguing
the legal community and address those needs through appropriate training and education dunng
Diversity Awareness Week. Highlights and topics of this year's event inlcuded diversity from
Christian perspective, medical discrimination and assisted suicide, same-sex mamages and Roe v.
Wade.
To learn more about Diversity Week or the Diversity Advocates organization, visit
www.law.du.edu/divenstyweek.
I would like to thank David Gair for coming up with the original idea and arranging for the presence
of our panel's members, as well as Heather Beattie for her logistical support provided for this event.
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Within days of its unveiling, the Bush Administration's temporary worker
proposal was labeled an "amnesty,"' the "Wal-Mart bracero ' '2 program, a "new era
of indentured servants," 3 an "election-year ploy,"'4 a "huge step backward," 5 a
"reward" to "illegal aliens"'6 and "a classic guest worker program on the European
model.",7 It was even deemed "dead on arrival."8
This heated rhetoric and the political polarization it reflects should not detract
from the very real concerns that the plan could harm both the U.S. labor force and
the temporary workers themselves. Meanwhile, there exists a threshold question of
how serious the proposal is m the first place.
These comments examine the current status of the Bush temporary worker
proposal, and compare it with the current H-2A and H-2B programs m place m the
United States as well as the former bracero program of 1942 to 1964. In addition,
from a worker perspective, these comments point out other concerns about the
Patricia L. Medige, Esq. is Managing Attorney of the Migrant Farm Worker Division of Colorado
Legal Services, as well as President of the Board of Directors for the Rocky Mountain Immigrant
Advocacy Network (RMIAN) and a member of the Board of Directors, El Centro Humanitano Para Los
Trabajadores (Humanitarian Center for Workers). She has coordinated or presented at numerous
national and statewide migrant and immigration law conferences. Recent publications include
"Immigration Issues in Security Minded America" which appeared m the March, 2004 Colorado
Lawyer. She practices in federal, state and administrative courts.. Ms. Medige graduated from the
University of Denver College of Law, where she served on the Denver Journal of International Law and
Policy.
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3. Farmworker Justice Fund Inc., The President's Temporary Foreign Worker Proposal is Ill-
Conceived, at http://www.fwjustice.org/bush_policy.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
4. Hutcheson and Montgomery, supra note 1.
5. Washington, supra note 1.
6. Id.
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proposal.
A. A SERIOUS PROPOSAL?
The Bush Administration temporary worker program, "Fair and Secure
Immigration Reform, was announced Jan. 7 2004.9 It essentially outlined broad
principles, such as protecting the "homeland, serving the nation's economy by
matching a willing worker with a willing employer, and providing "incentives" for
the worker's return to his or her home country 10 Little detail was provided about
implementation of these pnnciples and other program requirements. For example,
under the plan, employers would have to make "every reasonable effort" to find an
American to fill a job before extending job offers to foreign workers." But the
proposal does not specify how exactly an employer would demonstrate that effort.
Other considerations seemed to be omitted altogether. For example, the
government fact sheet mentioned wages only once, with a reference to "fair
wages,"' 12 without specifying any sort of scheme to avoid undercutting the current
labor market.
When the Administration provided further details about the plan, it was not
through proposed legislation, but in the form of testimony by Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) officials before the Senate Judiciary Committee on
February 12 .3 That testimony still yielded few specifics. For example, Steven J.
Law, Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) testified that the
program would "put American workers first" and that the DOL "would protect the
nghts of workers regardless of citizenship." 14 There appeared to be no testimony
about such key issues as how to prevent a downward spiral of wages and what sort
of "incentives" would be implemented to encourage the workers to return to their
country 15 The Admunstration has made occasional references to "a fair and
meaningful citizenship process"' 16 and applying for permanent residence within the
United States.' 7 At the same time, it is clear the Admimstration intends for these
workers to remain non-immigrants (i.e., maintain visitor status) and not obtain
residency directly through the temporary worker program.'8 Specifically, it would
require "the return of temporary workers to their home country [sic] after their
9. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Fair and Secure Immigration Reform
(Jan. 7, 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040107-I.html (last




13. Rachel L. Swains, Officials Discuss Details of Bush's Immigrant Worker Plan, N.Y. TiMEs,
Feb. 13, 2004, at A28. See also Senate Committee Evaluates Proposed Temporary Guest Worker
Program, 81 INTERPRETER RELEASES 341 (Mar. 15. 2004).
14. Id.at 342-3.
15. Id.
16. The White House Fact Sheet, supra note 9.
17 Swarns, supra note 13.
18. The White House Fact Sheet, supra note 9.
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period of work has concluded."' 9 Thus, it seems references to citizenship and
lawful permanent residence are misleading.
Finally, as of March 23, the Administration still had not proposed any specific
legislation. 20  At least six senators, three Republicans and three Democrats,
reportedly expressed frustration at the lack of progress in advancing immigration
reform. 21 According to Eduardo Aguirre, director of DHS's Bureau of Citizenship
and Immigration Services, despite the lack of progress m proposing its own
specific legislation, the White House was not ready to back any existing
immigration bills pending before congress either.22 Two pending immigration bills
that have widespread support from congress and the public, but not from the
Administration, are the DREAM Act 23 and the AgJOBS Act.24 The DREAM Act
would eventually grant residence to certain young people who have been long-term
residents of the United States, who graduate from high school, who can
demonstrate good moral character, and who complete certain specified future
schooling or military service.25 AgJOBS in part would provide for eventual lawful
permanent residency, known as "earned adjustment, for workers who can show a
certain amount of past employment and who later complete additional tume m
agriculture.26 The bill has bipartisan support, including 54 sponsors in the Senate,
94 cosponsors in the House,27 and hundreds of organizations.
The vagueness of the Bush Administration proposal to date, combined with
the delay in proposing specific legislation and the Administration's unwillingness
to support any pending immigration bills, raises doubts that the President is serious
about immigration reform.
B. COMPARISON WITH CURRENT GUEST WORKER PROGRAMS
Assuming the Administration's proposal is genume, it appears to provide
fewer protections for workers than the current guest worker programs, which
19. Id.
20. Rachel L. Swarns, White House Irks Senators by Inaction on Immigrants, N.Y TIMES, Mar.
24, 2004 at A I7.
21. Id.
22. Id
23. Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, S. 1545, 108th Cong.
(2003).
24. Agricultural Job Opportunity, Benefits, and Security (AgJobs) Act, S. 1645, 108th Cong.
(2003).
25. For summary of the DREAM Act, see, National Immigration Law Center, Dream Act
Reintroduced in Senate, Sept. 4, 2003, at http://www.nilc org/immlawpolicy/DREAM/DreamOOl.htm
(last visited Mar. 30, 2004).
26. For a summary of the AgJOBS Act, see, American Immigration Lawyers Association,
AgJOBS: We Need Reform to Achieve Stable and Legal Agricultural Work Force, at
http://www.aila.org/fileViewer.aspx?doclD=l 1993 (last visited Mar. 30, 2004).
27 Sergio Bustos, Bill to Legalize Migrant Farrmworkers Gets Support, TUCSON CITizEN, Mar.
25, 2004, available at http://www.tucsoncitizen.com/index.phppage=local&storyid=032504a4_
immigration (last visited Mar. 30,2004).
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themselves are senously flawed. Most relevant are the H-2A
28 and H-2B 29
programs, which are temporary worker programs for agricultural workers and
other laborers.
First, the H-2A program allows the "import" of foreign workers to provide
agricultural labor or services of a temporary or seasonal nature. 30 Requirements
for H-2A petitions include: a certification that there are not sufficient able and
available U.S. workers; and a certification that the employment of the temporary
worker will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in
the United States.3' Thus, the statute itself requires that wages remain high enough
that they do not undercut the wages of U.S. workers. To date, it appears no such
provision has been mentioned for the Bush temporary worker program. The Bush
program mentions only a vague "fair wage ' 32 and protecting the rights of
workers.3 3  Unless some reasonable base wage is established, this temporary
worker proposal could result in a downward spiral ending at the federally
mandated minimum wage of $5.15 per hour, 34 or at the state minimum wage, in
states that have one. If employers find temporary workers who are willing to
accept wages of $5.15 an hour, there may well develop a new underclass of
undocumented workers willing to work for even less. 5
The H-2A program has additional requirements that apparently would be
eliminated under the Bush proposal. These include a requirement that employers
furnish housing36 and that the employer guarantee employment for at least three-
fourths of the work days in the contract period.37
Because of these requirements, the H-2A program has been criticized by
employers, who call it expensive, because of the wage rates, and cumbersome, due
to the certification process.38  News reports have claimed that farmers are
"dropping out" of the H-2A program and employing undocumented workers
because it is too difficult to have to work with two government agencies and too
costly to pay the required wage rate. 39 By promising "user-friendly, streamlined
mechanisms for employers to locate willing and available workers," 40 the
Administration apparently is attempting to appease these employers.
Second, the H-2B visa allows workers to come temporarily to the United
28. INA § 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a), 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a).
29. INA § 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b), 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b).
30. INA § 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a), 8 U.S.C. § ll01(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a).
31. INA § 218(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1188 (a).
32. The White House Fact Sheet, supra note 9.
33. 81 INTERPRETER RELEASES, supra note 13, at 343.
34. 29 U.S.C. § 206.
35. See, e.g., Ann Imse, Critics See Flaw in Bush Immigration Plan; Union Says it Will Create
'Permanent Underclass, ROCKY MOUNTAiN NEWS, Jan. 16, 2004, at 15B.
36. INA § 218(c)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1188(c)(4).
37 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(6).
38. See, e.g., Stella M. Hopkins, Immigrant Reform: Hard Road Ahead; Carolinas Offer Good
Look at Obstacles Bush Proposal Faces, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Feb. 1, 2004, at IE.
39. Id.
40. 81 INTERPRETER RELEASES, supra note 13, at 343.
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States to perform temporary nonagricultural labor if such workers cannot be found
m the United States.4' The program does not afford as many protections as the H-
2A visa, and has fewer requirements, which include: the job and the employer's
need must be one time, seasonal, peak load or intermittent; the job must be for less
than one year; and there must be no qualified and willing U.S. workers available
for the job.42 There is a 66,000-per-year limit on the number of foreign workers
who may receive H-2B status each fiscal year.43 The H-2B visa does not require
that employers provide housing. While employers must pay the prevailing wage,
they do not need to pay the "adverse effective wage rate" required for H-2A
workers, which is typically higher. It also requires less paper work. 44 Thus,
generally it has not received as much attention from disgruntled employers as the
H-2A program.
Meanwhile, workers and worker advocates have longstanding concerns about
both the H-2A and H-2B temporary worker programs. Worker advocates consider
the H-2A and H-2B programs to be detrimental to workers m many respects, even
though the H-2A program provides some protections. For example, because they
are nonimmigrant visa categories, H-2A and H-2B visas do not lead to permanent
residence or citizenship. 45 Under both the H-2A and H-2B programs, employees
are only allowed to work with the employer they have contracted with and will
lose status if they leave their jobs.46  They fear being blacklisted - refused
employment m future years - or otherwise intimidated if they attempt to assert
their rights.47 Thus, they are less likely to complain about illegal employment
conditions and may become virtually a captive work force. The Bush proposal
could lead to many of these same problems. The level of intimidation would still
exist, but could be reduced somewhat, if under the Bush proposal employees were
able to change employers without risking their status, detention, and ultimately,
deportation.
Based on the information currently available, the "Fair and Secure
Immigration Reforms" appears to eliminate many of the protections available
under current guest worker proposals, especially the H-2A program's wage,
housing, and work guarantees. In addition, it would not be limited to agricultural
workers and would apply to year-round, not just seasonal work. Consequently, a
larger range of workers would be harmed. Finally, it continues the guest worker
41. INA § 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b), 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b).
42. U.S. Department of Labor, Employment & Training Administration, H-2B Certification for
Temporary Nonagricultural Work, available at http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/foreign/h-
2b.asp#qc> (accessed Mar. 30, 2004).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. INA § 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a); INA § 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b), 8
U.S.C. § I 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b).
46. See Bruce Goldstein, Farmworker Justice Fund Inc., The Basics About Guestworker
Programs, at http://www.fwjustice.org/thebasics.htm> (accessed Mar. 30,2004).
47. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Unfair Advantage: Workers Freedom of Association in the
United States under International Human Rights Standards, Aug. 2000, at
http://hrw.org/reports/2000/uslabor/index.htm#TopOtPage (last visited Mar. 30, 2004).
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principle of denying residency to long-term laborers, undermining their futures and
creating a class of expendable, lower-skilled workers.
C. COMPARISON TO BRACERO PROGRAM
The United States previously has experimented with this sort of expendable
foreign worker. One notable example, the bracero program, began in 1942
through an agreement between the United States and Mexico. 48 U.S. growers were
permitted to hire Mexican workers, provided that there was a shortage of U.S.
workers. 49 Administration of the program evolved over the years; 50 ultimately,
however, more than 4 million Mexican workers toiled in the United States under
the program between 1942 and 1964 .5 They became the "backbone" of U.S.
agriculture during World War II and beyond,5 z and, typically, they ended up
having to abandon their farms back in Mexico. 53  During the period of their
contract, they could only return to Mexico m the event of an emergency 54 Once
the contract period ended, however, they were required to turn m their alien laborer
permits and leave the United States, with no right to long-term or permanent
residence.55 The braceros experienced numerous abuses, including racial
oppression, economic hardship, and mistreatment by employers.56  In one
notorious failure of the program, ten percent of the braceros wages completely
disappeared 7 Under the terms of the program, this ten percent was withheld from
their pay, to be deposited m Mexico for their future retirement.58 However, they
never received those funds, which some estimate could be worth $150 million by
now.59  As a result of this monumental loss, those familiar with the bracero
program are apprehensive when hearing the government speak of financial
"incentives" that would encourage workers to return to their home countries.
60
As vague as the details are, the Bush Administration proposal indeed bears
some resemblance to the bracero program, even broadening it. Since the Bush
proposal does not appear to limit the countries of origin, workers from all over the
world could face the vulnerability of depending on their employer for temporary
status, and of not wanting to jeopardize that status by asserting their rights.
48. Andrew Scott Kosegi, Note, The H-2A Program: How the Weight of Agricultural Employer
Subsidies is Breaking the Backs of Domestic Migrant Farm Workers, 35 IND. L. REV. 269,272 (2001 ).
49. Id. at 272.
50. Id. at 272-278.
51. Maria Elena Salinas, Ex-Braceros Still Waiting for Their Checks, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 17,2004, at B7.
52. Id.
53. Sin Fronteras Organizing Project, The Farmworkers Website/el Website Campesino, The
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Furthermore, under the Bush program, the laborers would not only be working in
the fields for part of the year. They might well be changing sheets in hotels,
building homes, emptying bed pans in nursing homes, planting trees, cooking in
restaurants, all for three years at a time. The program could expand into more
skilled employment as well, since there appear to be no limitations on the types of
positions that could be filled by temporary workers. The Administration's
overview-again, notably vague-proposes the matching of temporary workers
"with willing U.S. employers when no Americans can be found to fill the jobs. ' '6i
The Administration fact sheet laments that "[t]he visas now available do not allow
employers to fill jobs in many key sectors of our economy ,62 such as Wal-Mart,
perhaps.63
D. CONCLUSION
The labels given to the Bush temporary worker scheme are perhaps more
inventive than the proposal itself. If the government and the public fail to learn
from past mistakes, a "Wal-Mart bracero" program indeed could result. Unless the
planners develop numerous protections, many of which are not evident in the
information provided thus far, this temporary worker program would lead to the
worst worker exploitation since the orginal bracero program. Necessary
protections include: wage rates based on the labor market rather than on the federal
minimum wage, to avoid wage deflation; a genuine requirement that employers
first search for U.S.-based workers; a clear path to residency and later citizenship
for the workers themselves; the ability for the workers to change jobs without
losing their status; and provisions that allow families to be together.
61. White House Fact Sheet, supra note 9.
62. Id.
63. The Wal-Mart department store chain, the world's largest retail chain, received national
attention m October, 2003, after federal officials reportedly raided some 60 of its stores across the
country and arrested more than 250 allegedly undocumented immigrants who worked as janitors for
contractors used by the store. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Wal-Mart Raids By U.S. Aimed At Illegal
Aliens, NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 24,2003, at Al.
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The government of Mexico has generally welcomed President Bush's
immigration proposal. As President Fox said in January of this year when he met
with President Bush in Monterrey, Mexico, "it is a very important step in
improving the relationship because the topic [of immigration] is a priority for both
nations."' In this respect, Mexico values President Bush's initiative because it
signified the importance Washington places on the bilateral relationship.
The immigration issue is in fact something both leaders had been working on
long before they became heads of state. As President Fox said shortly after
President Bush made his proposal, "[i]t is a program we've been working on since
we were both presidents of our respective countries. We've been working on this
since he was governor [of Texas] and I was governor [of Guanajuato], since he
was president elect and I was president elect, and we've been working on it for the
last three years. It has been a fundamental topic in bilateral relations." 2
But President Fox also said that it is an initiative that has to be widely
discussed and analyzed by the U.S. public and U.S. Congress. While the proposal
recognizes the invaluable contributions Mexican immigrants make economically
and socially to the United States, right now, it constitutes a first step in the right
direction. As we all know, details are crucial; and, in these comments, I will
outline a number of questions the proposal raises, which have also been raised by
various Mexican government officials over the past few months. However, first I
will summarize the histonc pattern of Mexican immigration to the United States
and the reasons for increase in the numbers.
Migration flows have evolved rapidly since the early 1970s. Since that time,
Mexican innmigration has become a much more complex phenomenon than many
commentators realize. There are three principle factors that explain this evolution:
1. The first is an accelerated growth of Mexican migration beginning m
the 1970s. Between the 1940s and 1970s, Mexico adopted an
Mariana Diaz is Consul for Political and Economic Affairs, Consulate General of Mexico in Denver
and, since 1999, is a member of the Mexican Foreign Service.
1. Press Release, Mexican Government, The President of the Republic, Vicente Fox, met with
the President of the United States of America, George W Bush (040112/03).
2. Press Release, Mexican Government, President Fox spoke on the telephone with President
Bush about the migration reform (040107/02).
DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
economic growth model that emphasized industrialization. This
resulted in a significant decline in agriculture's contribution to
Mexico's gross domestic product and, thus, displacement of Mexican
agricultural workers. Moreover, Mexico's internal migration, from
rural urban areas, exacerbated migration to the north. This milieu of
economic trnsformation was marred by fiscal crises, which peaked
m the 1980s, during which Mexico suffered high inflation, low
wages, and increasing unemployment. The peso, you may recall, was
devalued m 1976 and again 1982.
2. During this period, migrants increasingly came from the poorest
regions of Mexico, who were migrating further inland m the United
States to work in a wider variety of occupations.
3. Third, these new immigrants began to stay longer m the United
States than their previous counterparts. Many began to develop roots
in this country
Since the 1970s, the Mexican population in the United States has grown
constantly In 2002, that population was 25.5 million, of which 15.9 million were
Mexican-Americans and 9.5 million were born in Mexico. It is estimated that there
are some 4.8 million undocumented Mexican immigrants in the United States.3
One of the important reasons for the increase in immigration is that the
historic pattern of migration has become less circular. In other words, fewer
Mexicans are returning to their homeland. Why9 First, there has been a change in
the pattern of job growth in the U.S. that favors year-round employment in U.S.
cities.
Second, more restrictive border-control policies beginning in the 1990s
disrupted that circular pattern even more. The policy, coming on the heels of the
signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement, focused on erecting barriers
across major entry points along the U.S.-Mexico border. One of the most extensive
was Operation Gatekeeper, which in 1994 was extended 66 miles inland from San
Diego. Another, Operation Blockade, which was later renamed Operation Hold the
Line, was extended west from El Paso, Texas, into New Mexico.
The new policy left essentially open and under guarded some of the most
dangerous desert and mountain areas of the U.S.-Mexico border, and is m part the
cause of the boom in human trafficking. During the past decade, an estimated
2,500 persons have died trying to get into the U.S. from Mexico.
The unintended consequence of enhanced border enforcement was the
decrease in the chance of return migration. In other words, reluctant to face the
new costs and higher risks of border-crossings, Mexicans who hoped to return
home did not.
This brings us back to the meeting that presidents Fox and Bush held in
February 2001 in Guanajuato at Fox's ranch San Cristobal. At that meeting, they
3. Ger6mmo Guti~rrez Femdndez, The migration proposal of President Bush: nature, viability
and relevance, Remarks at El Colegio de Mdxico (Jan. 21, 2004).
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agreed to approach the immigration issue under the principle of "shared
responsibility" and to work to establish mechanisms that will achieve legal,
orderly, and safe migration between Mexico and the United States.
For Mexico, the migration agenda has two major components:
1. The migration status of Mexicans already living in the United States;
2. and second, mechanisms by which Mexicans, for reasons of
employment, can cross the U.S. border m a legal and secure way
The proposal presented by President Bush aims to reconcile both components
through a temporary work program. It uses this program to normalize the situation
of those who are already m the U.S., and on the other hand, modernizes and
broadens the mechanisms for those who want to go to the U.S. to work. Mexico
welcomes a program that provides legal, orderly, and safe migration that
guarantees the dignity as well as the labor rights, of Mexican migrants.
However, as I mentioned earlier, President Bush's proposal raises some
interesting questions; from the Mexican perspective, there are some aspects of the
proposal that require special attention from those involved.
Last January, in a talk given at El Colegio de Mexico, one of Mexico's most
prestigious universities, Geronmo Gutierrez, undersecretary for North America in
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, mentioned the followmg
"
1. The efficiency and access of such a temporary work program, which
may very well determine whether people will be interested m such a
program.
2. The manner in which access to the program is renewed, as well as
the duration of the program.
3. The process by which permanent residency, and eventually
citizenship, can be attained. The proposal does not specifically
eliminate these from consideration. But there are no details, even
though they are of special interest to those involved.
4. The treatment that would be given to Mexican immigrants who are
self-employed; they could represent a substantial number of people
interested in such a program.
5. The criteria and legal regulations that guarantee family unity for
migrant workers.
6. The treatment given to those under a process of administrative
repatriation.
7 The criteria and legal regulations that guarantee the equality and
labor rights of workers who enter such a program.
8. The convenience and feasibility to accelerate, in a parallel program
with the characteristic that the application be processed at the
4. Id.
2004
746 DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y VOL. 32:4
moment of permanent residency or citizenship.
9 The modalities by which both Mexico and the United States can
agree the program's operating aspects.
10. After approval by the necessary authorities, the length of time
necessary to implement the program.
Perspectives on the Bush Administration's New
Immigrant Guestworker Proposal:
The Time For Immigration Reform Is Now
REGINA GERMAIN*
President Bush did something quite remarkable on January 7th, 2004 when he
proposed dramatic changes to our immigration system.' His proposal has been
attacked as too generous by some2 and not generous enough by others.3 The main
group backing the proposal has been the U.S. business community 4  The
American public is split on this issue 5 as I would imagine the people in this room
are, as well. Today you'll have the opportunity to hear about the proposal and
perhaps some other proposals in the works. Before we dive in, I want to tell you a
short story about my first experience in the practice of immigration law and the
lessons I learned from the last time the U.S. attempted comprehensive Immigration
reform.
I have been an immigration lawyer for 14 years, in many different
capacities-as an associate in a large law firm, as the sole lawyer in a small non-
profit, as a Senior Legal Counselor for the United Nations refugee agency and as a
clinical teacher both at Georgetown University and here, at the University of
Denver. My very first experience with immigration law occurred during law
school and it is that experience which probably sealed my fate and caused me to
dedicate my legal career to serving immigrants. After my first year of law school,
I accepted a summer position as a legal intern with the Illinois Migrant Legal
Assistance Project.
Professor Germain is Visiting Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Denver College of
Law where she supervises students representing asylum-seekers and other immigrants in asylum and
immigration court proceedings. She also taught at Georgetown University Law Center in Washington,
D.C. and was Senior Legal Counselor in the Washington Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees.
1. White House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Fair and Secure Immigration Reform
(Jan. 7, 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/pnnt/2004OO7-I.htmi
(last visited Mar. 30, 2004).
2. See, e.g., Border Agents Assail Bush Plan to Bring in Guest Workers, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23,
2004.
3. See, e.g. Proposal is Not All Good News, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 14, 2004;
Farmworkers Seek Greater Protections under Bush's Plan, OAKLAND TRIBUNE, Jan. 14, 2004.
4. See, e.g., Immigrant Realities: President Bush's Proposal Helps America's Security and
Economy, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Jan. 9, 2004, available at http://www.opinionjounal.com/
editonal/feature.html?id=I 10004532.
5. A nationwide Gallup poll conducted shortly after President Bush's announcement of his
proposal for a guestworker program found that 55% of Americans opposed it.
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It was the summer of 1987 Ronald Reagan was President of the United States
and it was an exciting time to be practicing immigration law. Congress had just
passed a law that allowed farm workers and other undocumented immigrants who
had resided m the United States for five years to obtain legal status. 6 About 3
million did so. The quid pro quo was that from that point on all employers had to
request documents from employees that demonstrate they are authorized to work in
the United States.7 For me, it was a baptism by fire into immigration practice.
There were millions of immigrants who needed legal help; there were new
regulations being issued which even experienced lawyers had difficulty
comprehending (and which sometimes misapplied the law8 ); and there were
bewildered employers who wanted to follow the new law, but did not know how
I learned three important lessons that summer:
1. The practice of immigration law can be extremely rewarding.
Hardworking, law abiding individuals and families who had lived in
the United States for many years could finally legalize their status
and improve their lives.
2. Every immigration benefit has a cost attached and often unintended
consequences, too. Requiring employers to check identity
documents created a tremendous amount of paperwork for U.S.
businesses, but, as we know, it did not actually deter undocumented
immigrants from working m the United States. What it certainly did
do was create a booming black market for false documents.
3. I saw firsthand how vital immigrants are to our country, especially
the agricultural sector. Our nation would grind to a halt without
immigrants willing to do the least desirable jobs m our society
Today we have between 9 and 10 million9 undocumented immigrants in our
country Most are from Mexico (about 55%).1O About a quarter are from Central
America (22%).' They make up 26% of the total foreign born population.'
2
Interestingly, they are almost 40% of the foreign born population m Colorado.
13
What have we done about the influx of undocumented immigrants? Since
6. See generally, Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3359 (Nov. 6, 1986).
7 8 U.S.C 1324(a). Legislative history available at H.R. Rep. No. 99-682 (I), reprinted in 1986
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 55649.
8. On January 23, 2004 and February 18, 2004, federal courts approved settlements in two class
action lawsuits initially filed in 1987 regarding eligibility for legalization. See USCIS Settlement
Agreements and Notices, available at http://uscis.gov/graphicslawsregssetiement.htm.
9. Urban Institute Immigration Studies Program, Undocumented Immigrants: Facts and Figures
(Jan. 12, 2004) states that there are 9.3 million undocumented immigrants in the US. This number
vanes from 9 to 10 million.
10. American Immigration Law Foundation, Immigration Policy Brief: The Cost of Doing
Nothing, available at http://www.ailf.org/ipc/CostofDoingNothmgPrint.asp.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Undocumented Immigrants, supra note 10.
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1993, the amount of money spent on border enforcement has more than
quintupled.14 The FY 2005 budget for the two immigration enforcement agencies
is over $10 billion.'
5
Despite increased border enforcement and increased risks in traveling to the
United States, undocumented immigration has continued at a rate of 500,000
munmgrants per year. As a result there has been a dramatic increase in human
smuggling and also an increase in the number of people who die while attempting
to cross the border-1,896 people have died over last 5 years trying to cross the
South West U.S. border. 6 Undocumented workers in this country continue to fill
millions of jobs in various sectors of our economy that American workers cannot
or will not fill.
What has the federal government done to address this issue besides increasing
border enforcement? Not much. As a result, officials at the state and local level
have been filling the void with piecemeal approaches, including:
allowmg for acceptance of Mexican consular IDs as valid lDs
granting drivers licenses to undocumented immigrants
allowing undocumented high school students rn-state college tuition
rates
President Bush's proposal was bold and politically risky. It took political
courage and a willingness to think outside the box. Tis proposal was the result of
two separate but overriding concerns: one, economic (we really do need these
workers) and the other mvolvmg national security (we need to know who these 9
to 10 million people are). He proposed a program that allows undocumented
workers with jobs m the United States to obtain temporary legal status here, which
would allow U.S. employers with unfilled jobs to hire foreign workers. As
President Bush described it, his proposed reforms have four mare goals
17
I. To protect our country through better control of U.S.
borders.
2. To serve the economic needs of United States.
3. To ensure no unfair rewards to undocumented immigrants;
they must wait in line for citizenship like everyone else.
4. To encourage immigrants to return home after their period
of work in U.S. has expired through a retirement savings
plan and credit to their home country's pension plan.
The proposal was and still is vague. The President and his advisors were
14. Id.
15. Evaluating Temporary Guest Worker Proposal Before the Senate Judiciary Comm. 's
Subcomm. On Immigration, Border Security and Ctizenship, (2004) (Testimony of Asa Hutchinson,
Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security, Department of Homeland Security) (noting
FY2005 seeks $4 billion for ICE and $6.2 billion for CBP) available at
http://www.aila.org/contentViewer.aspxbc--9,576,4682,4685 (last visited July 6,2004).
16. Cost of Doing Nothing, supra note 10.
17. Set forth in President Bush's Jan. 7, 2004 remarks (transcript on file with author).
2004
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careful to avoid any mention of the A word or "Amnesty '8" This word is taboo
for anyone proposing any sort of immigration reform, so it is often referred to
using other names. The President did, however, say the program will have an end,
although he did not say when.' 9 Here are some key elements of the program
mentioned by the President or his spokespersons:
1. Even though it has an end, the proposal envisions that some of the
participants will remain m the United States and will be able to
obtain permanent status. However, they just cannot jump in front of
others in line.2 °
2. Those applying for the program will probably have to pay a one-time
fee to register.2' The fee will probably be a hefty, $1,000 or more.
3. Those who qualify would be protected by U.S. labor laws, will have
the right to change jobs, and enjoy the same working conditions as
U.S. citizens.22
4. Those who qualify will be given a tamper-proof; fraud-proof identity
document,23
5. The proposal envisions increasing the number of green cards
available each year and improving the process to obtaining
citizenship-such as changes to the citizenship test.
The Bush Proposal is not alone; other examples include:
1. The AgJobs bill,24 addressed further by Attorney Pat Medige in her
remarks.
2. Senators Hagel and Daschle's Immigration Reform Act of 2004 has
the aim of strengthening border security and increasing the number
of visas available.25
18. Id. (stating "I oppose amnesty, placing undocumented workers on an automatic path to
citizenship. Granting Amnesty encourages the violation of our laws, and perpetuates illegal
immigration."); Press Briefing by Scott McClellan, Jan. 10, 2004, available at http://www.ilw.com/cgi-
shl/pr.pl. (Q. You keep saying this is not an amnesty. Yet clearly you are going to forgive these people,
you're not going to prosecute them. How is that not an amnesty? A[n] amnesty rewards
undocumented workers, or undocumented immigrants with an automatic path to citizenship. The
President's plan would not give the temporary workers any unfair advantage. They would have to go
through the normal existing process.")
19. Bush Remarks, supra note 17.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Hutchinson Testimony, supra note 15. Evaluating Temporary Guest Worker Proposal
Before the Senate Judiciary Comm. 's Subcomm. On Immigration, Border Security and Ctizenship,
(2004) (Testimony of Eduardo Aguirre, Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Dept. of
Homeland Security) available at http://www.ailaorg/contentViewer.aspx?bc=9,576,4682,4688 (last
visited July 6, 2004).
23. Bush Remarks, supra note 17.
24. Agricultural Job Opportunity, Benefits, and Security (AgJobs) Act, S. 1645, 108th Cong.
(2003).
25. The Immigration Reform Act, S.2010, 108th Cong. (2004).
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3. Representative Tom Tancredo even has his own bill. It is called the
BE REAL Act (Border Enforcement and Revolving Employment to
Assist Laborers Act), which also proposes a temporary worker
program and calls for increased border security, including the use of
U.S. armed forces along the border.26
The question we should be asking now is how do we avoid the mistakes of the
last immigration reform that took place back m 19869 The administration should
consider the following proposals
27
I. To ensure full participation by the undocumented population and to
decrease the incidence of fraud, we need to avoid arbitrary cut-off
dates, and other restrictions on eligibility We should certainly keep
out dangerous criminals and people who are a risk to national
security But if we really want all ten million immigrants to come
forward, we should not impose restrictions such as lengthy residency
requirements.
2. We need to recognize that a temporary worker program, in and of
itself, won't be a cure-all. Any immigration reform proposal needs
to incorporate a plan for addressing future needs for legal
immigration. The most important aspects should be a mechanism for
addressing labor shortages in the future and ensuring the family
reunification process is not a lengthy one.
3. Once these reforms are implemented, how do we avoid the
continuation of illegal immigration into the United States? One way,
is to work with our neighbors, Canada and Mexico, to strengthen
entry controls and to combat human smuggling. Another way is to
ensure that there are economic opportunities and continuing
development in the countries that send immigrants to the United
States.
A comprehensive immigration reform bill will be enacted m the near future.
The question is not /fthere will be a new law, but when it will pass. Not before the
November 2004 election; that's almost certain. But soon after, is quite likely But
at what cost? We need to ask ourselves, what are we, as a country, willing to give
up in exchange for immigration reform?
Is it acceptable to militarize our borders as proposed in
Representative Tancredo's BE REAL Act 2"9
Will we reinterpret laws we took for granted-like the 14th
Amendment so that we don't automatically grant citizenship
26. BE REAL Act, H.R. 3534, 108'b Cong. (2003).
27. See, e.g. Evaluating a Temporary Guest Worker Proposal Before the Senate Judiciary
Comm. 's Subcomm. On Immigration, Border Security and Ctizenship (2004)(Testimony of Dr.
Demetnos Papa demetrious, President, Migration Policy Institute) available at
htp://www.aila.org/contentViewer.aspx?bc=9,576,4682,4683 (last visited July 6, 2004).
28. BE REAL Act, supra note 26, at § 102.
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to undocumented or temporary immigrants299
We will be one step closer to a national identification card
for all citizens?
I urge lawmakers and advocates to carefully consider any compromises in an
immigration reform package. There is a danger that the cure may be worse than
the ailment.
29. Oforji v. Ashcrofl, 354 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2003) (J. Posner, concumng) ("[O]ne rule that
Congress should rethink is awarding citizenship to everyone born in the United States including the
children of illegal immigrants).
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